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Preface
Tests are constructed and used to facilitate assessment and understanding of
human beings in all their multifaceted complexity. Hence, testing by its very
nature is both a scientific and a social endeavor.
The interplay between testing and society has resulted in both praise and
criticism from concerned citi zens, psychologists, educators, and numerous other
professional and consumer groups. For over 40 years, Oscar K. Buros, as Director of The Institute of Mental Measurements and Editor of the Mental Measurements Yearbooks. contributed immensely to this interplay between testing practices and societal issues. On March 19, 1978, Oscar Buros died. Luella Buros ,
his wife and lifelong helpmate, completed the work on The Eighth Mental
Measurements Yearbook with the support of the Institute's devoted staff. She
also took steps to relocate the Institute to ensure the continuation of the Institute's
scholarly work and services for test consumers. The new Buros Institute of
Mental Measurements is now at the University of Nebraska- Lincoln and is under
grant from The University of Nebraska Foundation .
An important objective of the new Buros Institute is to conduct an extended
outreach effort that will help communicate more effectively with test users about
contemporary issues in testing . Thus, it was the combination of recent social
issues focusing on testing and our desire to fulfill more vigorously the mission of
the Buros Institute that motivated the development of an annual scholarl y symposium and this series on measurement and testing.
We intend each symp.osium and volume in this series to present state-of-theart knowledge that will contribute to the improvement of test construction and
test usage. Such a schema will incorporate topics across a broad spectrum such
as theoretical models of human behavior, test standardization procedures, soc ial
and legal factors in testing, admin istration of testing programs , and test-based
decision making. Thus, the series will be focused thematically and yet be flexible
enough to integrate current and future measurement and testing issues into its
schema.
The success of our first Buros- Nebraska symposium and this volume is the
result of the efforts of many individuals. We thank Luella Buros for having faith
in us to carryon and extend a tradition that has become so important to the
measurement field and to test users. Barbara Plake , as editor of the first volume
in the series, made conceptual and editorial contributions that were of critical
importance to its success. Finally, we want to thank Larry Erlbaum for his
support , encouragement, and commitment to the project and to its timely
completion.

Series Editors
Stephen N . Elliott
James V. Mitchell, Jr.
Lincoln , Nebraska
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Dedication
At the combined ann ual meeting of the American Educational Research Association and the National Council on Measurement in Education in April of 1980,
Luella Buros, widow of Oscar Buros, was presented with a plaque honoring the
achievements of her husband. The inscription read as follows:

"TRIBUTE"
"Whereas Oscar K. Buros established the series of Mental Measurements
Yearbooks, and continued publishing these brilliantly over the last 40 years of
his life; and
"Whereas these yearbooks have achieved recognition as classic contributions
to the theory and practice of educational and psychological measurement, and of
great benefit to our various professions"Therefore, we the undersigned officers of the American
search Association and the National Council on Measurement
hereby pay public tribute to the memory of Professor Buros,
principles of quality and integrity which he represented in his
life. "

Educational Rein Education do
and to the high
work and in his

It was most fitting that Luella Buros received this tribute on behalf of her
husband, because she had helped him in many ways from the very beginning of
the series, particularly with matters pertaining to business and design . Oscar
Buros had dedicated the Third and Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbooks to
his wife, and when she completed The Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook
after his death, she dedicated it "To the memory of my beloved husband: Oscar
Krisen Buros." The new Buros Institute of Mental Measurements will be dedicating both Tests in Print III and The Ninth Mental Measurements Yearbook to
Oscar Buros. For the first book in this symposium series, however, we decided
to take a different path and dedicate the volume to a remarkable couple who had a
loving, happy, and productive relationship over so many years. We therefore
dedicate this volume to:

Oscar and Luella Buros

Filling the Gaps Between Test
Outcomes and Usage: An
Introduction

Barbara S. Plake
University of Nebraska- Lincoln

Why do we have tests? What useful purposes do they serve? How can test results
be used to make decisions? How can a test be proved to provide accurate and
usable information? Questions such as these have been posed recently by a
concerned public who have become more aware of and concerned about testing,
test quality, and appropriate test usage. Their questions are challengi ng, legitimate queries that can and should be addressed by members of the measurement
community .
Some of the questions being asked by the public are value laden, providing
topics for many thoughtful but heated debates. For example: Would we be better
off as a soc iety if we did not have tests? Should testing be banned? Other
questions are technical in nature and require accurate answers from the measurement community, which communicates to the public the present state of the art in
measurement, assessment, and interpretation . Finally, questions such as "How
can tests be used to eliminate the errors made in the selection process?" can
provide an impetus within the measurement field for both theoretical and empirical development and yet are not ones that can, at least so far , be definitely
answered .
The measurement field should take serious stock of itself and assess, as well
as possible , the boundaries of its capabi lities. From this assessment, it would be
possible to communicate with the public about what testing can do , may be able
to do, and is incapable of ever doing. At the present time , however, there
appears to be an informational and expectational gap concerning what can be
possible with the use of test results . Unless measurement experts and test users
obtain a direct line to the angels, for example , error-free measurement will never
be a reali ty !
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Part of the communication and expectation gap can be assigned to a lack of
measurement sophistication on the part of the public. Measurement course work
and classes are not readily accessible to the public as a whole and may not be
truly meaningful and usable to the public even if they were . A well-meaning but
confused public provides fertile ground for test misunderstanding and misrepresentation by both knowledgeable and unknowledgeable test representatives.
Tests enter into the lives of the public in so many ways; questionnaires, market
surveys, school achievement batteries, classroom exams, and admission screenings are only a few possibilities. Yet the knowledge level of the public is minimal
at best with regard to test information and interpretation.
Another part of the blame for the communication and expectation gap belongs
to the measurement and testing professionals. Careful theoreticians are the first
to caution on too rapid application oftest advances into test usage and decisions.
The state of the art is not as advanced in criterion-referenced testing or latent-trait
modeling as some practitioners would want the public to believe. In addition, we
are only now beginning to come to grips with decision-making models for test
usage. Thus, a clear and purposeful statement (for public consumption) of what
tests can and cannot do needs to be addressed by measurement and testing
professionals. This would be an important first step in narrowing the gap .
Until such a statement is made, societal confusion and concern will abound.
Confusion is fostered by the fact that decisions about test quality, application,
and utility are made regularly by persons who are not trained as psychometricians . Legislative and legal decisions by politicians and judges who mandate and
dictate test usage and disclosure only serve to widen the communication and
expectation gap further.

PURPOSE OF THE VOLUME

The purpose of this volume is to investigate social and technical influences on
test development and usage. As such, the volume can be viewed as making initial
progress toward identifying what testing can and cannot do . This is accomplished
first by establishing what some of the social influences are that impact tests and
second by documenting some current technical aspects of testing. The volume
provides essential preliminary information on how tests can be used and may be
interpreted.
The intent of the volume is to present state-of-the-art content on: (1) characteristics that tests should have to be valid for use in decision making; (2) public
awareness and social- legal issues that influence the credibility of tests that are
used in decision making; (3) applications of tests in the decision-making process;
(4) cognitive psychology's impact on test development and vice versa; (5) quality
issues of test development, packaging, sales, and usage; and (6) technical advances in test validation . These components are found in the five chapters of

1.
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Section I: Social and Technical Influences. Section II: Influences on Aptitude and
Achievement Test Development and Usage is composed of three chapters that
provide an integrated example of how social and technical issues have affected
the development and usage of aptitude and achievement tests .

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

Section I
Section I begins with the keynote presentation, "Struggles and Possibilities: The
Use of Tests in Decision Making" from the first Buros-Nebraska Symposium on
Measurement and Testing, and is authored by Dr. Ellis B. Page. Breaking from
the style found in the other chapters in the volume, Dr. Page's chapter is essentially a transcription of his symposium presentation because it was the keynote
presentation for the symposium and therefore set the stage for the subsequent
chapters within the section.
Dr. Page brings to focus a series of concerns that are relevant to the topic of
uses of tests in a decision-making process. He chooses this forum to emphasize
the social as well as technical issues in using tests for decision making. Dr. Page
reviews factors that often influence perceptions of test quality, such as attacks on
testing by the media , decisions with regard to test usage made by the courts, and
concerns for test fairness and bias. Perception of test quality is identified as a
fundamental factor in the use of tests for decision making. Unless tests are
considered to provide valid, reliable, and reasonable pieces of information, he
surmises, their role in making decisions will be subject to controversy and
question . The chapter proceeds from a discussion of ways of establishing test
quality and the reasons attitudes about the quality of tests may be threatened to a
presentation of theoretical foundations for applying test results in the decisionmaking process . Page's chapter therefore approaches the use of tests in decision
making on two levels: initially, it must be demonstrated that the tests in question
are in fact appropriate for use in a decision; second, a decision-making process
should be employed to determine how the information provided by the test can be
applied rationally to aid in making decisions .
Dr. Robert Sternberg presents an account of contributions of cognitive psychology to test development and usage in the following chapter titled " What
Cognitive Psychology Can (and Cannot) Do for Test Development." He contends that cognitive psychology stands to make substantial contributions to test
development, although most of the contributions will be in the future. Sternberg
discusses four topics: (I) what cognitive psychology is; (2) how cognitive psychologists study intelligence; (3) implications of cognitive psychological research for test validation ; and (4) score interpretation and modification . Testing
is presented in a reciprocal fashion whereby tests are used as assessment tools in
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cognitive psychological research, the results of which can suggest modifications
to test development and usage .
The next chapter presents fundamental and valuable information on the role
and status of test validation research. In this chapter, Dr. Lyle Schoenfe ldt
reviews the hi story of test validation strateg ies, identi fying methods of establishing test content , criterion-related , and construct validity . New advances in criterion-re lated validity , such as multivariate validation approac hes, are presented
and evaluated. In addi tion , validity generali zation and Bayes ian statistical approaches are discussed. The chapter presents recent advances and applications of
test validation theory and research to the fie ld of business (e .g., applicant selection and job satisfaction) . Test validation is presented as an essenti al and legally
necessary step in test usage. Some important and timely ramifications of not
using tests with demonstrated validity are also discussed . Because the use of test
results is only reasonable if the test is valid , this chapter presents the fo undations
upon which test usage relies.
"Social and Legal Influences on Test Development and Usage" is the title of
the following chapter. After Schoenfeldt' s presentation of legal ramifications of
inadequate test validation , Dr. Donald N. Bersoff posits th ree social influences
that he regards as underl ying all legal dec isions pertaining to tests. These social
influences are: (I) attempts to undo past injustices due to discrimination; (2)
recognition of the public of their rights to privacy; and (3) negligence and lack of
care by persons in positio ns to make dec isions. Application of these social
influences are illustrated in the fi elds of education, employment , and forensics .
Bersoff continues his chapter with some examples of how soc ial sc ience research
has and could be used to aid in court decisions on testing. He relates the impact
of social influences and soc ial science research to decisions in the cases of Larry
P v. Riles, PA SE v. Hannon, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , and Merriken v.
Cressman . The chapter concludes with a section on psychologists and public
policy. Bersoff places the ultimate dec ision of test usage in the court 's hands,
recogni zing that the court 's decision will be influenced by the social and legal
climate, which should be influenced further by test quality (validation) and
expert psychometric testimony . He points out the fin al decision , however, is
made by the judges, who are not generally psycho metrically oriented .
Section I is concluded with a chapter fro m the Director of the Bu ros Institute
of Mental Measurements, James V . Mitche ll , Jr. , which is titled , "Testing and
the Oscar Buros Lament: Fro m K nowledge to Implementation to Use." Dr.
Mitchell reviews the progress made in test development , using information accumulated from research and theoretical developments in testing knowledge. He
reports that ev idence of the status of test quality , as fo und in administration or
technical manuals for tests, is often inadequate, and he contends test publishers
are rewarded financiall y for test development by consumers who are, on the
whole, psychometricall y naive . If test sales are used as the guide, it appears that
test users are, as a group , influenced by Madison-Avenue- type adverti sing and
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tests' promises and titles, and they are not functioning as informed consumers.
The responsibility for naive behavior of test consumers is traced to education and
communication failures of professionals in the fields of testing and measurement.
Dr. Mitchell concludes his chapter with specific recommendations that he believes will upgrade the education level of the consumers of tests that in turn will
result in requiring test developers to upgrade the quality of their test documentation and development.
The perceptions of tests, especially as they are influenced by attacks on tests
by persons in the media or courts who are in positions to make recommendations
or decisions without adequate psychometric training, is one central theme that
recurs in the chapters of Section 1. The "call to action," issued by Mitchell, is
reverberated in all the chapters of the first section. Improvement of test construction and test usage, viewed from utilization, theoretical support for and from
cognitive psychology, test validation, legal and social influences, or quality
control, require communication channels to the ultimate users of test results- the
public.

Section II
Section II contains three chapters that originally were presented in the 1982
American Psychological Association's State of the Art Symposium . The symposium was organized by Dr. Carol Dwyer and focused on testing issues. The
first chapter in Section II is authored by Dr. Anne Anastasi and is titled" Aptitude and Achievement Tests: The Curious Case of the Indestructible Strawperson ." Dr. Anastasi initially reviews the traditional distinctions between aptitude
and achievement testing, specifying that aptitude testing has been conceived as
measuring "innate capacity" independent of learning, whereas achievement
testing presumably assesses the effects of learning. The historical antecedents of
this view are traced from Franzen's (1920, 1922) description of AQ (achievement quotient), the components of which were identified as EQ (educational
quotient) and IQ (intelligence quotient). Dr. Anastasi then recounts efforts of
psychometricians to disband the AQ terminology, beginning with Kelley (1927),
noting that investigators repeatedly have reported extensive overlap of information obtained from these two types of tests . Yet despite the attempts by psychometricians to establish simi larity between aptitude and achievement tests, the
distinction reappears continually in presentations and writings of psychologists
and psychometricians. Progress is being made though, as test companies recognize and communicate to the consumers that the distinction between aptitude and
achievement tests is essentially one of breadth versus specificity of test content
and antecedent learning experience. The conclusion of her chapter contains a
more detailed analysis of the continuum of developed abilities, a continuum on
which she places both aptitude and achievement tests. Thus, the major thrust of
Dr. Anastasi's chapter is that psychologists and measurement experts have been
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making steady progress in clarifying what aptitude and achievement tests measure; yet communication of this knowledge to test users, test takers, and the
general public remains a problem.
Current issues in achievement testing is the topic of Dr. Robert Ebel' s chapter , "Achievement Test Items: Current Issues." Dr. Ebel focuses his attention
on the measurement of human characteristics and initially addresses the fundamental topic of the measurability of human characteristics. Within the domain of
measuring human characteristics, Dr. Ebel considers the relative merits of various types of test items, such as: (1) essay and objective items ; (2) realistic
problem-solving items; and (3) alternate-choice items . Ebel concludes his chapter with a discussion of a technology of item writing. The major theme appears to
be that any important human characteristic is necessarily measurable, and test
items that focus on the basic components of knowledge are examples of an itemwriting technology that has promise to yield highly reliable and valid assessments of human characteristics.
The final chapter in Section II , "Abilities and Knowledge in Educational
Achievement Testing: The Assessment of Dynamic Cognitive Structures," is
authored by Dr. Samuel Messick . The chapter begins by examining the question
of what educational achievement tests are or ought to be. Both educational
achievement and cognitive ability are viewed as constructs. The distinction between theoretical definitions and practical reality of assessment instruments is a
major theme . Messick posits that educational achievement is a compound of
developed abilities and knowledge structures. He then contrasts his view of what
educational achievement tests are with that presented by Ebel, Anastasi , and
others. Messick's conclusion is that theory, not empiricism, should guide the
conceptualization and process of test development. He maintains that, to serve
both theory and practice, new approaches to achievement measurement that are
complex, dynamic , and cognitive need to be developed.
Each author in Section II conceptualizes aptitUde and achievement testing
differently. Anastasi elects to present aptitude and achievement testing on a
single continuum, the distinction between them being one of specificity of a task
and antecedents to the task. Ebel, on the other hand, considers aptitUde as a
special case of achievement and vice versa, establishing that intelligence, aptitudes , abilities, and achievements are synonymous. Messick believes the conceptual distinction between aptitude and achievement tests is flawed due to a
reliance on empirical results obtained from using imperfect and variously contaminated tests . Thus, he discards the approach taken by Ebel, Anastasi, and
others . His implication is that new approaches to appropriate measurement of
aptitudes and achievement, which should be dynamic , cognitive, and complex,
will enable a better assessment of what role cognitive abilities play or ought to
play in educational achievement testing.
In summary, the authors in Section II focus on aptitude and achievement
testing and debate social and technical issues pertaining to their application,
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meaning, and usage. Dr. Anastasi points out that , despite attempts by psychometricians to defeat the distinctions popularly held by the public about aptitude
and achievement tests, the "strawperson " remains indestructible and hence is an
excellent example of social influence on test interpretation and usage. Technical
issues that influence test construction and usage are central to Ebel' s and Messick 's chapters, with Ebel postul ating the ex istence of an item-writing technology and Messick imploring test developers to use a theoretical , not empirical ,
basis for test construction .

CONCLUSIONS
The assessment of human abilities and qualities by tests has become an integral
part of decision making in modern society. Nearly everyone has taken or will
take a test that has the potential to influence his or her life significantly . The
public is becoming more aware of and concerned about testing, test quality , and
appropriate test usage. Testing and measurement cannot be treated in isol ation.
They are not immune from criticisms and influences from the very people their
work affects most-society . To survive and thrive, measurement and testing
must continue to develop through both improved technology and interactions
with society.
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SOCIAL AND TECHNICAL
INFLUENCES

Struggles and Possibilities:
The Use of Tests in Decision
Making

Ellis Batten Page
Duke University

What a happy occasion it is to celebrate, as we do in this volume , the establishment of a national Buros Institute of Mental Measurements, located on the
campus of the University of Nebraska, in Lincoln . What a culmination of many
plans, hopes, and dreams! On such an occasion, we can take a quiet pride in our
profession and in the life and accomplishments of one of our colleagues and
friends, Oscar Krisen Buros, who with Luella Buros is leaving to us, and our
posterity , an institution of integrity to foster the science and practice of testing.
How new all this field really is: According to Stanley and Hopkins (1972, p.
163), the first large-scale testing was done in the City of New York Survey, in
1911 . Oscar Buros was 6 years old then , so we can think of most of the
astonishing developments in measurement really happening during his lifetime.
And the first machine for scoring of answer sheets, the old IBM 805, was
developed when Oscar was 30. Many of us can remember, only 20 years ago,
many clerical workers reading the dials from these machines and writing the
scores as they might be estimated from this analog device. Then these tools also
became obsolete as the field was overtaken by optical readers and computer
scoring. So Oscar and Luella Buros have witnessed the explosion of testing into a
central institution of education, of psychology, of all the social and behavioral
sciences. But they have done much more than witness: Their publications have
served as a steady center of this growth, and their independence has established a
tradition of reputation and honor as a goal, if not always as a realization , of the
profession and the practice of testing .
The establishment of such published symposia from the Buros Institute is an
important further step. There is a major place for such a forum. I hope these
symposia will represent a determined effort to stand apart from the testing giants,
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just as Buros did, and to remain independent of federal agencies as well. The
Institute, and these symposia , should continue to sponsor solid , sometimes severe criticism of tests and test practices, also as Buros did. They should similarly
stand apart from the political huckstering and trend riding, the cheap shots
against testing, and apart from the constant distortion of what tests tell us about
ourselves and our world.
Of course, the Institute should make full modern use of wordprocess ing,
automatic mailing, information retrieval, and all the present and future efficiencies of operation becoming available. But hopefully there will remain these
steady principles that marked Buros' work, and a simil ar vision of mental measurement , of how it can help our society to be happier and more productive.
At such a historic time, it is a pleasure to remember the classic words of E. L.
Thorndike (1918 , p. 16) , which serve as a kind of cornerstone for our whole
professional and scientific deve lopment:
Whatever ex ists at all ex ists in some amount. To know it thoroughly involves
knowing its qu antity as we ll as its quality. Education is concerned with chan ges in
human beings; a change is a difference between two conditions; eac h of these
conditions is known to us only by the products produced by it- things made, words
spoken, acts performed, and the like. To measure any of these products means to
define its amount in some way so that competent persons will know how large it is,
better than they would without measurement. To measure a product well means so
to define its amount that competent persons will know how large it is with so me
precision , and this knowledge will be conveniently recorded and used.

If we have, for our profess ion, an Apostle's Creed, surely Thorndike has here
given it to us. And the last phrase echoes for us: "so that this knowledge will be
conveniently recorded and used." And used. Aye, there's the rub and the thrust
of the testing movement. It is the use of testing that has caused its growth from
academic curiosity to a billion-dollar industry and that makes it a battle ground
today for conflictiong ideologies and the warring of powerful political alliances.
In my opinion, technical people in testing cannot go on sidestepping these major
battl es. Sooner or later, we should recognize publicly what it is that we believe;
we should state our beliefs openly for both colleagues and society; and we should
counterattack the falsehoods about testing.
Who are these enemies? For one example, let us mention the recent storm of
anti testing sentiment surrounding the publication of Gould's (19 8 1) book , The
Mismeasure of Man. This book follows in the tradition of Leon Kamin's (1973)
The Science and Politics of I. Q., the writing of the consumerists Nader and Nairn
and of Lewontin , Layzer, and others. Once again, the major media have rushed
to approve the new book by Gould and to endorse its claims. A recent New
Yorker has an extended piece by one of their science popularizers, in which most
test experts are implicitly denigrated and the founders of our disc ipline are
derided and smeared . There are many echoes of these sentiments.
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The major medi a of the Northeastern Seaboard are, of course, considerably
more antitesting than is the American mainstream. What of the more conservative press? Although it is part of the conservative tradition to recognize and to
accommodate large indi vidu al di ffe rences , the better-known conservative writers
seem daunted by the name-calling and by the technical difficulty of the arg uments. Both sides are handicapped by the recondite nature of many of the core
proofs of testing. As Garrett Hardin recently commented during a visit at Duke,
most opin ion leaders and shapers who control our media, of whatever leaning,
are highly literate but are " innumerate." Left or ri ght, journalists fail to gras p
our technicalities . They believe that our hard-won principles (the best body of
theory in the social sc iences) are purely a matter of opinion!
Then what about the " numerate" scienti sts concerned with tests? Those who
do speak out often suffer for it and are frustrated again and again by the major
media. Consider, the experiences of one of our most productive and di stinguished
defenders of psychometri cs, Arthur R . Jensen of Berkeley. Those who know him
well can recount some of hi s harassment and defamation , which , by the way, is
still going on. And Richard Herrnstein (1982) of Harvard has written a critique,
much of it fro m his own unhappy treatment , about his efforts to be expressed
properl y in the major media. His forum is the Atlantic Monthly, an intellectual
magazine that is highly respected and of general readership but that commands
none of the publicity clout of CBS or of the Ne w Yo rk Times and their multimillion audiences . Some of Herrnstein ' s ( 1982) accusation is worth reproducing
here:
Incurabl y addi cted to qu antificati on, I have now searched the daily and the Sunday
New York Tim es from 1975 to Nove mber 198 1 for all book reviews dea ling with the
IQ. T he res ults speak for themselves. Of the 15 reviews that I fo und, everyone'
deni grated IQ tests, often vitriolicall y. All but two of the books reviewed were ant itesting, as far as one can te ll fro m the reviews, and were praised for their position .
One exception was a boo k by Arthur Jensen lI 980] , which happened also to be the
onl y book by a trained psyc hometrician (psychometri cs is the psychological specialty concerned with testing). Jensen 's book was panned by a philosopher with no
detectable ex pertise in the subj ect.
Except for Jensen's book, none of the other major works on testing written by
pro fess ionals during the period was reviewed. Most remarkabl y, however, the
Times published no rev iew by a trained profess ional. Dozens of literate psyc hometri cians mi ght have commented on the shallowness of the books the Times
usuall y chooses to re~"iew . But psychometrics is forbidden territory in the Timesits books are mos tly unreviewed , its discoveries are unreported, and its experts are ,
from what gets published , unconsulted. Rarely, if ever, in more th an a decade , has
a spec ialist published a review of a book on testing in the Times, [or in] other
national publicati ons that occasionall y co mment on testing. For no other subj ect of
public concern- not for economi c policy, disarmament, we lfare reform, nuclear
power plants- has the professional outl oo k on a controversy been so shut off fro m
a voice in the nati onal press. Yet , while public policy on testing may not have the
immedi acy of a tax cut or a nuclear accident , it ul timate ly affects everyone lp . 69] .
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A DOUBLE STANDARD
Herrnstein's (1982) article is a good one, revealing for all concerned with testing
and education. Its principal burden is the double standard of treatment of two
cases of apparent malfeasance by testing researchers: One of these cases is
known widely even to college students; the other is a nonevent, conveniently
buried from public awareness . The first, so widely known, concerns the probable
falsification of certain twin data by the late, brilliant Sir Cyri l Burt. Herrnstein
counted at least six stories about this apparent misconduct in the New York Times
alone. However, as repeatedly noted by scholars of behavior genetics, nothing in
Burt's estimates was very deviant from what has been found by other researchers
since his reports. Burt's data are, in short, now redundant, and if he did fabricate
some of his numbers, he "apparently knew enough to guess correctly" (Herrnstein, 1982, p. 70). But the attacks on him persist, endlessly, and are made
central to denigrating not only behavior genetics but our entire field of mental
measurement.
The other story will probably be new to many readers and will surely be new
to most nonspecialists. In J ul y 1981, Dr. Rick Heber, Director of the Waisman
Center of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and chief adviser to a U.S.
president on mental retardation, was convicted in federal court of diverting funds
to personal use and was sentenced to 3 years in prison. Heber, it will be remembered, was principal investigator of the much publicized miracle of the environmentalist movement, the "Milwaukee Project." He had proved, he wrote, that it
was possible to take 20 children of retarded parents and depressed homes and to
raise their true IQs an average of over 30 points, from dull normal to superior in
intelligence, by a massive preschool intervention.
What of his results themselves and their claim to scientific seriousness? Eight
years before that trial , an article was published for fellow researchers (Page,
1972b), arguing that the Milwaukee Project was, for a number of technical
reasons, not scientifically credible. And just before Heber's indictment, another
article (Page & Grandon, 1981) carried an intensive criticism of the Project. In
brief, we found that the Project, which had never been truly refereed , was
extremely shaky, and the 'explanations of it shifted in ways quite unacceptable in
scientific reporting . What evidence was avai lable on follow-up data, moreover ,
suggested that there was no residual difference between the treatment and control
groups on measures , such as school reading tests, which were outside the reach
of Project management. The 30 points gain, if it ever existed, had apparently
disappeared.
The point here, however, is not to resurrect the Milwaukee Miracle to slay it
again but to draw attention to the way that psychometric questions are treated in
the media. The earlier "findings" of the Milwaukee Project had been widely
noted in the national media. The Washington Post believed that it might have
"settled once and for all" (sic) the question of heredity versus environment for
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the intelligence of slum children. The New York Times had reported that the
Project "has proved" that IQs could be raised more than 30 points by the
methods of Heber and his associates (these quotes cited by Herrnstein , 1982).
Wouldn't one suppose, therefore, that the disgrace of the Project leadership
deserved some attention? After all, the Milwaukee work had been unique and
widely acclaimed in its demonstration of such large environmental effects. And
this demonstration had depended on faith in its leadership. Wouldn't the astonishing misconduct of the leadership , then , cast some shadow across such
findings, which no one else had obtained?
Not at all. Not a word about the Heber scandal has appeared in the Times, the
newsweeklies , Science magazine, or on national TV. To quote Herrnstein (1982)
again,
The media seem unwilling to publish anything that might challenge the certitude
with whi ch editors, politicians, judges, and others insist that we know how to
increase meas urable intelligence, or that test data "prove," to use The New York
Times's word , that a poor environment causes fa milial retardation [p o 7 10) .

What is the cause of this remarkable double standard? Clearly , it is the ideology
of the major media, warmly supportive even of falsehoods favora ble to environmentali sm, generally condemnatory of individual differences and hence of psychometrics, our field , which persistently and embarrassingly reiterates important
and substantial differences in humankind .
Yes, we have our critics, and they have an extraordinary double standard; and
they are in very strong positions, affecting the beliefs of everyone: of editors,
educators, judges, legislators, federal officers, and the other countless millions
who read the national press or listen to the national TV. If we believe in our
di scipline and its contributions to society , then we had better stand up for ourselves and our field. What, then, do we believe?

THE VALUE OF TESTING
Scientific Value. In our own quiet way, and in .our own private literature,
there is a strong consensus among us concerning the pers isting values of our
science and our profession. In an excellent summary of this question , the scientific basis of testing was powerfully defended by Carroll and Horn (1981) . They
showed our growth to be following the earlier development of physics, in our
gathering understanding of intelligence and our strengthening theory.
Poor Alternatives to Testing . Many of our negative reactions to our critics
and would-be reformers are similarly shared among ourselves . That the interference of the courts is often ignorant , confused, and damaging is noted by even
the mildest of sc ientific commenters (Bersoff, 1981) . And the reforms forced on
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testing by outside criticism have, we are largely agreed , been frequently " nonsolutions" (Reschly , 1981). Such " unproductive changes" include the banning
of intelligence tests (such as in California) and the use of " pluralistic norms"
(such as SOMPA; cf. Mercer, 1977) . Often aggressive counterattacks to our
critics are slipped quietly into our thoughtful articles written for each other. Such
a counterattack is well illustrated by the comment of two of our respected
colleagues (Carroll & Horn , 198 1): " Indeed , it seems clear to the present authors
that far from being abused by overuse, the science of human abilities is underexploited in diagnosis, counseling, and evaluation [p o 10 19] ."

Fairness to Minorities. For a very important topic, the claim of racial unfairness , the view of experts was well summarized by Cole (1 98 1) , when she
wrote - that " we have learned that there is not large-scale, consistent bias against
minority groups in the technical validity sense in the major, widely used and
widely studied tests [p o 1075]." This position has been strongly supported by a
blue-ribbon panel on testing of the National Academy of Sciences . And a simil ar
conclusion is widely understood for the question of bi as in college admissions
(Linn , 1982). Indeed , much of the claimed evidence against test validity , for
example in employment , has apparently been misunderstood and improperl y
summarized (especially see Schmidt & Hunter , 198 1).

IDEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES
Through many arguments about test practice, however, run deeper currents of
contemporary ideology, philosophical , political, and economic . Those who
claim an exclu sively societal or economic determini sm are especially resentful of
testing and psychometric research, and what these disciplines show us about the
sources of human abilities and personality. In a candid account of the contemporary scene, then, we must not avoid the issue of what science and scientists say
about fa mily influences on these traits, both genetic and environmental.

Heritability of Intelligence
Surely we can now say that there is a scientific consensus for the heritability of
intelligence, and we can reject the name-calling of those who would say that
hereditary influence is a delusion or a hoax. If there is any scholar who honestly
questions it , and sincerely seeks evidence, there is a direct solution: Such a
person should read--or even just browse- in Fuller and Thompson 's (1 978)
weighty volume, Foundations of Behavior Genetics . Absorb the stately march
there from fundamental genetic principles to physiology, to neurobiology, to
quantitative methods, to the genetics of cognitive and intellectual abilities, to
personality and temperament , to mental illness. Loiter, for a while, in the 40
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pages of bibliography with their 1500 references. And for those with quantitative
curiosity , there are excellent works available (Falconer , 1960; Thompson &
Thoday, (979) .
Or, if a scholar seeks further knowledge of the genetic evidence specific to
mental measurements, give such a scholar Jensen's (1980) monumental book
Bias in Mental Testing . Someday this may be more widely recognized as one of
the best works ever written on testing , for the serious student of psychometrics .
(For other informed appraisals of such evidences, see Bereiter, 1970; Cancro ,
1971 ; Hebert , 1977. And for a nontechnical treatment of the issues, see Jensen,
198 1.) But then, how should we convince the lay world outside of the large
consensus on this matter of heritability? In 1972 , more than 50 scholars from
fields bearing on this question published a " Resolution on Scienti fic Freedom
and Heredity ," signing the emphatic statement that " we believe such influences
are very strong. " (Page, 1972c). Of the 50 signers, 60% were in Who' s Who in
America, and four were Nobel laureates. And their statement was publi shed in
the most prominent professional journal in psychology. But that testament , too ,
became a nonevent fo r the major media to ignore . The national press took no
notice of this, nor did C BS when its special, " The IQ Myth ," led by Dan
Rather, managed , thro ugh dist0l1ion and omission, to make test scores seem a
pure artifact of favored environments. One of the most common responses of
in formed psychologists and measurement experts is to avoid these questions or ,
if pressed , to state that these questions are not important for our major concern :
the use of tests in decision making. On the contrary, I hope to persuade that such
evas ions, of such overpoweringly central questions, must lead to waste, futility ,
and di shonor in our testing fi eld . Indeed , to some extent this has already
happened .
Nonetheless , it is curious how blind the media are to this consensus among
scientists about the heritability of intelligence . Even Gould 's (198 1) book , with
its strong ideological loading, does not exactly dispute the exi stence of heritability , though taking exception to nearl y every estimate of it. The device used
by Gould , and by others before him , is to challenge the precision of such an
estimate, as if some softness of numbers invalidated the whole pursuit. If a test
score is not precise, they seem to affirm , it is useless. If a heritability estimate is
not certain , then it is meaningless. One can only imagine the stultifying influence
such perfectionism would have had on the growth of any of our sc iences? But the
clear fac t, revealed even in the most polemical criti cism to the careful reader, is
that there is consensus about the large heritability of general intelligence .

Heritability of Specia l Abilities
Even among able psychometricians, however, there is much uncertainty about
the heritability of specific abilities or ac hievement measures . To explore this
question, a friend and I (Page & J arjoura, 1979) obtained an unprecedented data
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set from one of the two major college testing programs, the respected American
College Testing Program (ACT). Our results are briefly outlined here, as bearing
on this important and neglected problem affecting many of the tests the schools
have so widely adopted. If these measures, too, are loaded with heritability, we
should take this fact carefully into consideration.
As is well known , the ACT has four achievement tests , in the four fields of
English, Math, Social Studies, and Natural Sciences. From two different years of
testing, 1976 and 1978, ACT gathered for us 6800 pairs of twins from the nearly
2 million students who used this excellent program to apply to colleges in those
years . These twins were identified from the concordance of surname, birth date ,
and place of residence (or home phone) . Even without knowing which pairs are
fraternal or identical, it is possible to do some genetic analysis of such a wonderfully large data base, as long as we are willing to make certain assumptions about
same-sexed and opposite-sexed pairs (Scarr-Salapatek, 1971). Here there is little
space for technical detail, but let us consider certain findings, displayed in Table
2.1.
Table 2.1 shows results from a factor analysis of the genetic components
estimated from our methods (Page & Jarjoura, 1979 , p. 11 5). First, we observe
the sizable loadings of the four tests on the principal genetic factor. The
heritability estimates of these four tests were all high , by the way , ranging
from .64 to .84 . That is , each of the four ACT achievement measures showed a
substantial heritability in itself. The further question we raised, however, was the
extent to which the measures were genetically unique and the extent to which
they shared their genetic loadings with the others.
In Table 2.1, Part A shows these loadings of the four measures on the first ,
unrotated principal factor from the genetic correlations we generated . In Part B
of the table, we observe the amount of each of the genetic correlations , which is
explained by the principal component. And in Part C we see that there is also a
genetic loading specific to each of the four tests (these loadings are in the major
diagonal). What is thought provoking, and not often recognized among psychometricians, is that so much of the intercorrelation among such ability and
achievement measures should have a unitary factor as its biological source. And
it appears that G (genetic loading) and g (the always observed correlation among
diverse mental measures) do indeed have much to do with each other. (See also
kinship studies in Behrman, Hrubec , Taubman, & Wales, 1980; Loehlin,
Lindzey, & Spuhler, 1975; Loehlin & Nichols , 1976; Martin, 1975.)
From this example, we can score some points against frequent criticisms . One
of the repeated claims is that Burt's apparent defection destroyed the basis for
any belief in heritability. But obviously, Burt's few disputed twin pairs played no
role in this large analysis (nor in numerous other analyses in the United States or
abroad) . Another strawman from our critics is that we regard intelligence as a
"single thing." This claim is clearly false. Here one sees that, even genetically ,
there are other influences distinct to each trait. Even so, however, here as in all
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TABLE 2.1
Principal Factor Analysi s of th e Gen etic Compon ents of Twin Data"
Trait

English

Engli sh
Math
Soc. St.
Nat. Sc i.

M ath

Soc. St.

Na t. Sci.

(A) Loadings on principal genet ic factor
.7 1
.65
.83
(B) Component "expl ained " by principa l factor
.~
.%
.~
.43
.54
.69

.84

.59
.55
.70
.7 1

(C) Residual component
Engli sh
Math
Soc. St.
Nat. Sc i.

.02

. 14

.2 1

- .02
.00

.00
- .02

. 15

.01
.01

"From Page & Jarjoura, 1979, p. 11 5.
"Of the total geneti c matri x, 8 1.5% of the variance was expl ained by the single factor.

matrices of mental measures we see the ubiquitous positive component underl ying the whole matrix , which in this analysis is genetic. "S ingle thing" it is not;
indeed , by all estimates, it is based on many gene loci. And psycholog ically
there are surely various subabilities that contribute to it. Still , whatever its
nature, g does appear , to a greater or lesser extent , in virtually all mental tests.
Still another charge hurled at testers, but denied by our analysis, is that we
believe that "genetics is all ." Our Table 2. 1 clearly rejects any such conclusion ,
as does the research of everyone else known to us. Indeed , it is the power of
behavior genetics that it can best expose those influences that are, indeed , environmental. For example, we may consider the simple declaration that variance
of a test is the sum of the genetic variance, the enviro nmental vari ance, and error:
Var(test) = Var(G)

+

Var(E)

+

error.

(I)

Then it is possible to regard a test score in the way suggested by Fig . 2. 1.
For students of testing, thi s figure seems a most fa miliar one. From any test,
we might in fe r that the shaded curve represents the vari ance expectable from
error around some true score X'. But let us alter the meaning: Let X' now
represent the genotype, and the shaded figure represent the vari ation expected in
the phenotype, through the operation of a combination of environment and errors
of measurement. What such a perspective makes us realize is that, in each one of
our mental test scores, we are indeed looking at a genotype, plus other influences. That is, we may consider the indi vidual score to consist of genotype
" true" score, the envi ro nmental variations around such a genotype, and of
course a res idual error variance . Indeed , given the enormous amount of research
on these matters, we may assert that, for the individual student , most of the
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FIG . 2. 1 . Fam ili ar figure in measurement , applied to either re li ability o r
heritab ility. X may re present the " true score of a test" and the shaded curve
represent measurement error. O r it may re present the genotype of a tes t for an
indi vidual and the shaded po rtion may represent the co mbination of environmental
influences and meas urement error.

di stance from the mean is difference in genotype , and thi s is true, whether or not
it conforms with the sentiments of CBS or of the New York Times. But this
assertion in no way denies our pursuit of these env ironmental causes of test
performance. Rather , it clarifi es our goal and gives us some methods for identifying the environmental variance without the usual distortion and confounding
with an unconsidered background genetic variation.
The formula in Equation (I) is of course very general. A more detailed
formu la would be the following:
Var(IQ) = Var(E)

+ Var(G) + Cov(G, E) + Var(G

X

E)

+ error ,
(2)

where the two new terms represent the covariance and interaction of the genetic
and environmental influences . These are surely plausible enough additions to
such studies. It is logical that , given the sorting out of soc ial classes, in part
caused by differences in ability of the parents, there cou ld be a correlation of
genes and environment. And it is also logical that , to some extent , what favors
one genotype might not favor another to the same degree.
But such components are difficult to di stinguish in twin data and , therefore,
are usually neglected in studies of heritability because of mathematical confoundin g. Yet critics have sometimes used thi s confounding to disparage any
attempts at heritability analysis. One of the critics is an astronomer, who contemptuou sly referred to the usual methods of human genetics as " numerology ,"
but then himself committed two astonishing logical errors in his mathematical
proof (Layzer, 1974). Each of his objections to heritability leads to reductio ad
absurdum . His policy argument is that all heritability analysis should be curtailed
and that we as a society should emphasize only environmental efforts. Hi s prime
example of such remed iation was the Milwaukee Project (this was, of course,
before those investigations were closed and the leaders sent to Federal prison) .
There were the following two dilemmas : First, GE covariance either ex ists or it
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does not. If it does not ex ist, then heritability analysis may proceed without it. If
it does ex ist, then Layzer is already granting the argument of Herrnstein (1973)
and of others that the upper soc ial cl asses are already partially sorted for genetic
ability in intelligence. Either way , Layzer's practical conclusions are spoiled.
Hi s argument about G x E interaction suffers the same fate. If such interaction
does not ex ist, then heritability studies may proceed without it. If it does exi st,
then , by the very definition of interaction , any marginal improvement in social
environment will be, to the extent of that interaction , as unfavorable as it is
fa vorable. (For a more complete treatment of thi s question , see Page, 1975; and
for general treatment of interaction effects in the context of intelligence, see
Eaves, Last, Maltin , & Jinks, 1977 .)
Again , why are such matters worth speaking about , in a volume devoted to
tests and decision making? Is it not enough that most able testers acknowledge
the truth of heritability and of innate individual differences? Isn ' t thi s fac t,
indeed , something of an embarrassment to testing? Shouldn ' t we continue, by
our pass ive, noncommittal reaction to these controversies, to paper it over? Isn' t
it , in fact, almost bad manners to raise the question ? So it has often been treated ,
and there is usually , as Herrnstein (1 973 ) points out , a personal and professional
cost in res isting the tide of opinion as shaped by the major medi a.
But these questions are important exactly because our fa ilure to resist such
untruths is damaging the reputation of testing and seriously undermining its
utility in making decisions. The truth or falsity of our assumptions is crucial to
making long-range decisions, by the very nature of scientific dec ision making.
To support this assertion , we turn to the nature of decision making and to the
kinds of information requi red to make an intelligent choice.

DECISION MAKING
We should recognize that a sc ience of dec ision making has become itself a vast
and we ll -deve loped field of applied mathematics and stati stics with many
branches: linear programming, dynamic programming, transportation algorithms, queue ing theory, and many other techniques with large implications
fo r behavior science . For a survey of the general fi eld , the reader may see many
general texts in operation s research (Churchman, Ackoff, & Arnoff, 1957 ; Hillier & Lieberman , 1974; Trueman , 1974; Wagner, 1969) and increasingly in
statistics (Hamburg, 1970; Winkler & Hays, 1975). Some of these methods have
been studied for psychology or education (Anderson, 1970; Banghart, 1969;
Johnstone, 1974; Kaufman , 1972; Levin , 1975; McNamara, 197 1; Novick &
Jackson , 1974; Page, 1976 , 1978; Page & Canfield , 1975; Page, Jarjoura, &
Konopka, 1976 ; Tillett , 1975; VanDu sseldorp , Rich ardson, & Foley, 1971) . A
few have brought such methods to bear directly on the use of tests (Cronbach &
GIeser, 1965; Edwards, Guttentag, & Snapper, 1975; Page, 1980) . In general,
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however, there has been little recognition of its importance to educational psychology and its kindred disciplines, and few investigators have applied it to our
most serious problems of educational choice.

Decision Analysis. For easy understanding, the science of decision making
is often expressed in the notation of decision analysis. and the notation is that of
an upside-down tree, as shown in Fig. 2.2. The best-known writer in this field is
undoubtedly Howard Raiffa (1968), whose approach can be appreciated without
extensive mathematics, and can be applied directly in practical situations.
In Fig. 2.2, let us suppose that there is a career choice at stake, such as
whether to pursue a premedical career or some other. In this drastically simplified representation, as in many more complex ones, there are just four aspects
of choice:
I. Decisions to be made (in squares).
2. Probabilities to be estimated (in circles).
3. Values of the outcomes (numbers at dots).
4. Costs of the choices (small tollgates) .

Let us assume that the values of the outcomes are estimated in the same units as
the costs at the tollgate. Then such a tree may be automatically solved by
applying recursively two rules, beginning at the bottom of the tree and working
up:

1. Probability nodes are averaged. by mUltiplying each value by its associated probability, summing across the branches, and carrying the weighted mean
up to the node.
2. Decision nodes are maximized. by selecting that branch that carries the
highest net value. (Costs are subtracted from the value of the relevant branch.)
Tests for Individual Decisions. Decision analysis, then, like most methods
used in operations research, suggests our optimal choice, under the assumption
of the correctness of our data.
But where do we obtain the number themselves? They are based on some sort
of data, either objective or subjective. And the role of tests in forecasting should
be closely tied to the probabilities shown. The probabilities of various outcomes,
once a decision is taken, must depend on all appropriate information about these
outcomes: the experiences of others and the chooser's own abilities, past
achievements, economic needs, and the like . For example, suppose that the
choice of Plan B is for premedical training, where the payoff ($100 ,000 a year?)
is high but where the general probability of success is only 1 in 5. In the
individual case, this probability should be adjusted to the person concerned.
Once again, test scores should play an important role in such adjustment , consid-
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max(60.701 = 70

75 - 5 = 70

Cost of branch :::: - 5

.50(801+ .30(501+ .20( 1 001

80

50

100

= 7+ 15= 22

10

FIG. 2.2 . A decision tree. A decision is reached by tracing out the branches as
far as possible , assigning values to each terminal node, and probabilities to each
branch from a P node. P nodes are then solved (working from the bottom up), by
averaging out the branches. And D nodes are solved by fo lding back all but the
most valuable branch as evaluated below each D. For vocations, the probability
values are determined by knowledge of both the world and self, as are also the
terminal values. Techn ical procedures can be appl ied to aid all such determinations. (Source: Page, 1974b, p. 71. Reprinted with permission .)

ered together with the background information about others who have gone
before.
Consider, then, what great damage is done to decision making, if tests are
discredited and not used or if they are eliminated from the tools of decision
makers by court order or administrative uncertainty . It is not only the testers who
have much at stake in such mistaken elimination of tests; the biggest losers are
the students and those who would guide and select them.
From even such a simple model, an immediate realization is that such decision trees become complex, requiring computer assistance in their solution-just
as life decisions are indeed complex, yet made quite haphazardly today, without
mathematical help. We sti ll await truly competent, computerized advisory systems for such choices, though we have been aware of the need for some years
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(Page, 1974b), and some working research models were established in the past
(Katz, 1966).

Tests for Program Decisions. Let us look at Fig. 2.2 from another viewpoint, as though we were administrators and the decision were between two
programs, here labeled A and B. Suppose Program B seems to produce higher
average values, where these are measured in terms of test scores, but our data are
from a national study, where there is confounding of tests with school practices
and with the SES variables of the communities. What we face , again, is that
decision sciences must depend not on naive correlational data but on production
functions of the treatment variables. If this seems an obvious point, then it has
been seriously neglected in the social planning of the past several decades, and
its neglect has led us to one disillusionment after another in the world of educational research and development (cf. Page, 1972a).
Scores as Production Functions. In our desire to use tests in planning, we
are often blocked when we must choose among educational programs. Choosing
a criterion test then becomes troubled. Suppose one program relies more on a
textbook and the other more on films. Then it will be very difficult to construct a
test that will not be biased toward one outcome or the other. Quite understandably, in such a situation, we often wisely choose tests that are not so close to the
programs. We may, rather, choose a selection of standardized tests of global
ability or achievement: in English, for example , or in math , social studies , or
natural sciences . But wait, these are the very tests we found to be heavi ly loaded
on the same g factor (general abi lity). Even more disturbingly, they are loaded on
the same G factor (general genetic ability). And when we employ pre- post
testing with such measures, the change scores have well-known problems. Are
we really expected to detect the effects of programs through such measures of
general (and even genetic) ability?
Yes, in general we must, for there seem to be few defensible alternatives. We
have mentioned the experimental bias of tests designed explicitly for the comparisons, and these (even where avai lable) have many problems beyond such
built-in program biases. Tests that are called "criterion referenced" frequently
exhibit these problems . We have long seen much literature for and against such
criterion referencing, and some excellent consideration and debate have occurred
(for example, by Julian Stan ley, Robert Ebel, Roger Lennon, and Frank
Womer) . For an extended period Dr. Womer directed the massive National
Assessment of Educational Progress, which was dedicated, at least originally , to
the criterion-referencing philosophy (also see Page, 1982 , on this philosophy).
For research questions about programs, such issues have a special bite.
Special Versus General Tests of Achievement. Let us briefly summarize our
dilemma: On one hand, it is fairly easy to write tests that measure some very
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limited body of knowledge (e.g. , the new vocabulary taught in a spec ific lesson) .
Here indeed we can show marked change from before an instruction to after. On
the other hand , a small handful of words will have practically no visible effect on
one's ability to read general matter- and this is the goal we really cherish for
major decisions. If we test only the explicit program content , we may be ac ting
out something like the " drunkard' s search ," which the philosopher Abraham
Kaplan used to tell us about at UC LA . The drunkard was feeling around under a
lamppost and was asked what he was looking for . " I dropped my key ." Where
did you drop it? " Over there. " But if you dropped it over there, why are you
looking for it over here, under the lamppost? " This is where the light is."
We can , after all , develop a test for the lesson just past , which may show us
how we improved . That is where the light is. But the most important outcomes of
education often seem like the lost key, beyond our reach , over there in the dark.
Is there a way out of this problem? Yes, if we have sufficient numbers and
sufficient random ass ignment and acc urate enough predictive control variables,
then our standard errors of the means will be small enough to permit comparisons
that are meaningful for such standard testing programs. Such conditions, however , hold in probably less than I % of the evaluation situations that face the
psychometric researcher .

Showing Environmental Effect. T he problem is not hopeless . If we have,
indeed , important variables, sufficient cases, and solid mode ls, we may be able
to show these important environmental influences in a helpful light. Let us
consider two findings from recent research on the applied issue o f private and
public schooling.
Our first case illustrates the danger o f fa iling to provide for large individual
differences (in g or in G) . Coleman , Hoffer , and Kilgore (1981) had cl aimed
very prominently that , even after' ' controlling" for effects of family, they found
a striking superiority of the private schools in the United States in the educational
achievement of the huge sample from High School and Beyond . In a reanalysis
of the data, however , this time including six brief subtests of mental ability
(mostly nonverbal and relatively school-free) , we found that any residual effect
of private school was less than 0 .5% of the variance in student achievement
(Page, 198 1; Page & Keith , 198 1) . Thus a claimed environmental effec t largely
disappeared when student input was weighed into the test. This is, of course , a
common enough result when such variables are included- which has apparently
led some to wish to avoid measuring intelligence in such research.
The second findings, from the same debate, had a more optimi stic o utcome ,
as shown in Fig . 2 .3 . In Fig. 2 .3, we observe some major student vari ables, such
as famil y background , race , and general ability , which are understandably loaded with parental influences , both genetic and environmental, and largely beyond
the control of the school system. But here we al so introduced the amount of
homework the student did , as a causal variable for the general achievement of
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FIG . 2.3. Explaining student ach ievemen t of students in private and public hi gh
schoo ls. After allowing for background variables, homework still explain s 3% of
test ach ievement. (Source: Page & Keith , 1981. Reprinted with permission.)

reading and math. Clearly, from the paths shown , our major background variables were fundamental in explaining test achievement; and the special control of
"general ability" (a factor score made from two short vocabulary tests and four
nonverbal tests) was the most influential of all. Yet the homework does shine
through, explaining 3% of the variance in achievement even after controlling for
background variables. The eternal verities of educational psychology sti ll stand:
After ability , time spent on task does make the most difference, and our standard
tests, even loaded as they are with heritability, can show that such time matters.
Indeed, in this case of school comparison, homework also helps explain about
half of the tiny effect of private schools.
Tim Keith and I believe that homework, then , is a major variable that all
schools should emphasize, one that could truly improve performance. Keith's
(1982) separate article shows this homework effect even more clearly for student
grades: There is, in fact , a possible compensation for low ability shown in this
study of grades, with the low-ability hard worker actually catching up with the
high-ability nonworker in such school performance. Keith's remarkable graph is
shown in Fig . 2.4.
But another problem of practical decision making is illustrated in this homework question. I have talked about these results with various groups of policy
people: school boards , legislators, practicing administrators, equal opportunity
officials, teachers, and even governors active in education. The idea of increasing homework seems to have no lobbies ! To the contrary, there is often an
embarrassed si lence (and the facts are indeed embarrassing, with the average
senior doing less than 4 hours of homework each week, in all classes combined).
Some educators have even denigrated the homework question altogether, speaking of "meaningless drill" and the like. Clearly, far more than our psychometric
research enters into educational policy! But this case does illustrate how test
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information may improve our knowledge of bas ic issues, and our understanding,
if not always our application, of practical issues .

Heritability and Program Research. Our general neglect of heritability has
led to research handicaps that may unfortunately hinder our understanding of
some policy issues . In order to guide curricular change, we should know which
variables are relatively more influenced by fami ly variables and which more
influenced by schools. But our usual research strategies, with no kinship controls, do not often permit thi s distinction. Given large samples of twins and
siblings, however, and item information across achievement tests, we could do
heritability analysis on each item. Or, if zygosity were not known for the twin
pairs, we could analyze which items were more influenced by home or school ,
and various analyses of these results could in turn illuminate areas for greater
curricular attention in those school s showing such deficits.
Still another application of such techniques could be in matters of national
assessment, where we seek to track the national performance of student generations and to study the changes from one generation to another. For example,
there remain large questions about the causes of the decline of standardized test
scores over the past 15 years or so. One real possibility-that declines were
caused by shifting ability levels of parents- was never really explored . Yet item
analysis of the SAT scores, using the huge available samples of twins, might cast
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some light on the question, through the following reasoning : Reused items may
be measured at two points in time and their gain or loss reported. The twin
correlations of such reused items may be also discovered. Then if the more
family-influenced items are those in which there is greatest decline, the inference
would be that the decline was more likely caused within the home than within the
school; and the conclusions wou ld be quite different from those in the contrary
case. Conceivably, this exploration would not be very productive (we would
soon find out), but it would open a major line of investigation. And it was a
thesis that would be very easy and inexpensive to explore. A major cluster of
hypotheses remained unstudied . Once again, our psychometric understandings
are frustrated by our current political and ideological commitments. And we have
failed to make adequate use of the psychometric information available to us in
our search for improved social strategies.

Decision Making and Ratio Scales. One apparent problem of test scores for
decision making is the following: Most scientific strategies for optimizing decisions require that benefits be measured on some absolute scale of values. In
many decision techniques (such as certain kinds of dynamic programming), one
develops a ratio of costs and benefits for each alternative choice , a ratio that
makes no sense unless both costs and benefits have some recognized zero points.
Even in simple decision trees like that in Fig. 2.2, where costs are used there
must be some way of equating costs and benefits; they must be translated to the
same scale. But in mental measurement, we take most of our test scores to be
interval scaled, not ratio scaled. How may this difficulty be overcome, so that the
most important outcomes of education may be appropriately studied?
This question has been considered elsewhere, but some general answers may
be suggested here. Any time we consider change in scores then we have , indeed,
a ratio scale, for no change will be zero; two points will be twice the value of one
point, etc. Now, as we know, change scores have their own problems, because
the error variances are additive, whereas the subtraction of one score from the
other eliminates from the result most of the variance in the true scores. But if we
use group change scores, as we often will in program decisions, then indeed the
errors of measurement are made very small as the number of observations grows
large; and our analysis may proceed.
Often, of course, we will not have repeated measures on the same group but
will have some other groups that may be regarded as controls for comparison
purposes in our multivariate studies. Here, again, a zero point may be established
as the mean made by the relatively "untreated" control, and a production function may be estimated as a relation between possible alternatives and the growth
in such means. This should not give the impression that all such questions of zero
points are easily resolved but that they can become tractable for many practical
purposes in scientific decision making. And we are currently taking little advantage of such strategies.
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TEST SCORES AND DEEPER VALUES
Test scores, we have assumed , measure those outcomes for which we most
depend on our schools. The scores, then , stand for social values that we highly
esteem. Yet strangely little attention has been given to the placing of these test
values in some higher framework .
Suppose we ask the simplest curricular question: For example, should we
double the time for mathematics in a certain grade, at the expense of some other
course of study, such as history? How could we obtain evidence to help guide us
in this decision? It is striking that, after 70 years of using test scores and a
century of behavioral science, we still have no commonly accepted way of
combining such test scores or of trading them off against each other.

The Bentee. A decade ago, some of us studied this question , with the
concern of being able to use test scores as production functions (Page, I 972d,
1973, 1974a, 1976, 1980; Page & Breen, 1974a, 1974b). In this work , we felt it
necessary to invent a unit of measurement of educational benefit, called the
bentee, for benefit T-score. An illustration of the bentee is shown in Fig . 2.5.
In this figure, we note that the bentee represents the highest educational value,
and the branches beneath it stand for seven major branches of educational gain,
ranging from the verbal, quantitative, social sciences, and natural sciences
through esthetic learning, matters of the body (such as sports, health) to the
"personality" (which may include citizenship and moral and spiritual learning
where these are deemed appropriate). Each of these major branches may be itself
divided into subdivisions. In the present figure, only one, verbal, has been
divided into seven exhaustive areas. And one of these in turn, literature, has
been divided. And the tree branches down through poetic analysis and poetic
meter, to iambic pentameter, the great verse metric that has been the medium of
Shakespeare and of many of our greatest English poets. Recognition of iambic
pentameter, then, may be an explicit goal of instruction for good English students; it would be a suitable topic for a test item or for an operational objective in
instruction . In these steps, we observe that the tree reaches from the highest
philosophical and social values , through only a few steps, to the lowliest and
most concrete behavioral objective. Surprisingly, climbing down this tree , the
educational philosopher may actually be able to converse (chatter?) with the
educational psychologist, who may be occupied with behavior modification
techniques .
But how is the actual "evaluation" carried on? Having investigated two
methods, we believe that a "token" method may be suitable for most curricular
purposes: In this method, appropriate judges , acting individually, apportion 100
tokens (such as poker chips) among the half-dozen divisions at each branch. The
method may be applied recursively , at any level of the tree, and by judges chosen
as appropriate to that level. At the top, it might be educational leaders or simply
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FIG . 2.5. The recursive nature of the bentee method. As analys is moves from
the general to the spec ific, a shift is made from soc ietal to expert opinion and from
va lue space to test space. (So urce : E. B. Page, 1974 . Reprinted with permi ssion.)

in fo rmed citizens. At the lower levels, it might be subject matter specialists or
future employers (in training situations). These trees may be adapted for any new
program of study with its own nodes and branches.
Such a tree has a fairly clear relation to the use of test scores in decision
making. Where we have test scores for the various branches (such as English,
math , social studies, natural sciences), we may apportion our tokens according to
our beliefs in the relative benefits of these accomplishments. And our weightings
may vary with the individual concerned (the general student may have a different
weighting vector fro m the premed) or with the program under study . But once
such judgments are established , then we may proceed to evaluate the educational
accomplishment of individuals, of groups, and of programs. By adopting
changes in such bentees as our objectives, we may plot our production functions
as a relation between decision alternatives and the values that we seek to optimize . Given such methods, we may employ much more frequently the welldeveloped techniques of the dec ision sciences in our own studies of policy. (The
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reader is directed to related literature: For a technical approach different from the
bentee, see Dalkey, 1969 . For a deeper understanding of means-end analysis, see
Churchman, 1961. For a classic treatment of personnel decisions and test scores ,
see Cronbach & Gieser, 1965; and for the most advanced general treatment of
multiple objectives, see Keeney & Raiffa, 1976.)

PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS AND CAUSAL RESEARCH
We have already noted that "production functions" must involve more than
incidental relationships between variables. When we seek to "optimize" some
benefits from our decisions, we must depend on the assumption of a causal
relation between the decision alternatives and the desired benefit. For example,
suppose we note, as many researchers have, a recurring agreement between child
intelligence and family income. If we believe that this relation is causal, then we
naturally predict that when we change fami ly income, we will correspondingly
change child intelligence, at least to some limited degree. Programs to eliminate
poverty, therefore, according to this reasoning, should have a strong influence on
reducing school fai lure .
Or if we believe that such intelligence is a causal outcome of time spent with
the child by a well-intentioned adult , then we will predict that programs such as
Head Start will have a clearly beneficial effect on future performance of participating children. Many programs of recent decades have, in fact , been constructed on the assumption that observed correlations of this sort represented
strong causal relations . The disappointment about such programs results from the
ambiguous and debatable outcomes actually observed. (For a sharp disappointment in a major experiment, see Page, 1972a.) We do not need to resolve these
issues themselves to understand the need for some improved methods of policy
study. The most important improvement seems to be this: We must routinely
seek out data that will permit us to estab lish causal models explaining the
maximum amount of variance possible of those variables that we wish to optimize. This means, in the first place, that we indeed have such models and , in the
second, that we systematicall y collect the information that will maximize our
knowledge . The first requirement implies that we must turn to path analysis to
make explicit our causal models. Figure 2.3 shows such a model for exactly such
a purpose, here seeking a causal influence of homework time on test achievement. The second requirement implies that we should emphasize the use of
comprehensive data sets, rich with the correlates, whether from school, society ,
or fami ly , that most aid in causal explanation of our outcomes of interest. In Fig.
2.3, then, we truly wish to know the effect of homework time on achievement;
but we do not wish to be deceived by the correlates of race, SES, or other school
variables in estab lishing our "production function ." But if we did not collect
these background characteristics (including intelligence) or if we did not com-
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bine them properly into our causal model, we would be utterly deceived about
the effect of homework (just as Coleman, as mentioned earlier, was deceived in
his claimed effect of private schools).

Path Analysis. As a testing profession, then, interested in policy decisions,
we must turn to the rich discipline that is now the center for policy research in
most social sciences. This is the field of path analysis, introduced by Sewall
Wright (1921) some 6 decades ago. In its wandering route, it has come from
genetics, to economics, to sociology, to education and psychology and is now
found at the heart of many of the research journals in these fields. The number of
textbooks about path analysis has rapidly increased in recent years, and these
have improved in complexity and quality (Aigner & Goldberger, 1977; Blalock,
1971; Duncan, 1975; Heise, 1975; Kenny, 1979; Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973,
ch . 11; Li, 1975; Pedhazur, 1982, chs. 15-16; Taubman, 1977).
There is excellent research discipline in using these models. Because they are
explicitly causal, their use forces us to specify our hypotheses about the presence
and direction of causal influences and strongly encourages us to employ in our
models whatever variables we have available that may illuminate our interests.
Drawing and publishing such a model, moreover, forces us to put "up front" our
assumptions about these influences. If we have left out measures of intelligence ,
say, or family influence, then this will be apparent in our model. Or if we have
placed variables in the wrong order, thus distorting the influences, this too will
be apparent to our readers, whether they are allies or critics. These considerations, clearly, have huge meanings for debates about policy decisions. Indeed,
without such considerations of background influences, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to plot out any ratios for costs versus anticipated benefits.
Comprehensive Data Sets. The second major requirement for such causal
reasoning is the availability and use of large data sets containing the information
necessary for causal inference and estimation. High School and Beyond is probably the most pertinent and available data set for many current concerns. It will be
still more valuable as the follow-ups are completed and distributed in 1983 and
beyond (current tapes are available through the National Center for Education
Statistics , U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C.) . A splendid data
set is also available in the predecessor to HSB, the National Longitudinal Study
of 1972, with its four follow-ups (also available from the NCES in Washington).
Still another valuable set of tapes may be obtained from the U.S. Department of
Labor, dealing more with work and later life and less with the high school years.
But each of these data sets lacks something of great importance in family background and many other matters that might be of large interest for many particular
policy questions .
Still, such data sets are much more powerful than many realize , even when
they appear to lack certain variables of prime concern . Advanced path techniques

2.

STRUGGLES AND POSSIBILITIES

33

involving unmeasured variables or latent variables can often generate new factors much closer to the variables of real concern. For instance, we generated a
relatively school-free "mental ability" from factor analyzing a set of short
mental tests (Page & Keith, 1981) . Others have similarly constructed factors of
"self-concept" from a collection of items about attitude. HSB already supplies
an excellent SES scale from a weighted sum of many relevant questions about
education, occupation, home, and other factors. In general, then , a rich data set
can be much more than the simple sum of its parts.

CONCLUSIONS
From this analysis, there are some strong inferences to draw about the use of tests
in decision making, and we briefly summarize them here:
1. Test professionals and test users should stop being placed on the defensive by ill-informed and polemical critics. We should reassert, firmly and publicly , the many virtues of testing and the superiority of making decisions using
tests, compared with those made without tests.
2 . We should insist that psychometricians and others depending on tests be
heard in the major media when tests are discussed.
3. We shou ld stop being apologetic about the reality that tests do, in part,
show genetic influences and other family influences as well as social environmental influences. These are in fact part of their purpose.
4. We should cite frequently the research on the alleged biases of the most
widely used standardized tests of abi lity and achievement. In general, the conclusions are similar to those of the blue-ribbon National Academy of Sciences panel :
When properly used, tests are not biased against English-speaking U.S. minority
groups.
5. The measurement of intelligence is one of the greatest achievements in all
behavior science. The attempts to eliminate it from consideration at many decision points (such as selection for certain programs, schools, colleges, and professions) are not in the best interests of education nor of society as a whole.
6. When using tests in research on achievement, we should often lean
toward the avai lable standardized instruments, especially when these may be
treated securely.
7 . In such research situations, we should commonly control for the entering
ability of the students. It is often fallacious to make program selection without
such controls and may lead us to wasteful and disillusioning programs.
8. To assist in making decisions, test researchers should become more familiar with methods from the decision sciences, which permit technical analysis
of projected costs and benefits.

34

PAGE

9. To make use of such decision models, test researchers should translate
scores, where necessary, into useful values to serve as production functions.
10. But to use such production functions, we must look closely at the underlying causal relations of the variables (such as achievement) that we wish to
optimize. We should design these relations into explicitly causal models in path
analysis.
11. If researchers look only at the variables of narrow interest, they will often
be deceived by what Simon called "spurious correlation." Rather, the explanatory variables must be expanded to control, as much as possible, for background
correlates of both programs and outcomes.
12. Many of such correlates will be found strongly active in family influences . To study such family influences, wherever possible researchers should
look to twin pairs and other sibling and kinship relations, together with their
degree of kinship (e.g., if known, whether twins are identical or fraternal).
13. It is important that government agencies, large testing corporations, and
other collectors of data recognize the explanatory power of such family information and collect such variables into data sets wherever feasible.
14. And it is, finally, important that data sets be made inexpensively available to researchers , so that the causal study of human achievement may proceed
in as open and active and public an environment as we can create .
Now it should be evident why this chapter is called Struggles and Possibilities. Testing is struggling under attacks by many enemies, operating from
many motives and conceptions , often incorrect. And testing is also under constant criticism from its friends. It is friendly criticism, of course, that most
characterizes the scientific enterprise and the tradition of Oscar Buros, as editor
and model for this Institute that we celebrate in this volume. It is this ferment of
friendly and informed criticism that has fostered the splendid growth of our field
in its theoretical structure and in the construction and use of tests. These too are
struggles, and they are essential to the continuing evolution of testing. Surely,
the Buros Institute will continue this tradition of sharp and searching criticism by
its most knowledgeable friends.
We must call upon ourselves, as well, to defend our field firmly against the
defamations and uninformed assaults by its enemies. If we are faithful to the
scientific tradition of open scientific debate and self-criticism, then testing will
continue to grow and flourish, just as it has during the Buros' shared lifetime of
work . But let us , and the Institute, firmly and courageously take sides.
Our field, after all, is probably the soundest structurally of any in the social
and behavioral sciences . It is probably the most useful for decision making, for
individuals and for social programs. For its past accomplishments, it probably
has the smallest amount of apology to make- though it will surely be transformed in each succeeding generation as more is learned. Let us celebrate the
field as we celebrate the Buros Institute. Perhaps the Institute might prominently
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display on its wall those famou s lines from Shakespeare, now as applicable to
our discipline as to ourselves as individuals:
This above all: To thine own self be true,
And it must follow , as the night the day ,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
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What Cognitive Psychology
Can (and Can not) Do for Test
Development

Robert J. Sternberg

Yale University

Whenever research is launched under a new paradigm for studying an old set of
mental phenomena, researchers joining the new armada of explorers hope, at
best, to discover new uncharted mental territories and, at worst, to provide new
mental maps of previously charted territories that amend errors of the old maps.
This has been I believe, the experience of cognitive psychologists studying
mental abilities . Although they may not have revolutionized our map of the mind
(yet), neither have they left the old maps standing. What is critical is that at least
the flaws and incompletenesses of the new methods are different from those of
the old . One can therefore be provided with some new insights about the mental
phenomena being studied. Consider an analogy to polar and Cartesian coordinates: Each provides a different and useful view of a world that is not quite so
simple as either coordinate system would have us believe. Seeing the mental
world in two ways can tell us more than seeing it in just one way. In the language
of Gamer, Hake, and Eriksen (1956), we have provided "converging operations" to view a unitary phenomenon.
I have divided my analysis of the contribution of cognitive psychology to test
construction into four main parts dealing, respectively, with the contributions of
cognitive psychology to: (1) content for construction of tests; (2) validation of
tests; (3) scoring and interpretation of tests; and (4) modification of tests . Before
discussing these contributions , however, let me say just what are the characteristics that define "cognitive psychology" and what psychologists do in the cognitive-psychological investigation of intelligence.
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WHAT IS COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY?

Cogn itive psychology is the study of the mind in terms of the mental (cognitive)
representations and processes that underlie observable behavior. In particular, I
find that cognitive researchers tend to address five main questions:
I . What are the mental processes that constitute intelligent task performance?
2. How rapidly and accurately are these processes performed?
3. Into what strategies for task performance do these mental processes
combine?
4 . Upon what forms of mental representation do these processes and strategies act?
5. What is the knowledge base that is organized into these forms of representation , and how does it affect and become affected by the processes , strategies,
and representations that individuals use?
These questions have been asked of performance on a rather wide range of
cognitive tasks.

Cognitive Versus Psychometric Approaches
The cognitive approach is often contrasted with the psychometric one, perhaps
because historically it has seemed easy enough to separate the psychometricians
of a given time from the experimental psychologists of that time (many of whom
now call themselves "cogniti ve" psychologists) . However , I think it worth
mentioning and even emphasizing that the distinction has never been as clear as
Cronbach's (1957) paper on "the two disciplines of scientific psychology" or as
the conventional wisdom (which may in part be based upon Cronbach's paper)
might have one believe. Many of the great experimental or "cognitive" psychologists in the history of psychology have also been psychometricians and vice
versa, and it often seems almost arbitrary to identify a given individual as one or
the other. Consider some examples.
Sir Franc is Galton invented the correlational method and yet was an av id
experimentalist. Alfred Binet invented the prototype for the most widely used
psychometric intelligence test, and yet a close reading of his writings will show
hi s often neglected theorizing to be as "cognitive" as any we find today. Charles
Spearman invented factor analysis, and yet his 1923 treatise on the "principles
of cognition" was a cognitive monograph and the basis for much cognitive
theorizing today, particularly in the domain of inductive reasoning. Edward
Thorndike is most well known for his experimental work in animal learning and
yet was the author of a major book on the subject of psychometrically measured
intelligence. C lark Hull, another famous learning theorist, wrote his first book on
the subj ect of aptitude testing. Louis Thurstone, a psychometrician if ever there
was one , advocated factorial methods as preliminaries to experimenta l ones, not
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as replacements for them. Finally, J . P. Guilford, clearly identified as a psychometrician, has also proposed a theory of intelligence in which one of the three
facets describes the processes of intelligence.
The list could go on and on, but I think the point by now should be clear: Even
before Cronbach' s (1957) paper, there was already a substantial connection
between psychometric and cognitive lines of endeavor. I do not believe they
were ever quite so separate as Cronbach's paper suggested, and for all the
overwhelming positive contribution the paper clearly made, it may have served
the slightly negative function of tending to underscore the points of friction rather
than the points of smooth contact. Today, I believe (in part because of the
positive contribution of Cronbach's paper) that the distinction between psychometricians and cognitive psychologists, at least in the research domain of intelligence, is fuzzier than ever. People like Jack Carroll, Earl Hunt , Robert Glaser,
Susan Whitely, Richard Snow, and myself, among others, could perhaps as
easily be classified as falling into one camp as into the other.
If the line between psychometrics and cognitive psychology is so unclear, just
what is it that is distinctive about the cognitive approach? Certainly it is not just
the questions asked , in that the questions listed earlier would also be quite
relevant to the interest of many psychometricians theorizing about intelligence.
Nor is it, really , the emphasis of the questions upon stimulus rather than subject
variation. Psychometric methods, like factor analysis, really can be used to study
either source of variation (although they are most commonly used to study
subject variation) , and experimental methods can also be used to study either
stimulus or subject variation (although they are most commonly used to study
stimulus variation).
The critical difference, I believe, is a sociological one and resides primarily
(but not exclusively) in the professional identification of the investigator and of
the methods he or she uses. A number of contemporary investigators, including
this author, use multiple regression in modeling of test performance; for whatever reason , this methodology today seems more to belong to the "cognitive
camp," despite the fact that multiple regression can certainly be and has been
viewed as a psychometric method. Susan Whitely does a highly similar (although
by no means identical) kind of modeling using latent-trait analysis and tends to
be viewed more in the psychometric camp. Users of exploratory factor analysis,
like Raymond Cattell and John Horn , tend to be identified with the psychometric
camp, whereas users of confirmatory factor analysis, like Carl and John
Frederiksen, tend more to be identified with the experimental camp. The lines
between camps are certainly not clearly drawn, although they can be inferred to
some extent by the conventions one attends and by the journals in which one
publishes as well as by the methods one uses . The rationale for placing someone
in one or the other camp is certainly not clear-cut.
I have tried in several ways to make the basic point, one that I have come to
believe only recently. This point is that the lines that have been drawn between
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the psychometric and cognitive approaches to intelligence are often arbitrary and
even capricious. If I speak in this chapter of the contribution of cognitive psychology to the psychometric tradition of mental test development, I am speaking
of boundaries between traditions that I think have much more to do with the
sociology of science than with its substantive concerns.

Cognitive-Psychological Approaches to the Study of
Mental Abilities
How do cognitive psychologists go about studying mental abilities? Cognitive
psychologists are highly similar in their emphasis on intensive task analysis. The
idea is to take performance on a single task and then to study it in great depth.
One then constructs an information-processing model of performance in the
given task, a model that specifies in considerable detail just how subjects solve
the task. Only after the task has been intensively analyzed is an attempt made to
generalize the results of the task analysis to related tasks as well.
One can carve up the field in many different ways, as people in fact have
(Pellegrino & Glaser, 1979; Sternberg, 1977, 1981c). I have loosely classified
these different approaches into four different categories, but it should be understood that these categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive with
respect to current research approaches in cognitive psychology. 1 now briefly
describe what each approach is, what its goals are, what kinds of research it has
generated, and what its implications for test construction are.

Cognitive Correlates. In this approach to understanding mental abilities,
subjects are tested in their ability to perform tasks that contemporary cognitive
psychologists believe measure basic human information-processing abilities. (Information processing is generally defined as the sequence of mental operations
and their products involved in performing a cognitive task .) Such tasks include,
among others, the Posner and Mitchell (1967) letter-matching task, in which
subjects are asked to state as quickly as possible whether the letters in a pair such
as "A a" constitute a physical match (which they don't) or (in another condition)
a name match (which they do), and the S. Sternberg (1969) memory-scanning
task, in which subjects are asked to state as quickly as possible whether a target
digit or letter, such as 5, appeared in a previously memorized set of digits or
letters, such as 3 6 5 2. Individuals are usually tested either via tachistoscope (a
machine that provides rapid stimulus exposures) or via a computer terminal, with
the principal dependent measure of interest being response time.
The proximal goal in this research is to estimate parameters (characteristic
quantities) representing the durations of performance for the information-processing components constituting each task and then to investigate the extent to
which these components correlate across subjects with each other and with scores
on measures commonly believed to assess intelligence (e.g., Raven's Progres-
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sive Matrices test) . Most commonly, correlations between parameter estimates
and measured intelligence are statistically significant but moderately low- usually around .3 (Hunt, Frost, & Lunneborg, 1973; Hunt , Lunneborg, & Lewis,
1975). The distal goal of cognitive-correlates research is to integrate individualdifferences research and mainstream cognitive- psychological research- in particular, by providing a theoretical grounding from cognitive psychology for
differential research (Hunt et al., 1973). Thus, instead of trying to draw theoretical conclusions by correlating scores on one empirically derived test (e .g., reasoning) with scores on another empirically derived test (e.g., vocabulary), as
differential researchers have done, cognitive-correlates researchers draw theoretical conclusions by correlating scores on an empirically derived test with
parameters generated by a cognitive model of some aspect of mental functioning
(e.g., memory scanning) .
Cognitive-correlates researchers would be most likely to supplement psychometric tests with information-processing tests based on standard laboratory information-processing tasks such as the memory-scanning and letter-matching tests
mentioned earlier. Rose (1978) has actually constructed and tested an information-processing assessment battery based on standard laboratory tasks. Using this
battery , one can isolate latency scores for a variety of different informationprocess ing components. Rose's battery is an impressive one, although correlations across tasks are relatively low , and correlations of the information-processing tasks and parameters with psychometric tests or various types of real-world
performance have yet to be reported .

Cognitive Components. In this approach to understanding mental abilities,
subj ects are tested for their ability to perform tasks of the kinds actually found on
standard psychometric tests of mental abilities-for example, analogies, series
completions , mental rotations, and syllogisms. Subjects are usually tested via a
tachistoscope or a computer terminal, and response time is usually the principal
dependent variable, with error rate and pattern of response choices as secondary
dependent variables. These latter dependent variables are of more interest in this
approach than in the cognitive-correlates approach because the tasks tend to be
more difficult and thus more susceptible to erroneous responses.
The proximal goal in this research is first to formulate a model of information
processing in performance on IQ-test types of tasks; second , to test the model at
the same time as parameters for the model are estimated; and, finally, to investigate the extent to which these components correlate across subjects with each
other and with scores on standard psychometric tests . Because the tasks that are
analyzed are usually taken directly from IQ tests, or else are very similar to tasks
found on IQ tests, the major issue in this kind of research is not whether there is
any correlation at all between cognitive task and psychometric test scores.
Rather, the issue is one of isolating the locus or loci of the correlation that is
obtai ned . One seeks to discover what components of information processing in
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task performance are the critical ones from the standpoint of the theory of
intelligence.
Cognitive-components researchers would be most likely to supplement psychometric tests with information-processing tests based on the psychometric
ones, but with test items administered in a computer-controlled setting that
would enable the examiner to decompose test performance into its informationprocessing constituents. An information-processing analysis of a subject's inductive reasoning performance, for example, would assess skills such as the individual's ability: (I) to encode stimuli; (2) to infer relations between stimulus
terms; (3) to map higher-order relations between relations; (4) to apply previously inferred relations to new settings; (5) to compare alternative answer
options in terms of their similarities and differences; (6) to justify one answer as
preferred but not necessarily ideal; (7) to respond; (8) to combine these components into a strategy that results in efficient item solution; and (9) to represent
information in a way that facilitates operations on the data base stored in longterm memory (Sternberg & Gardner, 1982) .

Cognitive Training . This approach to understanding mental abilities can be
used in conjunction with either the cognitive-correlates approach or the cognitive-components approach, or in conjunction with some other approach. The
essense of this approach is aptly described by Campione, Brown, and Ferrara
(1982). Essentially, the approach seeks to infer the identities of cognitive processes through an analysis of effects of training. The cognitive-training approach
has been used widely in a variety of domains. For example, Belmont and Butterfield (1971), Borkowski and Wanschura (1974), and Campione and Brown
(1978) have used the approach in investigations of learning and memory. Feuerstein (1979), Holzman, Glaser, and Pellegrino (1976), and Linn (1973) have
used it in investigations of reasoning and problem solving. One conclusion has
emerged with striking regularity in many studies by many different investigators:
To attain both durability and generalizability of training, it seems to be necessary
to train both at the level of metacomponents (or executive processes) and at the
level of performance components (or lower-order p.ocesses used to carry out the
orders of the executive processes- see, e.g., Belmont, Butterfield, & Ferretti,
1982; Feuerstein, 1979, 1980).
Cognitive-training researchers might follow any of a number of paths to
testing depending on their choice of what to train and how to train it. One of the
more interesting approaches to testing among such investigators is that of Feuerstein (1979), who has devised a "learning potential assessment device" that he
believes measures cognitive modifiability, or what Vygotsky (1978) referred to
as the "zone of potential development." Modifiability is assessed by giving
examinees guided instruction in solving problems that the examinees are initially
unable to solve and by evaluating the examinees' ability to profit from instruction.
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Cognitive Contents. Recently, a new approach to research has emerged on
the cognitive- psychological scene that has yet to be applied directly to the study
of mental abilities but that seems to provide a good entree into such research. The
approach seeks to compare the performances of experts and novices in complex
tasks such as the solution of physics problems (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981 ;
Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Larkin , McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980a,
1980b), the selection of moves and strategies in chess and other games (Chase &
Simon, 1973 ; DeGroot, 1965; Reitman, 1976), and the acquisition of domainrelated information by groups of people at different levels of expertise (Chiesi,
Spilich, & Voss, 1979; Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 1979). Research on
expert-novice differences in a variety of task domains suggests that the way
information is stored in and retrieved from long-term memory can largely account for the substantial differences in performance between experts and novices. This view would suggest that a possible locus of differences between more
and less mentally able people is in their ability to organize information in longterm memory in a way that makes it readily accessible for a variety of purposes
(Egan & Greeno, 1973). Presumably , information stored in such a flexible way
is maximally available for transfer from old to new problem situations.
Because the cognitive-contents approach has not yet been directly applied to
the investigation of differences in mental abilities, it is impossible to evaluate its
utility for purposes of such investigation. But the approach seems to supply a
valuable new inroad for mental-abilities research, and I expect it will be only a
matter of time before it is used for this purpose.
Cognitive-contents researchers might supplement psychometric tests with
complex-learning or problem-solving tasks that elicit an examinee's knowledge
base and the way in which knowledge is mentally represented . Such researchers
would be particu larly interested in the features of problems to which examinees
attend. It has been found, for example, that less skilled physics problem solvers
tend to pay more attention to surface features of physics problems, whereas more
skilled problem solvers tend to pay more attention to deep structural features
(Chi et aI., 1981, 1982). Cognitive-contents tests might also supplement cognitive-components tests, with the former assessing knowledge deficiencies and the
latter assessing processing deficiencies.
Cognitive psychologists studying mental abilities differ markedly in the tasks
they have chosen to study, in the dependent variables they use to study these
tasks, in the kinds of theories that motivate their research, and in their concern
with individual differences. Because I have more to offer later about differences
in task content, I pass over this source of differences now. The kinds of dependent variables that cognitive psychologists use include reaction time , percentage
correct, breakdown of response choices, protocol analysis, and output of computer simulations. Although choice of one (or more) dependent variable(s) may
not seem like a major issue to many psychologists, the history of cognitive
psychology up to the present has been marked by active (and at times explosive)
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debates regarding the relative merits of various dependent measures (see, e.g.,
Ericsson & Simon , 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Pachella, 1974; Sternberg,
1977 ; S. Sternberg, 1969). Cognitive psychologists also differ in the scope of the
theories that motivate their research, with scope ranging from quite narrow
(Egan, 1976) to very broad (Anderson, 1976) . The optimal scope of a motivating
theory of intelligence has also been a subject of intense debate among cognitive
psychologists (Anderson, 1976; Sternberg & Davidson, 1982). Finally, cognitive psychologists differ greatly in their concern with individual differences. In
the past decade, cognitive psychologists have progressed from little or no concern to an increasingly broad concern with this issue.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TEST
CONSTRUCTION
Cognitive psychologists studying mental abilities have investigated a wide range
of tasks, some of which have been used in test construction. The tasks they have
investigated differ in a multitude of ways, but it is convenient and, I believe,
accurate to array them along a single dimension of task complex ity , from simple
and choice reaction time at one extreme to complex logic and mathematics at the
other extreme. The tasks along this continuum differ in the apparent" level" of
mental processing required .
At the simple end of the continuum, Furneaux (1956), Jensen (1979), and
Lunneborg (1977) have used simple and choice reaction time tasks to test the
hypothesis that individual differences in mental abi lity can be understood largely
in terms of individual differences in sheer speed of mental functioning . Hunt
(1978; Hunt et aI. , 1975) has studied mental speed as well but at a somewhat
higher level of processing. He has suggested that individual differences in mental
abilities, especially verbal ones , can be understood in terms of differences in
people 's speed of access to lexical information in long-term memory. In sharp
contrast to Furneaux, Jensen, and Lunneborg, he has preferred to hold constant
simple or choice reaction time divorced from lexical access so as not to confound
his measurement of access speed . Pellegrino and Glaser (1979, 1980) , Snow
(1979), and I (Sternberg, 1977, 1980c, 198Ic), among others, have claimed that
the level of mental processing studied by Hunt and his colleagues is sti ll low and
have preferred instead to study performance on tasks at a level of complexity
equal to that of intelligence-test items . Like those cited earlier, these researchers
have emphasized speed of processing, but particularly speed in solving relatively
complex tasks such as analogies and syllogisms. Finall y, investigators such as
Greeno (1980); Chi et al. (1982); and Larkin (1981) have suggested, if on ly by
implication , that even the intelligence-test items are at too Iowa level of processing and have studied instead performance in very complex mathematics and
physics problems .
In sum, the range of tasks studied by cognitive psychologists investigating
intelligence is at least as broad as that studied by psychometricians. Indeed, the
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range in levels of complexity is probably greater: Whereas most psychometricians seem to have resolved the Galton- Binet dispute regarding test content to
their satisfaction, cognitive psychologists seem not to have done so.
Even if cognitive psychologists did display more agreement regarding the
kinds of task performance that should be studied under the rubric of intelligence,
it is not at all clear that they would have much to contribute to psychometricians
by way of useful feedback regarding test content, because when cognitive psychologists have used reference measures at all for external criteria for their tasks
and theories, they have used intelligence tests and subtests rather than the behaviors these tests were themselves intended to predict (such as school grades and
job success). Their use of psychometric tests as (obviously proximal) criteria for
their own tasks and tests has made it impossible to use their data to modify the
tests . One can use the criteria to suggest changes in the predictor but not the other
way around!
My message regarding the contribution of cognitive psychology to selection
of test content is not a wholly pessimistic one, however. Some recent cognitive
research has suggested promising lines of endeavor that I believe are now ready
for at least pilot attempts in psychometric tests. I think three suggestions are
clearly forthcoming, albeit from experiments using IQ-test items as criteria.
First, there is good evidence that performance on the Clark and Chase (1972)
sentence-picture verification task, which requires the examinee rapidly to indicate whether a sentence representation (such as "The star is above the plus.")
agrees with a pictorial representation (such as : ), can provide a quick estimate
of a person's general level of intelligence (Hunt et at., 1975) and even, possibly,
of their proclivity for verbal versus spatial strategies for problem solving (MacLeod , Hunt, & Mathews , 1978; Mathews, Hunt, & MacLeod, 1980). The task is
easy to adnlinister and usable for examinees over a wide range of ages, ability
levels , and mental conditions.
Second, there is strong evidence to suggest value in measuring fluid intelligence by using novel tasks employing novel kinds of concepts (Snow , 1980;
Sternberg, 1981 a). The important thing appears to be not the particular task or
concepts used but their relative novelty for the examinees performing them . By
novelty, I refer not only to a difference in content but to a difference in kind from
conventional kinds of test items .
Third, substantial evidence has now been accumulated for the considerable
value in measuring crystallized, or verbal, intelligence of a task requiring examinees to learn and then define previously unfamiliar words presented in natural
written contexts (Sternberg, Powell, & Kaye, 1982) . Such a task appears to tap
at least one major aspect of the antecedents of developed individual differences
in verbal skills and knowledge.
To conclude this section, cognitive psychology has probably not been at its
best in suggesting to test developers the kinds of content they might profitably
use in test construction . There is almost no resolution among cognitive psychologists as to what kinds of test contents best measure intellectual functioning, and
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experiments have not been designed in ways that would be particularly informative with regard to suggested content even if cognitive psychologists could agree
as to what kinds of contents to employ . Nevertheless, a few suggestions have
emerged from cognitive research regarding several kinds of contents that might
be beneficially employed in future testing.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TEST VALIDATION

Whereas cognitive psychology has probably made its weakest contribution to test
development in the realm of test content, it has probably made its strongest
contribution in the realm of test validation and , in particular, construct validation. There is perhaps some irony in the fact that the paradigm that was perhaps
hoped by some to provide a replacement for the psychometric paradigm has
instead provided converging evidence to support its major findings. Let me
elaborate .
Whereas psychometricians have generally attempted to understand mental
abilities through the construct of the "factor," cognitive psychologists have
generally attempted to understand mental abi lities through the construct of the
"process" and, to a lesser extent , the " mental representation" of information.
Through successive refinements, cognitive psychologists have developed techniques that seem to be quite successful in the isolation of mental processes
(Ericsson & Simon , 1980; Newell & Simon , 1972; Pachella, 1974; Siegler,
1976; Sternberg, 1977; S. Sternberg, 1969) . A few of the cognitive psychologists, such as Carroll (1976 , 1981) and myself (Sternberg , 1980a) , have explicitly addressed the question of the extent to which the structural factors of
psychometric ians deal, at some deep level, with the same latent abilities as the
processes of cognitive psychologists. We have concluded that both sets of investigators are, in fact, looking at the same underlying entities, albeit in different
ways.
I disagree with Carroll's (1981) position that factors are in some interesting
sense more " basic" than are processes, and I also disagree with my own earlier
position (Sternberg, 1977) that processes are in some interesting sense more
basic than factors. So far as I can tell , there ex ists no empirical means to
determine which is more basic, nor is it even clear what, conceptually , " more
basic" means. If there is some basic molar unit in terms of which mental abilities
are organized, we probably do not know what it is; even more discouraging,
perhaps, we wouldn't know we knew if we did , in fact, know . At this point,
therefore, I regard arguments regarding basic-level mental units as nonfruitful
and believe we should probably be quite pleased that constructs from the psychometric and cognitive, as well as fro m other approaches (Sternberg, 1981b) , have
converged as well as they have in suggesting how mental abilities mi ght be
organized .
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What, exactly, are these points of convergence? I believe there are th ree main
ones .
First, there appears to be some (i f you wish, higher-order) general fac tor or
source of individual differences that is common to performance on a strikingly
wide range of cognitive tasks (Holzinger, 1938; Jensen, 1980 ; Spearman, 1927;
Thurstone, 1938; Vernon , 197 1). Individual differences in this general ability , or
g, appear to derive in large part from differences in the functioning of (higherorder) executive processes- such as solution pl anning, monitoring, and control- that regulate most mental functions (Butterfield & Belmont , 1977; Campione & Brown , 1978; Snow , 1979; Sternberg , 1979) .
Second , there appear to be at least two , and possibl y several more , broad
constellations of skills that operate in fairly broad ranges of tasks but not, by any
means, in all tasks. The two most prominent constell ations, which have been
referred to by many names but here will be referred to by the names of " fluid "
and "crystalli zed " abilities (Horn & Cattell , 1966), encompass reasoning kinds
of tasks on the one hand and verbal kinds of tasks on the other (Cattell , 197 1;
Horn , 1968; Vernon, 197 1) . Individual differences in these abi lities appear to be
traceable to present and past functioning of lower-order performance and learning processes, as well as to the interactions of these processes with the higherorder executive ones (S ternberg, 1980c) .
Finally, for however they may interact, it is important to separate speed from
power as pects of performance (Carroll , 198 1; Egan, 1976; G uyote & Sternberg,
198 1; Sternberg, 1977 , 1980b). Speed and power appear to be di fferentiable
aspects of mental skill , and confounding them can lead to mi sleading or even
downright incorrect conclusions (Sternberg, 1980b).
To conclude this section, I would argue that cognitive psychology has provided a valuable complementary way of investigating pretty much the same
constructs psychometricians have been studying all along . The contribution of
cognitive psychology goes beyond a merely salutary or congratulatory one.
Cognitive psychology has provided insights into the processes underl ying the
products studied by psychometricians and has told us what happens in real time
to generate these products. The process models of cognitive psycholog ists, and
the theoretical and metatheoretical schemes underl ying them , have provided
important insights into mental abilities that prev iously had been lack ing.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, TEST SCORING, AND TEST
INTERPRETATION
Using a cognitive approach, one would deri ve and interpret a set of test scores
quite differe nt from that derived and interpreted via a psychometric approach.
The major di fference in scoring would be the isolati on, in cogniti ve analysis, of
subscores based on processes rather th an actual or alleged fac tors .
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Consider, for example, the rather global construct of reasoning ability . It
would not be at all surprising to discover that individuals believed , for one reason
or another, to be of low intelligence score below the average on tests of reasoning
ability. But exactly what does this tell us? Does it tell us what it is that leads to
the subject's low intelligence? Does it tell us what kinds of interventions might
be indicated to increase the individual's level of intellectual funct ioning? Does it
even tell us that the individual is low in reasoning ability as opposed, say, to
encoding the terms of the problem so that the reasoning operations can be
performed? I would argue that the answer to each of these questions is negative;
in short, that the low score in reasoning provides relatively little by way of
diagnostic or prescriptive information.
A cognitive analysis of the bases of performance on one or more reasoning
tests would seek to go "inside" the reasoning factor-to elicit for each individual a measure of performance on each of the processes theorized in combination to constitute reasoning performance . In my own theory of inductive reasoning, for example (Sternberg, 1977, 1980c), separate component scores might be
estimated for processes such as encoding, inference , application, and response .
Other cognitive theories would yield somewhat different sets of process scores,
just as alternative factorial theories yield somewhat different sets of factor
scores. At the very least, any of the "reasonable" theories of cognitive processing would permit a separation between performance on the encoding, pure reasoning, and response aspects of task performance.
These process scores not only permit a finer diagnosis of strengths and weaknesses in congitive skill s but permit as well the construction of a process-based
training program . It is difficult to conceive of training something as ill-defined as
"reasoning" but relatively easy to conceive of training a specific skill such as
inferring relations. The relative ease of conceiving and actually of preparing such
a training program should not, however, desensitize one to the considerable
difficulty that can be involved in instantiating transfer of training in the individuals exposed to the program of instruction .
The theoretical basis now exists not only for analyzing processing skills in
reasoning tasks but for analyzing processing skills in other kinds of tasks as well ,
such as spatial, verbal, and numerical tasks. Yet, I do not recommend our
actually implementing the theory in practice at this time . There are several
reasons for my reluctance to what I view as premature implementation.
First, obtaining reliable estimates of process scores for individuals requires
very lengthy testing , usually via a computer terminal or comparable device .
Thus, the technology does not yet exist for implementing theory in an expeditious way. We need much more research aimed simply at enabling efficient
measurement of process parameters of test performance.
Second, the differential validity of process scores in predicting interesting
criterion performances has yet to be demonstrated . At present, such differential
validity is available as a promissory note rather than as a demonstrated accomplishment.
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Third, although we have the means for isolating lower-order processes of
performance (i.e., those processes used in strategy implementation), we do not
yet have adequate means for isolating higher-order executive processes (i .e.,
those processes used in strategy planning, monitoring, and control). Yet, these
latter processes are the ones I believe most crucial to understanding the bases of
individual differences in intelligence. Until we have a feasible technology for
isolating these more interesting processes, I am reluctant to advocate rapid implementation of process analysis in mental-ability testing .
To conclude this section, I believe we now have a theoretical basis for the
scoring and interpretation of ability tests but that the practical basis has lagged
behind. In some ways, this situation is a welcome contrast to what has been the
typical one in abilities research, where theory has tended to lag behind practice. I
believe that process analysis will eventually become both feasible and desirable
in the scoring and interpretation of ability tests; the time has not yet come.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TEST MODIFICATION
What are the implications of the previous discussion for the modification of
ability tests? The answer depends on the time frame into which one puts it. At
present, I think they are modest. None of the cognitive research that has been
done has come up with any alternative test that is clearly better than the best of
the ability tests we now have . But there have been interlaced throughout this
discussion a number of promising notes that I would like to summarize here,
because I believe they will, eventually, result in test modification. First, with
regard to test content, I feel the research to date suggests the importance of using
measurements based upon performance on novel tasks comprising novel task
content. Second , with regard to construct validation , I think cognitive research
has shown that current tests can be understood in terms of their measurement of
process constructs. Third , with regard to test scoring and interpretation, I believe
it will eventually be possible to measure executive and performance processes in
technically feasible ways and that such measurements will provide new bases for
diagnosis and training that are currently unavailable. Finally, I feel that cognitive
psychology will continue to provide a basis for the questioning of some of our
assumptions regarding the nature of mental abilities and how they can be
measured .
Let me give three specific examples of some dubious assumptions regarding
the nature of mental abilities that are entrenched in mental testing , and let me
show how these assumptions are being added into question by informationprocessing research.

Dubious Assumption I . To be smart is to be fast. The assumption that
"smart is fast " permeates our entire society. When we refer to someone as
"quick," we are endowing them with one of the primary attributes of what we
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perceive an intelligent person to be. Indeed , in a recent study of people' s conceptions of intelligence, when we asked people to list behav iors characteri stic of
intelli gent persons, behaviors such as " learns rapidly," "acts quickl y," " talks
quickl y," and " makes judgments q uickl y" were commonly listed (Sternberg ,
Conway , Ke tron , & Bernstein , 198 1). It is not onl y the man in the street who
believes that speed is assoc iated with intellect: Several prominent contemporary
theori sts of intelli gence base their theories in large part upon individual diffe rences in the speed with which people process informati on (Hunt , 1978;
Jensen , 1979).
The ass umpti on that more intelligent people are rapid in formation processors
also underlies the overwhelming majority of tests, including creativity as well as
intelli gence tests . It is rare to find a test that is not timed or a timed test that
virtuall y all examinees are able to finish by working at a comfortable rate of
problem solving. I would argue th at thi s ass umption is a gross overgeneralization: It is true for some people and for some mental operations but not for all
people or all mental operati ons . Blind , across-the- board acceptance of the assumption is not only unjustifi ed- it is wrong .
Almost everyone knows peopl e who , although often slow in performing
tasks, perform the tasks at a superior level of accompli shment. Moreover , we all
know th at snap judgments are often poor ones . Indeed , in our study of people's
conceptions of intelli gence, " does not make snap judgments" was listed as an
important attribute of intelligent performance. Evidence for the dubiousness of
the " smart is fast" ass umption extends, however, beyond intuition and everyday
observation. A number of findin gs from carefull y conducted psychological research undermine the validity of assumption. I will cite four such findin gs, which
are only examples from a wider literature on the subject.
First, it is well known that, in general, a refl ective rather than an impulsive
style in probl em solving tends to be associated with more intelli gent problemsolving performance (see Baron , 198 1, 1982, for reviews of thi s literature).
Jum ping into problems without adequate reflection is likely to lead to fa lse starts
and erroneous conclusions . Yet, timed tests often fo rce the examinee to solve
proble ms impul sively . It is often claimed that the strict timing of such tests
merely mirro rs the requirements of our highl y pressured and productive society.
But ask yourself how many signi ficant problems you encounter in yo ur work or
personal li fe that allow no more than the 15 to 60 seconds allowed for a typical
test problem on a standardi zed test; yo u will probabl y be hard pressed to think of
any such problems.
Second , in a study of the role of planning behavior in pro blem solving, it has
been found that more inte lligent persons tend to spend relatively more time than
do less intelligent persons on global (higher-order, up-front) planning and relatively less time on local (problem-specific, lower-level) planning. In contrast,
less intelligent persons show the reverse pattern , emphasizing loca l rather than
global pl anning (relative to the more intelligent persons) (Sternberg, 198 1a). The
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point is that what matters is not total time spent but distribution of this time
across the various kinds of planning one can do .
Third, in studies of reasoning behavior in children and adults, it has been
found that although greater intelligence is associated with more rapid execution
of most components of information processing, problem encoding is a notable
exception to this trend. The more intelligent individuals tend to spend relatively
more time encoding the terms of the problem, presumably to facilitate subsequent operations on these encodings (Mulholland, Pellegrino, & Glaser, 1980;
Sternberg, 1977 ; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979) . Similar outcomes have been observed in comparisons of expert versus novice problem solvers confronted with
difficult physics problems (Chi et aI. , 1982).
Finally , in a study of people's performance in solving insight problems (arithmetical and logical problems whose difficulty resided in the need for a nonobvious insight for problem solution rather than in the need for arithmetical or
logical knowledge), a correlation of .75 was found between the amount of time
people spent on the problems and measured IQ. The correlation between time
spent and score on the insight problems was .62 (Sternberg & Davidson, 1982).
Note that, in these problems, individuals were free to spend as long as they liked
so lving the problems. Persistence and involvement in the problems was highly
correlated with success in solution : The more able individuals did not give up;
nor did they fall for the obvious, but often incorrect, solutions.
The point of these examples is simple: Sometimes speed is desirable; sometimes it is not. Whether it is desirable or not depends on the task, the particular
components of information processing involved in solution of the task, and, most
likely , the person's style of problem solving. Blind imposition of a strict time
limit for a test, or even a not-so-strict one, is theoretically indefensible and
practically self-defeating .

Dubious Assumption 2. Intelligence is last year's achievement. At first
glance, this would appear to be an ass umption few people would accept. Indeed,
doesn't almost everyone make a clear distinction between intelligence and
achievement? But if one examines the content of the major intelligence tests, one
will find that they measure intelligence as last year's (or the year before's, or the
year before that 's) achievement. What is an intelligence test for children of a
given age would be an achievement test for children a fe w years younger. In
some test items, like vocabul ary, the achievement component is obvious. In
others , it is more disguised, for example, verbal analogies or arithmetic problems. But virtually all tests commonly used for the assessment of intelligence
pl ace heavy achievement demands on the students tested.
The achievement-testing orientation ex hibited in intelligence tests may be
acceptable and even appropriate when the tests are administered to children who
have had full y adequate educational opportunities in reasonably adeq uate social
and emotional environments . But for children whose environments have been
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characterized by deprivation of one kind or another, the orientation may lead to
invalid test results . There is no fully adequate solution to the problem of identifi cation of the gifted among such youngsters, especially if the youngsters will have
to function in the normal sociocultural milieu . A common solution to the problem , exclusive use of nonverbal tests, is almost certainly an inadequate so lution :
First, one is measuring only a subset of important intellectual skills; second , and
perhaps more importantly , nonverbal tests actually show , on the average, greater
differences in scores across sociocultural groups than do verbal ones (Jensen ,
1980 ; Lesser, Fifer , & Clark , 1965). An alternative solution to the problem is to
ask what abilities one is really interested in measuring by the ac hievementsaturated tests and then to attempt to measure these abilities more directly and in
ways that reduce the achievement load. This is the path we have followed.
Consider two examples.
Consider first one of the most common types of items on intelligence testsvocabulary. It is well known that vocabulary is one of the best predictors, if not
the best single predictor, of overall IQ score (Jensen, 1980; Matarazzo, 1972).
Yet, fe w tests have higher achievement load than does vocabulary. Can one
measure the latent ability tapped by vocabulary tests without presenting children
with what is essenti ally an achievement test? I believe one can.
There is reason to believe that vocabulary is such a good measure of intelligence because it measures, albeit indirectly , children's ability to acq uire information in context (Jensen, 1980; Sternberg, Powell, & Kaye, 1982, 1983;
Werner & Kaplan, 1952). Most vocabulary is learned in everyday contexts rather
than through direct instruction . Thus, new words are usually encountered for the
first time (and subsequently) in textbooks, novels, newspapers, lectures, and the
like. More intelligent people are better able to use surrounding context to figure
out the words' meanings. As the years go by, the better decontextualizers acquire
the larger vocabularies. Because so much of one's learning (including learning
other than vocabulary) is contextually determined , the ability to use context to
add to one's knowledge base is an important skill in intelligent behavior. Is there
any way of measuring this skill directly rather than relying on indirect measurement (vocabulary testing) that involves a heavy achievement load ? We have
attempted to measure this skill directly by presenting children with paragraphs
written at a level well below their grade level. Embedded in the paragraphs are
one or more unknown words. The children 's task is to use the surrounding
context to fig ure out the meanings of the unknown words . Note that , in this
testing paradigm, differential effects of past achievement are reduced by using
reading passages that are easy for everyone but target vocabulary words that are
unknown to everyone. We have found that quality of children's definitions of the
unknown words is highly correlated with overall verbal intelligence, reading
comprehension, and vocabu lary test scores (about .6 in each case). Thus, one
can measure an important aspect of intelligence directly and without heavy
reliance on achievement rather than indirectly and with heavy reliance on past
achievement.
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Consider second another common type of intelligence test-arithmetic word
problems (and at higher levels, algebra and geometry word problems as well).
Again, performance on such problems is heavily dependent on one's mathematical achievements and , indeed, opportunities. Can one measure the main ski ll s
tapped by such tests without creating what is essentially an achievement test? We
believe we have done so through the insight problems mentioned earlier. Consider two typical examples of such problems:
I . If you have black socks and brown socks in your drawer, mixed in the ratio
of 4 to 5, how many socks will you have to take out to make sure of having a pair
the same color?
2. Water lilies double in area every 24 hours. At the beginning of the summer
there is one water lily on a lake. It takes 60 days for the lake to become covered
with water lilies . On what day is the lake half-covered?
Solutions of problems such as these requires a fair amount of insight but very
little in the way of prior mathematical knowledge. In most problems such as
these, a common element in successful solution is selective encoding- knowing
what elements of the problem are relevant to solution and what aspects are
ilTelevant. Performance on such problems is correlated .66 with IQ. Thus , it is
possible to use word problems that are good measures of intelligence but that
require very little in the way of prior arithmetical knowledge (Sternberg &
Davidson, 1982) . Moreover, it is unnecessary to time problem administration.
As mentioned earlier, higher performance is associated with more, not less , time
spent on the problems.
To summarize: We need not measure intelligence as last year's achievement.
It is probably impossible to rid intelligence tests of achievement load entirely.
Indeed, it may not even be desirable to do so. But the load can be substantiall y
reduced by asking oneself what intellectual ski lls one wishes to measure and then
by seeking to measure these directly through the use of items that tap the ski lls
rather than their by-products.

Dubious Assumption 3 . Testing needs to be conducted in a stressful, anxiety-provoking situation. Few situations in life are as stressful as the situation
confronting the examinee about to receive (and then receiving) a standardized
test. Most exam inees know that the results of the test are crucial for the examinees' future and that I to 3 hours of testing may have more impact on the future
than years of school performance. The anx iety generated by the testing situation
may have little or no effect on some examinees and even a beneficial effect on
other examinees . But there is a substantial proportion of exam inees- the test
anxious- whose anxiety will cripple their test performance, possibly severely.
Moreover, because the anxiety will be common to standardized testing situations
(although often not to other testing situations), the elTor in measurement resulting
from a single testing situation will be compounded by error in measurement in
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other testing situations. With repeated low scores, a bright but test-anxious
individual may truly appear to be stupid. What is needed is some kind of
standardized assessment device that is fair to the test anxious, as well as to
others, and that does not impose a differential penalty on individuals as a function of a form of state anxiety that may have no counterpart in situations other
than that of standardized testing. I believe that we have at least two promising
leads in this direction.
The first lead is testing based on the notion of intelligence as in part a function
of a person's ability to profit from incomplete instruction (Resnick & Glaser,
1976). A measure of this ability is now provided by Feuerstein's (1979) Learning
Potential Assessment Device (LPAD), which although originally proposed as an
assessment device for retarded performers, can be used for performers at varying
levels of performance, including advanced ones . The device involves administration of problems with graded instruction. The amount of instruction given depends on the examinee's needs . Moreover, the test is administered in a supportive, cooperative atmosphere, where the examiner is actually helping the
examinee solve problems rather than impassively observing the examinee's success or failure. The examiner does everything he or she can do to allay anxiety
(rather than to create it!). Feuerstein has found that children who are cowed by
and unable to perform well on regular standardized tests can demonstrate high
levels of performance on his test. Moreover , their performance outside the testing situation appears to be predicted better by the LPAD than by conventional
intelligence tests (Feuerstein, 1979).
The second lead is based on the notion that intelligence can be measured with
some accuracy by the degree of resemblance between a person's behavior and the
behavior of the "ideally" intelligent individual (Neisser, 1979). Sternberg et al.
(1981) had a group of individuals rate the extent to which each of 250 behaviors
characterized their own behavioral repertoire . A second group of individuals
rated the extent to which each of the 250 behaviors characterized the behavioral
repertoire of an "ideally intelligent" person . The investigators then computed
the correlation between each person ' s self-description and the description of the
ideally intelligent person (as provided by the second group of individuals). The
correlation provided a measure of degree of resemblance between a real individual and the ideally intelligent individual. The claim was that this degree of
resemblance is itself a measure of intelligence. The facts bore out the claim: The
correlation between the resemblance measure and scores on a standard lQ test
was .52 , confirming that the measure did provide an index of intelligence as it is
often operationally defined . And doing self-ratings involved minimal stress .
The behaviors that were rated had previously been listed by entirely different
individuals as characterizing either "intelligent" or "unintelligent" persons .
The intelligent behaviors were shown (by factor analysis) to fall into three
general classes: problem-solving ability (e.g., "reasons logically and well,"
"identifies connections among ideas," and "sees all aspects of a problem");
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verbal ability (e.g., "speaks clearly and articulately," "is verbally fluent ," and
"reads with high comprehension "); and social competence (e.g., "accepts others for what they are," "admits mistakes ," and "displays interest in the world
at large") . (No attempt was made to classify the unintelligent behaviors, which
were not the object of interest in the study.)
I would not propose the behavioral checklist, or the LPAD, for that matter , as
replacements for standard intelligence tests. Certainly, there is not enough validity information yet to make such a proposition. But I think that they deserve to be
considered as supplements to standard tests. They are much less stress provoking
than standard intelligence tests and may well be more accurate, at least for
individuals who fall to pieces when confronted with standardized tests. Persons
who scored high on these new indices but low on conventional indices would
merit further follow-up before writing them off as weak or even average performers. Such measures carry the potential of identifying gifted individuals who are
being lost for no reason other than their high levels of test anxiety .
To conclude, although cognitive psychology has not yet provided (and may
never provide) a basis for replacing existing psychometric tests , it has made and
is continuing to make contributions that I believe will result in some important
reconceptualizations of the nature of intelligence and its measurement. I think
cognitive psychologists have made substantial progress toward this goal during
the past decade, and I see no reason to believe that this progress will not
continue.
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The Status of Test Val idation
Research

Lyle F. Schoenfeldt
Texas A & M University

More than any other area, validation research is where the "rubber meets the
road" in test construction and test usage. The very term validation implies the
assessment or measurement of individuals and the relationship of this assessment
to some criterion of performance. The success of a test validation effort, or the
lack thereof, has implications for the value of the assessment and for the utility of
the procedures.
In today's environment, whether the validation is intended for employee
selection, educational decisions, or personal counseling, there is an increasing
probability that the outcomes of research will have legal implications. In the
past, a testing program could be set up in terms of professional judgment without
including the experimental validation of the procedures. If the individuals involved in establishing the test program were knowledgeable, it was quite possible the tests, although unvalidated, would make a practical contribution in terms
of the goals intended. In the absence of a formal validation, however, one would
never know the extent to which the testing program was successful or superior to
another assessment procedure. A testing program that does not involve validation
research is at best an unknown and at worst may be an outright fraud. In either
case, the likelihood that testing procedures will have to be defended, including
the possibility of legal action, has increased dramatically.
The purpose of the present review is to look carefully at the current status and
future directions of test validation research. It will be of value to look at what we
know, some of the problems with the process by which tests have been validated
up to now, what needs to be learned, and how we will move ahead in the area of
test validation research. Finally, it will be important to consider test validation
research as a vehicle for improving test construction and test usage.
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Test Validation: A Definition
In the context of this discussion a test is defined as any measure, combination of
measures, or procedure used to evaluate differences among people. In this manner , the term tests includes the full range of assessment techniques from traditional paper and pencil tests to performance assessments, and includes such
things as training programs (e.g., school achievement), situational assessment,
and probationary tryouts. In other words , a test is any formal or informal assessment from which an inference is drawn. For example, if a student transferring
into a middle school were to be given a series of paper and pencil assessments as
a basis for determining course assignments, few would disagree that these assessments constitute a test. On the other hand, the same decisions could be made on
the basis of an interview between a school counselor , the student, and parents.
Because inferences about readiness for various courses result from the counselor- student interaction, one could consider that this is also a test.
Validity is the degree to which inferences from scores on tests or other
assessments are supported or justified on the basis of actual evidence. Validity is
not a characteristic of a test; rather it is a characteristic of inferences that resu lt
from a test, assessment, or observation . Thus, validation determines the degree
of relatedness between inferences made and actual events .

History of Test Validation
The history of measurement and validation is at least as old as Plato's Republic .
Various summaries of the important events surrounding modern mental measurements have been well documented (Linden & Linden, 1968). In his review of the
role of tests in personnel selection, Guion (1976) developed a series of tenets that
summarize the "orthodox" history of validation research. These tenets, as
adapted from Guion (1976), are summarized in Table 4.1 . As seen, the emphasis
is on developing a singular predictor- criterion relationship as the basis for determining validity. The dates in the table suggest that the tenets were well established early in this century. Further, these values would not be wide of the mark
in the 1980s for an investigator interested in a traditional validation project.

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO TEST VALIDATION
Criterion Related
Traditionally, the criterion-related approach has dominated validation research.
The "tenets" of criterion-related research are essentially those described by
Guion (1976) and summarized in Table 4.1. It is possible to distinguish two
alternate approaches within the criterion-related procedure. Concurrent validation involves the relationship of tests to criterion measures obtained at the same

TABLE 4.1
Guion's Historical Ten ets of Orthodo x Valid ation Research"
Tenet
I . The purpose of validation is to predict
future performance .
2. Predictors and criteria should be selected on the bas is of job analysis.

3 . Measuring instruments must be
standardi zed .

Comments
" It is ... essenti al to know whether the scores
are in any useful sense predictive of subsequent success [Bingham , 1937, p. 2 16]."
" the tests which are to be experimented with
can be chosen onl y on the basis of some more
or less plausible relationship between particular tests and the sOl1 of duties performed
[Kornhauser & Kingsbury, 1924 , p. 47]."
" In order for measurements of persons taken at
varying times to be comparable, the procedure
of the test must be unifo rm [Freyd , 1923, p.

232]. "
4. Tests should be empiricall y validated .
5 . Validation is situation-specific.

No test has any signi ficance before it is tried out
(Link , 1924) .
"if max imum value is to be attached to test
scores the conditions under which
the .
[examinees performed] with the use
of tests should reproduce in general the condi tions under which they .
[performed] when
the tests were evaluated [Freyd , 1923 , p.

38 1] . "
6 . More than one test should be used.

7. Only one criterion should be used .
8 . Tests are preferred over non test
assessments .

To quote Guion (1 976 , p. 783), " Hull (1 928)
insisted that a battery of four or fi ve tests or
more must be developed if the criteri on in all
its complex ity was to be predicted with maximum effi ciency."
Freyd (1 923, p. 223 ) described the process by
which "a criterion" should be selected .
" The experimenter will not limit hi mself to any
particular type of measuring instrument, but
those in which he will be most interested are
tests and questionnaires [Freyd , 1923, p.

23 1] . "
9 . Individual differences should be recogni zed in evaluating tests.

"If men and women are both .. [in volved in
the validation research] it will be necessary to
examine the results for sex differences , and if
need be, to eva luate the test separately for the
two sexes [Freyd, 1923, p. 225 ]."

" Adapted fro m G uion (1976). Copyri ght © 1976 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Used by
permiss ion .
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time as the test data. Predictive validity involves the assessment of individuals
followed by the collection of criterion information at some subsequent time. In
some designs, the time factor can be an important consideration, whereas in other
situations it is not. For example, in predicting job success, concurrent validation
inevitably involves existing employees whose motives for performing well on the
test may differ from the motivation of applicants. In other fields, such as psychometrics, concurrent validity is used to demonstrate, for example, that a paper and
pencil assessment is an adequate substitution for a more cumbersome, painful, or
inefficient assessment procedure. In both cases, though, the goal is to develop
and to test a hypothesis and (hopefu lly) to assert validity on the bases of a
demonstrated relationship between individual characteristics and measures of
performance.
Criterion-related validity has traditionally been the most frequent ly used approach to test validation. In any instance of criterion-related validity, most attention is usually given to the decision about the selection of the criterion variables.
Given that the validation process is one of inferences from test scores, the
definition of the criterion or standard to be inferred looms large as a possible
limitation in the criterion-related approach.
The fact that two relatively recent review articles dealt with this subject
(James, 1973; Smith, 1976) emphasizes the attention that criteria selection is
receiving. Although the orthodox tenets of the traditional approach focus on a
sing le criterion, which often is a weighted combination of several criteria or a
succession of single measures, the emphasis of these two reviews is on a more
complex approach to the development of criteria. Mention is made in these
reviews of various models including the ultimate criterion (Thorndike, 1949), the
complete final goal of a particular type of selection or training; multiple criteria
approaches (Dunnette, 1963; Ghiselli, 1956; Guion , 1961; Wallace, 1965) (as
exemplified by the model shown in Fig. 4. 1 and discussed later); and general
criterion models (as exemplified by the models shown in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 and
discussed in a later section).

Content Oriented
Another traditional approach to the validation of tests is the content-oriented
procedure. This approach is applicable when empirical investigation is not possible and involves validation on the basis of assumed or hypothesized relationships. The legitimacy of the content-oriented procedure lies in the degree to
which the hypothesis itself is well grounded in carefully controlled observations
and prior research results (Guion, 1976). Although mentioned in various texts
and in the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests (American Psychological Association, 1974), content-oriented validation has always been the
stepchi ld of testing. Until quite recently information about procedures for demonstrating content-oriented validity has been perfunctory, contradictory, or un-
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TABLE 4.2
Steps in Content Va lidation
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Task analysis
Definition of performance domain
Survey of performance domain
Development of items
Demonstration th at items constructed are representative of the performance domain
Development of cut-off score

avai lable. The emergence of content-oriented validity has been largely a result of
a series of conferences (Guion, 1974a; Proceedings, 1975) , articles (Guion,
1974b , 1977; Schoenfeldt, Schoenfeldt, Acker, & Pearlson, 1976; Tenopyr,
1977), and manuals (American Psychological Association, 1974 , 1975 , 1980;
Mussio & Smith, 1973). The steps involved in a study of content-oriented
validity are summari zed in Table 4.2.
Perhaps the criticism of these two approaches to validation has been best
exemplified by Loevinger's (1957) belief that criterion-related validities are "ad
hoc" and that content-oriented validity relies too much on the judgment of the
investigator and is thus nongenerali zable. Loevinger believes that ad hoc arguments are sc ientifically of minor importance if not actually inadmiss ible and
terms both approaches to validation as "administrative" as her way of implying
a lack of scientific basis.

CONSTRUCT VALIDATION
Definition of Construct Validity
Construct validity is concerned with understanding the underlying dimensions or
attributes being measured through any test or observation process. This type of
validation is less concerned with specific performance inferences but instead
considers the relationship of test scores to possible underlying attributes.
Many researchers have conducted validation studies but tend to show little
concern for construct validity. Construct validity is more in the nature of determining the sc ientific basis of a particular measure and frequently does not concern practitioners. Evidence of construct validity is often fo und in a well-developed manual accompanying a particular test or is obtained by pulling together the
results of studies dealing with a particular instrument. With regard to the latter,
The Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook (B uros, 1978) lists over 5000 references to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). UndoubtedIy , the totality of this massive body of research provides much valuable in fo rmation about relationships to other tests, to criteria , and (through various multivariate analytic procedu res) to numerous constructs.
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On the basis of relating particular measures to a wide variety of possible
performance outcomes or other test scores, a network of research data is developed from which inferences could be drawn about the nature of the original test
and the constructs that underlie it. Large-scale studies of construct validity are
done and form the basis for new scientific learning about specific measures in
particular and human differences in general. More than with other approaches to
validation, a successful study of construct validity suggests and encourages
further research.

History of Construct Validity
Construct validation has always existed, at least at an implicit level, but was only
formally defined and extensively discussed in the mid- to late 1950s. A quote
from Cronbach and Meehl (1955) best summarizes the early articulation of this
conceptualization:
Validation of psychological tests has not yet been adequately conceptualized, as the
APA Committee on Psychological Tests learned when it undertook (1950- 54) to
specify what qualities should be investigated before a test is published. In order to
make coherent recommendations the Committee found it necessary to distinguish
fo ur types of validity, established by different types of research and req ui ring
different interpretation. The chief innovation in the Committee's report was the
term construct validity. This idea was first formulated by a subcommittee (Meehl
and R. C. Challman) studying how proposed recommendations would apply to projective techniques, and later modified and clarified by the entire Committee . . . .
The statements agreed upon by the Committee (and by comm ittee of two other
associations) were published in the Technical Recommendations . ...
Identification of construct validity was not an isolated development. Writers on
validity during the preceding decade had shown a great deal of dissatisfaction with
conventional notions of validity , and introduced new terms and ideas, but the
resulting aggregation of types of validity seems only to have stirred the muddy
waters. Portions of the distinctions we shall discuss are implicit in Jenkins' paper,
" Validity for what?" (1946), Gulliksen's "Intrinsic validity" (1950), Goodenough' s distinction between tests as "signs" and "samples" (1950), Cronbach' s
separation of " logical" and "empirical" validity (1949) , Guilford's "factorial
validity" (1946), and Mosier's papers on " face validity" and " validity generalization" (1947, 1951). Helen Peak (1953) comes close to an explicit statement of
construct validity as we shall present it [po 281].

Further discussions by Loevinger (1957), Bechtoldt (1959), Campbell (1960),
and Ebel (1961) followed , and all contributed in refining of the definition of
construct validity as well as in compiling ev idence necessary to substantiate its
existence.
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Multitrait-Mu ltimethod Approach
In terms of providing a methodology to verify construct validity, the article with
by far the greatest impact was "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the
Multitrait- Multimethod Matrix" by Campbell and Fiske (1959) . In this seminal
work, Campbell and Fiske (1959) advocated a procedure for triangulating a
construct, utilizing a matrix of intercorrelations among tests representing at least
two traits, each measured by at least two methods . Construct validity is the
degree to which measures of the same trait correlate higher with each other than
they do with measures of different traits involving separate methods.
The importance of the multitrait- multimethod (MTMM) procedure is in the
provision of a conceptualization of construct validity that could be readily operationalized by researchers . Interestingly, few articles or dissertations were published in the 1960s using the MTMM approach. The rate of diffusion of the
technology was understandably slow. However, the MTMM procedure has come
into its own in the 1970s and 1980s . An extensive computer review of the
validity literature revealed that 10 articles/dissertations were published in 1979
and another 12 were published in 1980 , using the MTMM approach. This is
exemplary of how standard the procedure has become in the establishment of
construct validity .
There have been both extensions and critiques of the MTMM. Werts ,
Joreskog, and Linn (1972) suggested that the MTMM approach may be treated as
a problem in confirmatory factor analysis and that the MTMM is subsumed by
the general model for analysis of covariance structure. Other authors have proposed further innovative factor analytic applications (Golding & Seidman, 1974;
Jackson, 1975; Kenny, 1976; Levin, 1974; Ray & Heeler, 1975). Other extensions have been in the application of nonparametric statistics (Hubert & Baker,
1978) and path analytic procedures (Schmidt, 1978). Limitations of the MTMM
have been discussed by Kalleberg and Kluegel (1975).

Other Approaches to Construct Validity
The multitrait- multimethod procedure has clearly become a standard for the
establishment of construct validity. At the same time, given the definition of
construct validity discussed previously, it is obvious that researchers are not
limited in the number of procedures employed to establish its existence. In fact,
given the nature of content validity , it is somewhat heretical to focus on methods
rather than models , although to a large extent the two are closely linked in the
context of this topic .
Historically, factor analysis has been associated with the establishment of
constructs. Many applications of factor analysis are in the nature of data reduction , and as such the results have little in the way of implications for the
establishment of construct validity. However, in conjunction with an appropriate
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model, factor analysis can playa valuable role in the validation of constructs.
Guilford's (1967 ; Guilford & Hoepfner, 1971) extensive work on the structure of
intellect is one of many examples that could be cited illustrating how a model and
appropriate factor analytic procedures can come together in the establishment of
construct validity.
Another method receiving recent recognition as a vehicle for its contribution
to the establishment of construct validity are latent-trait models (LTM). Several
recent studies by Whitely (l980a , 1980b) provide an example of the potential
contribution of LTM to the study of intelligence. LTM resolve several measurement problems in studies of intellectual change, including ability modification
and life-span development. LTM contribute to construct validity in their capability to represent an individual differences model of cognitive processing on
ability test items.

Construct Validity: State of the Science
Although specific procedures play an important role in the demonstration of
construct validity, the more important priority should be the research design.
With regard to the latter, some of the most recent work was discussed in a
conference on Construct Validity in Psychological Measurement (U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, 1980). This conference involved several important
themes. First was a call for more clearly defined professional standards for
construct validity. Second was a discussion of the realization of the role construct
validity plays, in conjunction with criterion-related and content-oriented validity ,
in the assessment of human differences. Included in this theme was the singularly
unique application of a construct model in the validation of the Federal Government's Professional and Administrative Career Examination (PACE) , as reported
by McKillip and Wing (1980).
A third theme of the conference involved a review of thinking and progress in
several important areas of assessment by several recent contributors in each area.
Carroll (1980) discussed background and progress in his assessment of abilities.
Sternberg examined different approaches to the construct validity of aptitude
tests in the context of an information-processing assessment (Sternberg , 1980).
Jackson (1980) reviewed construct validity and personality assessment, concluding " that through a judicious combination of psychological analysis of dispositional variables and psychometric and multivariate procedures, progress in personality assessment is possible [po 79]." Frederiksen (1980) and Messick
(1980), in different presentations , discussed research models for construct
validation .
In his conference review , Dunnette (1980) developed a number of integrating
thoughts with respect to construct validity. One of his main points was that, as a
part of a scientific undertaking, the study of constructs should be pursued by
diverse research strategies. Certainly anyone present at the conference or familiar
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with the proceedings would be impressed with the diversity of approaches taken
and with the state of the art with respect to sc ientific knowledge about intelligence, aptitude, and personality constructs.

MULTIVARIATE VALIDATION MODELS
Psychologists and measurement speciali sts have been interested in predicting
human behavior over a long period of time , although the shape and form of this
interest has changed. Traditional interest was largely empirical and has been
based on linear methods of prediction . Typical results have been disappointing.
For example, Ghiselli (1966) has summarized 107 validity coeffic ients calculated to predict training and proficiency criteria. The mean validity coefficients
in five major aptitude areas are shown in Table 4.3. As seen, coefficients are
relatively modest, with the overall average correlation to predict training success
being .30 and to predict the more important criterion of job performance, .19.
These results have spurred many researchers to experiment with various multivariate models over the last 15 years .

Person-Process-Product Models
One class of approaches might be termed persol1- process- produc/ models in
that they attempt to examine behavior as a complex outcome of interactions
between individual attributes and organizational requirements within the setting
in which the behavior occurs. Figure 4.1 is a schematic portrayal of a prediction
model adapted from one suggested by Guetzkow and Forehand (1961). It was
designed in an effort to take into account comp lex interactions that may occur
among various predictor combinations, different groups or types of individual s,
different behaviors, and the conseq uences of these behaviors. As Dunnette
(1963) indicated , the model permits the possibility of predictors being differentially useful for predicting the behaviors of different subsets of individuals. Also
ev ident is the fact that similar behaviors may be predictable by different patterns
of interaction between groupings of predictors and individual s or even that the
same level of performance on predictors can lead to substantially different patterns of behavior for different people . Also , incorporated into the model is the
fact that the same or simi lar behaviors can lead to quite different outcomes
depending on the situation .
A simi lar model, couched in terms of predicting job performance, is show n in
Fig . 4.2 (Campbell , Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick , 1970). In this model, job
performance is viewed as a product of the person impacting with various organizational forces . The individual is represented as a configuration of abilities,
special ski lls, interest, personality traits, attitudes, expectancies, and reward
preferences .
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TABLE 4.3
Comparison of Validity Coefficients for Training and Profici ency
Criteria by Type of Test "
Mean Validity
Coefficient

Inte llectual ab ilities
Intelli gence
Immed iate memory
Substitution
Arithmetic
Spatial and mechanical abilities
Spat ial relations
Location
Mechanical principles
Perceptual accuracy
Number compari son
Name comparison
Cancell at ion
Pursu it
Perceptu al speed
Motor abil ities
Tracing
Tapping
Dotting
Finger dexterity
Hand dex terity
Arm dexterity
Personality trait s
Interest
All tests

No.

Pairs of'

Train.

Prof.

Coefficients

.35
.34
.23
.27

.19
.2 1
.15
.23
. 15
.20
. 19
. 17
.24
.23
.24
.29
. 19
. 17
.27
. 17
. 15
. 13
. 14
.20
.22
.24
.08
.08
. 19

38
16
5
4
13
28
13
6
9
15
4
3

042
.36
.38
.24
Al

.26
.25
.24
.58
. 18
.30
.18
. 18
.1 5
. 15
. 16
.24
.54
.05
.05
.30

4
3
24
4
6
4
7
2
I

2
2
107

"From Gh iselli , 1966 .

Looking at the model from the individual' s point of view, a job involves task
demands that are objective lists of expectancies or priorities imposed upon the
indi vidual in an attempt to alter behavior in specified ways. Due to this, an
individual' s behavior consists entirely of emitted responses and performance on
the job that includes those aspects of behav ior related to organizational climate.
The result or product of the individual 's effort is a contribution to the organ ization , the generalized result of performance.
The models shown in Figs . 4.1 and 4 .2 are two of several that summarized the
relationship between individual characteristics and outcomes. The implications
are significant. Behavior is seen as a complex product of cognitive, noncognitive
(including motivational tendencies), and stylistic abilities. Expenditures of ener-
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FIG. 4.1. A modified model for se lection and prediction (adapted from Dunnette, 1963, p. 3 19).
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gy are the product of motivational forces. The level of motivation determines
whether goal-oriented behavior occurs or not. Once an individual is motivated,
the effectiveness of performance is determined by the cognitive capabilities,
styli stic tendencies, and other attributes of the individual.

Moderator Validation
A study by Berdie (1961) suggested that persons differing in intraindividual trait
variation (on measures of mathematics proficiency) might be differentially predicted to be successful or unsuccessful in engineering studies . Thus, intraindividual trait variation was thought to "modify" performance predictions . Other
efforts to discover moderators in predictions were given in studies by Fiske
(1957) and Fiske and Rice (1 955), both of which were simil ar to the Berdie
(1961) study. In addition , studies by Cleary (1966), Frederiksen and Melville
(1954) , Ghiselli (1956, 1960a, 1960b), Lee (1961), and Rock (1969) are relevant. In each case, the dominate theme has been an effort to identify persons who
are consistently more (or less) predictable using particular sets of predictors or
subgroups of persons requiring different prediction procedures.
The procedures described are statistical in that they all involve variations of
frequently employed prediction procedures . Although some of the procedures are
more difficult to implement than others, unlike the models shown in Figs. 4 . 1
and 4.2, all have been attempted in one or several studies .
Recently it has become apparent that moderated prediction approaches are not
much better than traditional linear methods of prediction. Zedeck (1971) , for
example, showed that initially favorable results usually fa il ed to maintain their
superiority upon cross validation. In discussing such statistical strategies, Dunnette and Borman (1979) concl uded that:
Selection research must devote increased effort toward reducing sources of both
variable error (meas urement and sampling e~ror) and constant error (such as percepti onal biases) in the development of instrumen ts and in the design of studi es.
Non-linear models may some day once aga in warrant attention but not until such
errors have been reduced significantl y to overcome the inherently superior robustness of the simple linear model ,"p . 495 ). 1

Aptitude by Treatment Interactions
In 1957, Cronbach wrote of "The Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology,"
the one concerned with corre lation and the other, through experimentation, with
the sequence of events. General discussions of the importance of combining the
IReproduced with permi ss ion, from the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 30. © 1978 by
Annual Reviews , Inc .
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"two disciplines," as Cronbach (1957) has been recommending, have been
published by , among others , Owens (1968, 1971) and Vale and Vale (1969) .
More recently Cronbach (1975) and Cronbach and Snow (1977) have published
comprehensive and penetrating reviews examining the background into the nature of the problem as well as the rationale for the aptitude by treatment (A TI)
procedure they advocated as an alternate validation model for enhanced
prediction.
The results of the ATI approach to date have not been impressive . Evidence
for significant interactions is scarce and fragmentary. Second- or third-level
interactions tend to cloud any simple person-performance relationships, or at
least render relationships inconsistent from sample to sample. In Cronbach's
(1975) words:
The line of investigation I advocated in 1957 no longer seems sufficient. Interactions are not confined to the first order; the dimensions of the situation and the
person enter into complex interactions . . . . Taking stock today, I think most of us
judge theoretical progress to have been disappointing lp. 116].

Later in the same article, Cronbach (1975) states:
When ATls are present, a general statement about a treatment effect is misleading
because the effect will come or go depending on the kind of person treated. When
ATIs are present , a generalization about aptitude is an unceltain basis for prediction
because the regression slope will depend on the treatment chosen . . . . An ATI
resu lt can be taken as a general conclusion only if it is not in turn moderated by
further variables. If Aptitude x Treatment x Sex interact , for example , then the
Aptitude x Treatment effect does not tell the story. Once we attend to interactions ,
we enter a hall of mirrors that extends to infinity. However far we carry our
analysis-to third order or fifth order or any other- untested interactions of a still
hi gher order can be envisioned (emphasis added) [po 199].

Thus, in Cronbach' s own words , the ATI path he has walked in an effort to
infer future performance better has not been fruitful. Gains were made, as reported in the 1975 publication, but these were of less magnitude than had been
hoped might materialize . These reservations have led Cronbach (1975) to propose abandonment of the A TI approach as a potential explanatory model for
predicting performance behavior.

Assessment-C lass if ication Model
Although the list of approaches that have been attempted to improve the inferential or validation process could extend ad infinitum , one further procedure,
namely the Assessment- Classification model described by Schoenfeldt (1974) ,
is worthy of mention. The Dunnette (1963) model , and virtually all the approaches discussed in this section, sought to improve the quality of inferences
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made on the basis of the assessment data by identifying subsets of persons for
whom predictors were differentially useful, for whom situational factors varied ,
and so forth. On the basis of these concerns , as well as in the interest of an
alternative to the ATI model, Owens (1968, 1971) suggested his developmental- integrative model. The Assessment-Classification model, shown in Fig.
4.3, is the logical extension of the Owens' developmental- integrative approach
Job Structure

Individual Assessment
BAYESIAN PREDICTION
Establishment of the Model
The following steps. each
outlined in depth in the
proposal, are necessary to
actualize the model:
(1) Formation of life
hi story subgroups
(5);
(2) Formation of job
families (F m); and
(3) Reg ressions to determine the probability
of success and sat isfaction in F m given
that I , is a member of
S.
Use of the Model
New individuals are
classified to the life
history group (5,) they
most closely resemble,
and are compared to eac h
job family. Employment
recommendations are for
the job(s) where the probabi lity of success and
satisfaction would be
maximal.

•

Individual
Antecedent
Behavior

Life
History
Subgroups
~

Biographical question naire to clas sify individuals (! , ) to subsets
(5 ,) homo geneous with
res pect to important
dimensions of life
experience.

FIG. 4.3.

Job
Families
Predictor se t to estimate
job success and sa tisfaction given that I, is a
member of 5, and is performing job J" which is a
member of family Fm.

Job
Activitie s

Posi tion Analysis
Questionnaire to classify jobs (J " ) to job
families (F m) homogeneous with re spect to
important activities.

Assessment-Class ification model of manpower utilization.
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and the version most compatible with the models shown in Figs. 4 . 1 and 4.2.
Thus , it incorporates the evaluation of person, process, and product (as suggested by the models in Figs. 4.1 and 4 .2) with the subgroup conceptualization
formulated by Owens (1968).
The specific process involved in actualizing the Assessment- Classification
model consists of providing separate categorizations of the predictor and criteria
sets. In dealing with the predictor set, two steps are needed. The first step
involves identifying standard predictors found to be related logically to the
criteria in question. The individual differences variables of the Campbell et al.
(1970) model provide an example of predictor variables that might be used. The
second step requires implementation of the procedures described by Owens
(1968), that is, formulating subgroups with respect to the major dimensions of
antecedent behavior and relating the subgroups to relevant criteria . This entai ls
administering a background questionnaire to assess the antecedent behaviors. On
the basis of responses to this questionnaire, individuals would then be classified
into subgroups that are homogenous with respect to important dimensions of life
behavior. In other words, the subgroups are constructed on the basis of bringing
together individuals who have reported simi lar background patterns .
The other aspect of the Assessment- Classification model concerns the structuring of the criteria domain, the jobs (in the case of Fig. 4.3), but with other
criteria for other situations. In Fig. 4.3, the structuring of jobs into fam ilies
homogeneous with respect to their performance requirements and desirable configurations of attributes is illustrated. Also, several instruments have been developed and found to be of use for measuring or structuring jobs in terms of the
psychological demands required for successful performance (Cunningham,
1969; McCormick, Jeanneret, & Mecham, 1969). Other procedures would be
used for structuring the criteria domain in educational or clinical settings.
Unlike the conceptual models in Figs . 4 . 1 and 4 .2 that do not lend themselves
to statistical evaluation or the statistical models that have been tried and found
lacking, the results with the Assessment- Classification model have been positive . Schoenfeldt (1974) examined the validity of the model with a large sample
of students (N = 1934) working toward college degrees. Subgroups formed on
the basis of previous behavioral data collected during the freshman year differed
with respect to criterion (major , grade point average, and so forth) measurements
taken 4 years later. More importantly , the subgroups differed with respect to the
curricu lar paths taken during college . The result indicated that it was possible to
differentiate people in meaningful ways (i.e. , to subgroup individuals and to
match these subgroups with similar structuring of the criteria domain).
Two industrial applications usi ng the Assessment- Classification model hav.e
been reported. In the first, Morrison (1977) tested the model's efficacy in making
placement decisions in an industrial setting with nonexempt employees . Eight
developmental-interest dimensions describing life choices, values, and interests
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of 438 blue-collar workers were formulated. Job analysis identified two clusters
of positions that were homogenous within and differentiated between each other
on relevant job attributes. One cluster composed of 102 incumbents with more
than 6 months service consisted of process operator positions . The other cluster
was composed of heavy equipment operator positions and had 148 incumbents .
A discriminate function was calculated on a validation group of incumbents in an
effort to develop a linear combination of the life history factors that maximinally
differentiated the two job families. Cross validation demonstrated that three
psychologically meaningful dimensions discriminated among the groups at both
statistical and practical levels of significance. The process operators were more
likely to be raised in an urban environment, to have a more favorable self-image,
and to prefer standardized work schedules than the heavy equipment operators.
The second study was by Brush and Owens (1979) and utilized a total of 1987
nonexempt employees of a U.S. oil company. Each employee completed an
extensive biographical inventory. Hierarchical clustering of the resulting biographical profiles produced 18 subgroups of employees such that, within anyone
subgroup , background experience and interest were similar, and yet among
subgroups they were different. A similar methodology was applied to job analysis data in creating a structure of 19 job families for 939 office and clerical jobs.
Significant relationships were found between biodata subgroups and other variables, such as sex, educational level , termination rate, job classification , and
(most important) performance rating .

VALIDITY GENERALIZATION

One of the tenets of the traditional criterion-related validity model has been belief
in the situational nature of the results . For more than 50 years , researchers have
believed that the results of criterion-related validity studies were applicable only
to the situation on which the study was based. This is understandable because
research, such as that by Ghiselli (1966), has clearly demonstrated results of
using the same predictors to predict similar criteria using different subjects in
comparable (different) settings varied over a wide range. The empirical results of
Ghiselli (1966) demonstrated considerable variability in validity coefficients
even when predictors and criteria were essentially identical.
On the basis of findings by Ghiselli (1966) and other investigators over a long
period of years , the profession has concluded that validity generalization was
essentially impossible (Ghiselli , 1966, p. 228; Guion, 1965, p. 126). This conclusion even has been incorporated into professional standards (American Psychological Association, 1975) and government regulations (U. S. Equal Opportunity Commission, 1978). In fact, Guion (1976) indicated that the problem of
limited validity generalization was perhaps the most serious limitation of personnel psychology .
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Bayesian Validity Generalization
Change in the belief of limited generalizability was seen in the mid-1970s and the
years followed through the work of Schmidt and Hunter along with their colleagues. The initial article by Schmidt , Hunter , and Urry (1976) attacked the
problem of small numbers typically used in validity studies. As pointed out in the
Schmidt et al. (1976) article, it typically has been believed that sample sizes of
30 to 50 individuals were adequate to make criterion-related validity studies
technically feasible . To quote Schmidt and Hunter (1980):
When sample sizes are in the 30- 50 range statistical power is typically in the .25
to .50 range. That is, if the test is in fact valid, such studies will correctly detect the
validity only 25-50% of the time. Sample sizes required to produce statistical
power of .90 are much larger, often ranging above 200 or 300 [p. 43].

In further articles, Schmidt and Hunter (1977) and Schmidt , Hunter , Pearlman, and Shane (1979, pp. 260-26 1) identified seven artifactual sources that
would explain the fact that different validity coefficients would result when
identical predictors and criteria were studied within the context of the same job .
The seven sources of variance that might lead to different results were as fo llows :
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Differences between studies in criterion reliability.
Differences between studies in test reliability.
Differences between studies in range restriction.
Sampling error (i.e., variance due to N < 00).
Differences between studies in amount and kind of criterion.
Computational and typographical error.
Slight differences in factor structure between tasks of a given type (e.g .,
arithematic reasoning test).

Schmidt, Hunter, Pearlman, and Shane (1979) proposed that a researcher
with, say, 100 validity coefficients relating tests of perceptual speed to clerical
proficiency compute the variance of the validity coefficient distribution and
subtract variance due to each of the artifactual sources from this total. The
Schmidt and Hunter (1977) article, as well as other articles by these authors,
included computational procedures associated with the first four of the seven
artifactual sources given previously. It is proposed that if the remaining variance
is zero or near zero, validity generalization has been achieved, because the
observed variation in validity results has been shown to be entirely a result of
statistical artifacts. Further, as Schmidt and Hunter (1977) have pointed out: "in
cases in which the mean of the corrected distribution is too low and/or the
variance too great to allow conclusions [as to the generalizability of the validity],
the corrected distribution will sti ll be useful-as the prior distribution in a Baye-
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sian study of the test's validity [p o 530)." The procedures and results of such a
Bayesian study are described in the Schmidt , Hunter , Pearlman, and Shane
(1979) article.
Schmidt and Hunter , along with their colleagues, have diligently demonstrated the generalizability of results from numerous small studies covering several test- job relationships. In their initial publication (Schmidt & Hunter, 1977),
they examined 114 validity coefficients relating tests of mechanical principles to
performance of mechanical repairmen , 191 tests of finger dexterity related to
performance of bench workers, 72 intelligence tests related to performance of
general clerks, and 99 studies of spatial relations correlated with performance as
machine tenders. In the Schmidt, Hunter, Pearlman, and Shane (1979) article
these results were extended through the examination of generali zabi lity of various tests related to performance in two fami lies of clerical jobs and the job of
first-line supervisor. With respect to clerical jobs , the criterion-performance
relationships of 11 tests were examined, with the number of validity coefficients
ranging from 53 to 32 1. In their most recent report (Schmidt , Hunter, & Caplan ,
1981) , the generali zabi lity of validities were estab lished for four types of cognitive tests and a weighted biographical information blank, five measures in all , in
relation to performance in two petroleum industry job groups .
The results of Schmidt and Hunter 's investigations have been nothing short of
a revolution with respect to validation research. In essence, they have sorted
through the confusing and varying results of a 50-year period to show that a
"true" validity can be establi shed. They are of the belief that these estimates are
far more meaningful than the results of typical studies with small samples for
individual scientists and that validities are possible even when they are not
technically feasible in the context of a particular predictor criterion relationship.

Meta-Analysis
The term meta -analysis comes from the work of G lass (1976, 1977) and involves
integrating findings across studies. The idea is similar to that advanced by
Schmidt and Hunter (1977), namely to bring together res ults from numerous
small studies into an integrated study. G lass (1976) was seeking a way of organizing and depicting results from numerous studies as an alternative to the traditional narrative review . Again, the most definitive work in the area is by Hunter,
Schmidt, and Jackson (1982) and describes both quantitative and qualitative
procedures for integrating findings across studies. The methods are similar to
those in validity generalization, namely one of removing sources of artifactual
variance . However, the range of possibilities is far greater than just the simple
correlation coefficients considered in the validity genera lization work. Hunter et
al. (1982) deal with the possibility that results of the several studies to be
integrated might be presented in terms of diverse statist ical procedures , such as
regression , canonical correlation, or multivariate analysis of variance. In addi-
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tion, procedures were considered for identifying moderator variables or interactions that are indicative of findings that might be selected to be integrated .
Meta-analysis has clearly been an innovation whose time has come. Although
the original introduction of the method by Glass was 1976- 1977, there have
already been extensive publications using meta-analysis procedures. An extensive computer review of the validity literature for 1980 and 1981 indicated II
and IO articles/dissertations, respectively . This is extremely rapid diffusion,
equivalent to the current diffusion of the multitrait-multimethod matrix after 20
years .

PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS
New attention has been focused on procedures that have been available for over
30 years to estimate work force productivity on the basis of validity information.
Some of the original work can be traced to Brogden (1949) and the well-known
publication by Cronbach and GIeser (1965), Psychological Tests and Personnel
Decisions. More recently Schmidt, Hunter , McKenzie, and Muldrow (1979)
have suggested simplified procedures that make the previously cumbersome
productivity analysis approach within the range of possibilities in most
situations .
The goal in productivity analysis is to estimate the dollar impact that would be
realized in using a valid test to select individuals for a particular job. In the past
the practical value of a selection procedure has been estimated in terms of the
increase in the percentage of "successful" workers through expectancy table
analysis or some equivalent procedure. Seldom have these estimates been in
terms of the economic implications of the valid selection procedure on work
force productivity.
The basic formula for overall gain in utility from use of a test is:

where

number of selectees
cost of testing one applicant
selection ratio
average standard score on the test of those
selected (in applicant group standard score
units)
test validity
standard deviation of job performance in
dollar terms among randomly selected
employees .
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As shown by Schmidt and Hunter ( 1980), the first four items of information are
easi ly determined. In the past it was believed that the standard deviation of job
performance dollars (SD) could only be estimated using cost accounting procedures that were both complex and uncertain. Schmidt and Hunter (1980) have
shown how SDy could be estimated by supervisors of the job under study using a
questionnaire procedure. In the Schmidt and Hunter (1980) study , budget analysis supervisors were given the following instructions:
Now, based on your experience with agency budget ana lysts, we would li ke for you
to estimate the yearly value to your agency of the products and services produced
by the average budget analyst . Consider the quality and quantity of output typical
of the average budget analyst in the value of this output. In placing an overall dollar
value on this output, it may help to consider what the costs would be of having an
outside consulting firm provide these products and services [pp. 55 - 56).

Following an appropriate opportunity to provide that estimate , the supervisors
were instructed: .
We would now like yo u to consider the " superior" budget ana lyst. Let us define a
"superior" performer as a budget analyst who is at the 85th percentile.That is , his
performance is better than that of 85 percent of his fellow budget analysts and only
15 percent of budget ana lysts turn in better performances . Consider the quality and
quantity of the output typical of the "superior" budget analyst. Then estimate the
value of these products and serv ices . In placing an overall dollar value in this
output, it may again help to consider what the costs would be of having an outside
consulting firm perform these products and services [p. 56).

Schmidt and Hunter (1980) were ab le to use these estimates to obtain final
estimates for SDy and were able to estimate the value of productivity gains from
the use of a test in hiring 2000 budget analysts at over 32 million dollars.
These fairly innovative procedures for estimating the component of an important equation (SD) should make feasib le the analysis of the productivity impact
of selection procedures. As Schmidt and Hunter (1980) concluded: "the resu lts
of these analyses will convince many who are currently skeptical that good
selection is critical to organizational success [po 57)."

IMPLICATIONS FOR TEST CONSTRUCTION AND TEST
USAGE
It is worth reemphasizing that validity speaks to the ultimate value of a test by
affirming, or denying if that be the case, the inferential value of the score in a
particular circumstance . As such, validity evidence has obvious implications for
the worthiness of a test's construction and the appropriateness of its usage.
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Problems with the Process of Validation Research
Despite the importance of validity ev idence, validation research has not always
been of the nature that one could point to with pride. The initial half of this
century could be characterized as relying most heavily on criterion-related evidence of validity, often in a way that represented "blind empirici sm" at its
worst. To be sure, the methods of factor analysis popularized in the 1930s
encouraged the development of constructs , but the ,methods were somewhat
prohibitive until the commercial availability of the electronic computer in the
mid-1950s . Until rather recently , validity research meant a predictor- criterion
correlation to the average practitioner. Even worse , as evidenced by the intial
court cases on employment discrimination, tests had a half-life of their own and
often enjoyed widespread use without concomitant validity ev idence. In retrospect, it was clear that validation, as the feedback loop to test construction and
test usage, could not operate effectively if not undertaken.

Changes in Validation Research
Change was rapid and proceeded along several fronts. The formalization of
construct validation, more than anything else, legitimized validation research as
a scientific undertaking rather than as a practitioner art. The definition of construct validity began in the mid-1950s and has continued in a steady, albeit slow ,
progression ever since. Certainly the 1979 conference discussed at length earlier
showed that much progress has been made and that work continues using the
diverse research strategies recommended.
There can be no doubt that Title VII of the Civ il Rights Act of 1964 has been a
profound stimulus in validation research. Although there was a latency period of
6 or 7 years before the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1 97 1) case communicated in
clear and forceful terms that tests had to measure the person for the job and not
the person in the abstract, the effect has been profound ,
The initial flurry of activity, at least at the practitioner level, involved efforts
to validate existing tests. Implications for test usage were immediate as validation efforts failed and test programs for employee selection were discontinued.
At the same time, work was initiated on alternate validation strategies. These
alternatives included such diverse approaches as attempts to define and refine
further content-oriented validity along with application of several of the multivariate validation models discussed previously . The obv ious capstone to these
many efforts has been the validity generalization research by Frank Schmidt ,
John Hunter, and their colleagues.

The Future of Validation Research
The future of validation research is promising. There has been more progress in
the last decade than in the previous quarter century . Extending thi s trajectory will
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undoubtedly lead to new learning about the inferential value of tests in predicting
and understanding behavior.
Obviously the work on validity generalization will continue . The profess ion
has had only a short time to adjust to these fairly unique notions. Perhaps the
recency of the research is best exemplified by the fact that virtually all the work
has been by Schmidt and Hunter, along with their students. Ultimately their work
should render as obsolete the need for the empirical validation that has so characterized the research to date . Practitioners and researchers will only need to
analyze jobs or situations of concern and , on the basis of these circumstances,
consult tables of generalized validities from the numerous previous studies using
various predictors in similar circumstances . This work is still in its infancy , and
the implications are yet to be fe lt.
The inferential value of any single assessment or combination of measures is
at best such to explain half the criterion variance. This is not a problem that will
be addressed by the ongoing work on validity generalization or utility concepts.
Instead , the multivariate validation models hold the single best hope of improving the inferential value of assessments. By seeking to incorporate information
about the types of individual s and types of behaviors with organizational consideration and consequences, these models hold the best hope of improving the level
of predi ctions. As we have seen (Owens & Schoenfeldt , 1979) , these multivariate procedures can bridge the construct and empirical validity procedures. On the
other hand , the procedures are complex, and progress has been slow. The hope
of the future is being unshackled from the necessity of endless small studies of
empirical validity with efforts be ing directed to the multivariate procedures.
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It was the Chinese over 3000 years ago, not the Americans in this century, who

first used large-scale psychological testing (Dubois, 1966). But, as with many
other technological developments, it was the United States that enthusiastically
adopted the method (Haney, 1981). By now it is highly probable that every
person in our country has been affected in some way by the administration of
tests. Testing has become the means by which major decisions about people's
lives are made in industry, education, hospitals, mental health clinics, and the
civil service.
Tests themselves, by and large, are facially neutral. They do not inherently
discriminate against those who take them and, undoubtedly, scores derived from
tests have been used to admit, advance, and employ. For most people, however,
test results have served as exclusionary mechanisms- to segregate, institutionalize , track, and deny access to coveted and increasingly scarce employment
opportunities .
At one time, the work of academic and applied psychometricians went virtually unexamined by the law, but as the use of tests increased in the United
States, so did their potential for causing legally cognizable injury to test takers .
As a resu lt , there is probably no current activity performed by psychologists so
closely scrutinized and regulated by the legal system as testing .
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SOCIAL INFLUENCES
Although recent lig itation and legislation directly affect the continued adm inistration of psychological testing, most especiall y in employment and educational settings, it is my contention that what appears to be an antitesting movement in the courts and in Congress is not an anti testing movement at all. It is my
thesis that , in the main , the law 's concern abo ut testing has been evoked by the
following three major social deve lopments.
I. Our society in the las t 30 years has made attempts, albeit unevenly , to
undo the e ffects of history of de jure segregation and discrimination against
racial and ethnic minorities. Many of the more familiar cases, such as Larry P .
v. Riles (1979) affecting individu al intelligence scales, Debra P. v. Turlington
(1981) t concerning minimal competency tests, and Teal v. Connecticut (198 2)
litigating nuances of employment selection assessment, flow inexorably from
Brown v. Education (1954) and are simply renewed claims by minorities for the
fulfillment of the meaning of the 14th Amendment 's equal protection clause.
They refl ect the most recent challenges to practices that are perceived as attempts
to continue , in a more soph isticated manner, the racial and ethnic separation
more blatantly used in the early 1950s and 1960s by educational institutions and
public and private employers .
2. T he courts have recognized , as a constitutional imperative, the right
against impermissible intrusion by the government into the private li ves of its
citizens. Defining the right to privacy has been di ffic ult for the courts, but
recently the Supreme Court noted that one aspect of the right " is the individual
interest in avoiding di sclosure of personal matters [Whalen v. Roe, 1977 , p.
598]" or as the late Justice Brandeis more esthetically phrased it , " the right to be
let alone [Olmstead v. United States, 1927, p. 478]." If, as Reubhausen and
Brim ( 1965) assert , the' 'essence of privacy is . .. the freedom of the individual
to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which , and most
importantly , the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opini ons are
to be shared with or withheld from others [pp. I 189- 11 90]," one can eas il y see
why the broad spectrum of testing, but particularly personality and attitude
testing , wou ld be the object of legal scrutin y.
3. Finally, there has been a third soc ial development that has influenced the
law's concern with testing. Unlike judicial declaration s concerning di scrimination and privacy, this last influence is not of recent vintage . As a soc ial phenomeno n it has been part of human culture since its beginning. If you will pardon
a highly technical psycho legal term , I would like to call this third as pect stupidity. Stupidity may be defined as negligence or, alternatively, the fa ilure to use
reasonable care in carrying o ut one's obligation s. Although it does not connote
IComplete c itatio ns for all cases referenced in the tex t are found in Table 5. 1.
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intentional or willful desire to harm, negligent harm can be just as damaging as
purposefully inflicted injury. It is my thesis that stupidity , more than modern
interpretations of equal protection and privacy , has been responsible for the
increased legal regulation of psychological testing. On this count, both psychologists and judges must be faulted.
I believe that almost all the important legal decisions concerning psychological testing may be viewed as various combinations of the social phenomena
identified as items 1 to 3 just given. I would like to spend some time in developing this thesis by giving several pertinent examples from educational , employment, and forensic settings .

SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON LEGAL DECISIONS: SOME
EXAMPLES
Education
The Supreme Court's ringing declarations in Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) ended state-imposed segregation in the public schools. But in the decade
after Brown, many southern school systems refused to accept the Court ' s decision as final. They interpreted the Court's assertion that separation of black
children from white "solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority ... that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone [po 494]" as an empirically testable hypothesis , not a normative legal
principle . Thus, in the early 1960s one of Georgia's school systems sought to
disprove what it believed to be an erroneous factual premise . It alleged the segregation they were accused of perpetuating was not based on color "but rather
upon racial traits of educational significance as to which racial identity was only
a convenient index [Stell v. Savannah- Chatham County Board of Education,
1963, p. 668]." They attempted to show that differences in learning rates ,
cognitive ability, behavioral traits, and capacity for education in general were so
great that not only was it impossible for black children and white children to be
educated effectively in the same room but that to "congregate children of such
diverse traits in schools . . . would seriously impair the educational opportunities of both white and Negro and cause them grave psychological harm [po
668]. "
To prove their contentions the defendants called several expert witnesses,
among them two psychologists, Travis Osborne and Henry Garrett. Based on
such instruments as the California Achievement Test and the California Mental
Maturity Tests, they testified that significant differences in test scores were
indicative of inherent differences in the races and that only minor changes could
be achieved by educational readjustment or other environmental change. AI-
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though these test results and testimonies went unchallenged by attorneys fi ghting
to enforce desegregation, the idea that such devices could measure innate ability
fo und its way into a 1967 decision that, at the time, became the most persuasive
and widely quoted legal opinion of its kind . That case is Hobson v. Hansen.
At issue in Hobson was not psychological testing but rather the constitutionality of disparities in the allocation of financial and educational resources in
the Washington, D .C., public school system that, it was claimed , fa vored white
children. Also at issue was the overrepresentation of black children in lower, and
white children in upper, ability groups. But, in the course of the tri al, it was
adduced that the method by which track assignments were made depended almost entirely on such standardized group ability scales as the Metropolitan
Readiness and Achievement Test and the Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability
Test. Hobson, when read in its entirety, represents the justi fied condemnation of
rigid , poorl y conceived classification practices that negatively affected the educational opportunities of minority children and led to permanent stigmatization of
bl acks as unteachable . But swept within Hobson' s condemnation of harmful
classification practices were ability tests used as the sole or primary decision-
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making dev ices to justify placement. Not only was ability grouping as then
practiced in the District of Columbia abolished , but tests were banned unless they
could be shown to measure children's innate capacity to learn . No psychologist
who has written on the subject, including Jensen (1969 , 1980) , believes that tests
solely measure hereditary endowment (Anastasi, 1976; Cleary, Humphreys,
Kendrick, & Wesman, 1975). No test could pass such a criterion .
Left unscathed in Hobson were the stately, revered , and venerated dev ices
against which all other tests were measured- the individual intelligence scales.
But that was soon to change as the result of actions brought in San Francisco and
Chicago. Two di ametrically opposed decisions, Larry P. v. Riles (1979) (the San
Francisco case) and PASE v. Hannon (19 80) (the Chicago case) are seen by
psychologists as attacks on IQ tests. That, however, is a significant misperception . Like Hobson, these two pieces of litigation are actually chall enges to
educational practices deemed to be discriminatory . [Similarly , the recent attack
on minimal competency tests, see Debra P . v. Turlington (1981), is more appropriately seen as a claim by black children that the use of such tests is merely a
subtle but effective effort by states to resegregate the public schools .]
The real issue was the basis for di sproportional pl acement of black children in
segregated, self-contained classes for the educably mentally retarded. Throughout his opinion , Judge Peckham in Larry P. v. Riles [hereafter Riles ] labeled the
EMR program "dead-end," " isolating," " inferior," and "stigmatizing." Relying on the testimony of state employees or printed material from the state
department of education, the court concluded California's EMR classes were
"designed to separate out children who are incapable of learning in regular
classes [Riles, 1979 , p. 941]" and were not meant to provide remedial instruction so that children could learn the sk ills necessary for eventual return to regular
instruction. Given these characteristics , the court considered "the decision to
place children in these classes . .. a crucial one. Children wrongly placed in
these classes are unlikely to escape as they inevitably lag farther and farther
behind the children in regular cl asses [po 942]." And, as in H obson , the primary
bas is for these decisions were found to be tests- most often the WISC-R and the
Stanford-Binet.
Interpreting the nondi scriminatory provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (Pub. L.
94- 142), particularly regulations requiring that assessment instruments be "vali dated for the specific purpose for which they are used [35 C.F.R. §104.35; 34
C.F.R. §300 .532]," Judge Peckham found the challenged tests unable to meet
that requirement. The tests, the court ruled, would have to be shown valid for
selecting childre n who belonged in substandard , segregated educational anachroni sms (otherwise known as EMR classes). And because that kind of validation
had not been done, the court permanently prohibited Californi a "from utili zing,
permitting the use of, or approving the use of any standardized tests .. . for the
identification of black EMR children or their placement into EM R classes [po
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989]" without first securing the court's approva l. Even Judge Grady, who in
PASE v. Hannon ( 1980) upheld the use of indi vidual intelligence tests in a
simil ar challenge concluded that inappropriate placement in an EMR class was
an educational tragedy that was li kely to be totally harmful.
Emp loy ment
Sim il ar phenomena as I have described in public schools occurred in employment settings. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), whi ch introduced the
concept of " job-relatedness" into the law of employment testing and created a
morass not yet fully resolved, wou ld never have been decided if the defendants
had not had a history of racial discrimination. Prior to 1965, the Duke Power Co.
openly discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring and assigning of employees at its Dan River plant. Blacks were employed only in the lowest level
jobs and at the lowest rate of pay. In 1964 Congress passed T itle VII of the Civil
Rig hts Act prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin . On July 2, 1965, the date on which T itle VII took
effect, Duke Power decided to no longer restrict blacks to the lowest level
positions. However, at the same time, it instituted a policy that, to qualify for
placement in hi gher leve l positions, employees would have to achieve sati sfactory scores on the Wonderlic Personnel Test, purportedly an intelligence measure,
and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. Blacks challenged the tests,
claiming that neither instrument was directed or intended to measure the ability
to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs. A unanimous Supreme
Court faulted the company for using "broad and general testing devices [p o
433]" and reminded the defendants that although the use of tests was permissible
under Title VII, they had to "fairly measure the knowledge or sk ills required by
the particu lar job [po 433]."
Simi larly, accusations of purposeful discrimination in both the private and
public sector has stimu lated litigation in such cases as Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody (1975) and Firefighters In stitute v. City of St. Louis ( 1980). The result
has been increasingly sophi sticated challenges to professionally developed tests
even in situations where purposeful discrimination is not an issue [e.g., Guardian Association of New York City v. Civil Service Commission (1980); Teal v.
Connecticut (1982)]. Like educational tests, "employment tests are being subjected to a degree of governmental scrutiny that very few human contrivances
could bear [Wigdor, 1982, p. 67]. "
Privacy
Although discrimination has evoked judicial scrutiny of ability tests, the concern
for the right to privacy has stimul ated simil ar examination of personality tests. If
stup idity has ever fostered a judicial decision concern ing testing, there is no
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better example than Merriken v. Cressman (1973) . The case had its origins in
1970 when a survey, ordered by the Commi ss ion of Montgomery County , Pennsy lvania and conducted by a company called Scientific Resources , revealed that
many children in the county were heavily involved with drugs. Most of the
children who used drugs, the study claimed, possessed some common characteristics. For example, one finding indicated that 80% of the identified drug
abusers felt estranged from their families . On the bas is of such data, Sc ientific
Resources proposed that the County Drug Commission sponsor a drug prevention program, later labeled CPI, for the Critical Period of Intervention. All three
of the county school districts agreed to participate in the program .
There were two phases to the study: identification and remediation. In the first
phase, tests were given to eighth-grade students and their teachers so that certain
students, deemed potential drug abusers , could become part of the remediation
program. The teachers were asked to identify pupils who most and least fit eight
descriptions of antisocial behav ior (e.g . , "This pupil makes unusual or inappropriate responses during normal school activity"). The student form was to be
somewhat lengthier. First , students would be asked to assess their own behavior ,
that is, to state which of the following statements was most like themselves: (1)
someone who will probably be a success in life; (2) one who gets upset when
faced with a difficult school problem; (3) someone who has lots of se lf-confidence; and (4) a student who has more problems than other students. In the next
part of the scale they would be asked questions about their relationships with
their parents and the behavior of their parents (e.g. , to indicate whether one or
both parents "tell me how much they love me" or "make me feel unloved" or
"seem to regret that I am growing up and spending more time away from
home"). Finally , the students would select from their classmates those who fit
certain descriptive statements similar in kind to the ones given the teachers.
The second phase of the study was intervention. When the CPI staff had
analyzed all the results , they would compi le a li st of chi ldren who would have
sign ificant potential for becoming drug ab users. This li st would then be given to
the school superintendent who would organize a joint effort among guidance
counselors, teachers, school psychologists, and others to provide group
therapeutic experiences to which the identified students would be involuntarily
assigned.
When the program was first developed the school system did not intend to
obtain the affirmative consent of the parents for their children to participate.
They did plan to send a letter home to each parent , as follows:
Dear Parent:
This letter is to inform you that, this fall , we are initiating a Drug Program
called "Critical Period of Intervention" (CPl). The aim of thi s program is to
identify children who may be susceptible to drug ab use and to intervene with
concrete measures to help these children. Diagnostic testing will be part of this
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program and will provide data enabling the prevention program to be specific and
positive.
We ask your support and cooperation in this program and assure you of the
confidentiality of these studies. If you wish to examine or receive further information regard ing the program, please feel free to contact the school. If you do not
wish to participate in this program, please notify your principal of this decision. We
will assume your cooperation unless otherwise notified by you [Merriken v. Cressman, 1973 , p. 9 17).

Also, as originally proposed, the study contained no provision for student
consent.
Sy lvia Merriken, the mother of one of the intended participants in the study,
who happened to be a therapist in a drug and alcoholic rehabilitation center,
complained to the principal of the school where her son was enrolled and to the
school board. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) then announced it
would represent Mrs. Merriken in an attempt to enjoin the school permanently
from carrying out its plans. The ACLU began by fi ling a complaint in federal
district court claiming that the program would violate the constitutional rights of
both Mrs. Merriken and her son. It quickly obtained a temporary injunction
prohibiting the county from implementing its proposal until the litigation was
completed. At that point , two of the three schools in Montgomery County decided to discontinue their participation but the Norristown system, where Mrs.
Merriken's son attended, persisted, although it honored the temporary injunction.
When the suit itself began, the school system offered to change the format of
their letter to include parental consent. In another attempt at compromise, the
school modified the test so that students who did not want to be included could
return an uncompleted protocol. But the proposal contained no provision for
student consent and no data were to be provided whereby students could make an
informed choice about participating.
Of the many constitutional challenges Mrs . Merriken made , the court entertained only one of them seriously- the right of privacy. The court found that the
highly personal nature of the instrument disrupted family associations and interfered with the right of the mother to rear her child. It said, "There is probably no
more private a relationship , excepting marriage, which the Constitution safeguards than that between parent and child. This Court can look upon any invasion of that relationship as a direct violation of one's Constitutional right to
privacy [p . 918] ." And although there was no precedent to the effect in the
Supreme Court, the district court declared that privacy was entitled to as much
constitutional protection as free speech .
Although the court failed to analyze the privacy rights of her son (but see
Bersoff, 1983), the court found that Mrs . Merriken was unable to give genuinely
informed consent to the invasion of her personal life because the parental permis-
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sion letter was so inadequate. The court deridingly compared the letter to a Bookof- the-Month Club solicitation in which parents' silence would be construed as
acquiescence. The letter was also criticized as a selling device in which parents
were convinced to allow children to participate. It was not , as it properly should
be, an objective document telling parents of the potentially negative feature and
dangerous aspects of the program .
There were other problems with the program. The promotional letter promised confidentiality, but the program contemplated the development of a " massive data bank" and the dissemination of data relating to specific, identifiable
students to school superintendents, principals, guidance counselors, coaches,
social workers, PTA members, and school board members. And even if the
school system had been more circumspect and had constructed means by which
the data were less widely distributed (or not distributed at all) , no promise of
confidentiality could take precedence over a subpeona compelling the disclosure
of the material to law enforcement officers. As the court warned:
(T)here is no ass urance that should an enterprising di strict attorn ey co nvene a
special grand jury to investi gate the drug program in Montgomery County, the
records of the cpr Program would remain in violate from subpoenas and that he
could not determine the identity of children who have been labeled by the CPI
Program as potenti al drug abusers lp. 9 16) .

Parents were not at all in formed of this possibility.
Compounding the other pro blems was the fact that the identification instruments did not possess enough psychometric soundness to overcome the hazards
that may have fl owed from their use. Although there could have been considerable harm done to children correctly identi fied , the court was particularly concerned about those children incorrectly identi fied . In a statement that should rai se
the anxiety level of psychologists, it said , "When a program talks about labeling
someone as a particular type and such a label could remain with him for the
remainder of his life, the margin of error must be almost nil [p o 920] ."
Forensics
Ironicall y, the one use of tests that has remained relatively uncriticized is in
fore nsic assessment. Ability tests used in educational and employment decision
making, despite their myriad problems, have been subjected to decades of empi rical analysis and validation. Yet , they have undergone the most scathing
review by the legal system . On the other hand , based on personality and projective instruments, forensic psychologists since the 1940s have routinely testi fied
in cases involving competency to stand trial, insanity , civil commitment , the
causal connection between negligent conduct and emotional and physical injury,
child custody, and the eligibility of criminal defendants for the death penalty.
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Whereas such determinations are at least as cruc ial to the interests of the test
taker and society, personality and projective instruments have escaped wholesale
scrutiny by the courts and remain largely untouched.
As long as psychologists possess the requisite indices of expertise such as
proper education, training, experience, scholarly publications, and professional
affiliation, they are permitted to offer opinions on the kinds of ultimate issues I
have just cataloged based on the adm inistration of tests like the Rorschach,
MMPI, and TAT. Although such testimony has subjected individual psychol ogists to harsh cross-exami nations (Ziskin, 198 1) , the courts have never seriously questioned whether these tests are sufficiently precise to evoke probative
expert testimony or to support valid opinions that will be more helpful than
testimony of the thoughtful layperson to the jury .
The confused approach to expert testimony by psychologists is, in part, explained by a failure to recognize that it is not a unidimensional concept but,
rather , involves three levels of inference. The first level consists of the psychologist's personal observation of the client made during the course of the clinical
evaluation, including essentially objective data about the individual's behavior
and the uninterpreted results of psychological testing. The second level moves
from reporting observations to the synthesis of data to form a diagnosis that will
classify, and perhaps account for, the behavior manifested during the course of
the evaluation or at the time of the event in question. It is on thi s level that
psychologists make a judgment about whether the person has a mental disorder.
Whether the diagnosis is presented in terms of a particular label or a lengthy
description of personality , the critical element is that the diagnosis derives its
value from the psychometric soundness of the assessment devices used . The third
level concerns an opinion about the ultimate issue (i .e., child custody, or insanity) that the jury or judge must resolve. Whereas I have significant reservations about any testimony by experts as to level three (Comment, 1978; Gass &
Bersoff, submitted for publication) , it is concern about testimony at level two
that is most relevant to this chapter.
The test for the adm issib ility of scientific evidence was developed 60 years
ago in Frye v. United States (1923), which limited such evidence to that which
has gained "general sc ientific acceptance." Under its modern interpretation by
subsequent tribunals, the courts require not only acceptance within the scientific
community but also accuracy. Thus , assessment devices used in the forensic
arena shou ld not only have gained acceptance within psychology but, more
importantly , the accuracy of the technique should be demonstrated to yield
information that is more like ly to be true than could be gleaned from lay testimony. Resu lts from polygraphs and voice spectrography have been denied admissibility because the error rate is considered to be 10 to 25%. If such a criterion
were applied to most clinicians' favorite projective devices , none of the information or diagnostic conclusions derived from them would be admitted in court .
Validity coefficients that clinicians might find highly acceptable may not pass
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legal muster, Tests' vulnerability to situational and experimenter effects and to
such phenomena as illusory correlations (Chapman & Chapman, 1969) have
been well documented (Comment, 1978; Monahan, 1981).
The scientific literature regarding reliability and validity of tests used by
forensic experts suggests that, at best , they are highly suspect and susceptible to
a variety of significant sources of psychometric and interpretive error. They have
limited psychometric soundness even in the hands of the most skilled clinicians ,
and there is little basis to assert that expert opinions , based on projective tests,
are more accurate than layperson's opinions, But, although forensic psychologists may have little empirically based expertise to offer the legal system, they
are uniformly permitted to testify and their judgments often CatTY great weight
with the jury. On the other hand , the work of educational and industrial psychologists undergo close review, even though there is greater reason to believe that
the instruments upon which they rely are more demonstrably accurate. Why? The
answer is partly rooted in tradition- such issues as insanity have confronted the
courts for decades; issues such as proper placement in special education programs or promotion to fire captains have not. But, more importantly, the tests
used in forensic settings do not impinge on privacy or disproportionately affect
racial or ethnic minorities. It is interesting to note, however, that recently foren sic examinations used in criminal settings have raised concerns about the privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel (see Estelle v. Smith, 1981 ,
and Bclltie v. Estelle, 1981),

SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE AND THE COURTS
All of these conflicting perceptions about psychological tests raise a final issue
with which I wish to conclude- that of the relationship between the social
sciences and the courts, If that relationship were to be examined by a psychoanalyst, the analyst would no doubt conclude that it is a highly neurotic, conflictridden ambivalent affair (I stress "affair" because it is certainly no marriage).
Thirty years ago the vitality of data generated by psychologists seemed assured
when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) conspicuously
referred to studies by Kenneth and Mamie Clark concerning the effect of segregation on black children. The reference to those studies in a now famous footnote
created a controversy that still exists concerning their relevance and validity
(Cahn, 1955 ; Clark, 1980; Kluger, 1975; Levin, 1978). Despite that controversy
there is little doubt that Brown represents the most dramatic use of social science
scholarship.
But if Brown produced optimism, subsequent events did not uniformly reinforce those buoyant feelings. In the past 5 years the Supreme Court has rejected
empirical data in cases concerning sex discrimination, the death penalty , and
corporal punishment. Perhaps most clearly exemplary of the Court's am-
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bivalence is its decision in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) where it unanimously
agreed that criminal trials before five-member juries unconstitutionally deprived
defendants of the right to trial by jury. Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Supreme Court and in his decision relied heavily on the work of
social psychologists and others to support the conclusion that less than six-person
panels substantially and negatively altered the jury process. However, only one
other justice joined that opinion. Three justices were particularly critical of his
use of social science data. In a concurring opinion (indicating agreement with the
outcome but not the reasoning of the primary opinion) Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, acerbically noted his "reservations
as to the wisdom ... of Mr. Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on numerology
derived from statistical studies [po 246]."
The same love- hate relationship finds its way into lower-court opinions concerning testing. These opinions, regardless of whether one likes the result, are
generally devoid of sound psychometric reasoning. Even if the conclusions are
correct, the courts often fail to cite the relevant literature in a way that convinces
the reader that the conclusion is empirically supportable.

Social Science in Education and Employment Cases
Education. We can once again return to the education and employment
testing cases for the most pertinent examp les . As you may recall, the court in
Riles permanently prohibited the state from using any standardized intelligence
tests for the identification of black chi ldren for placement into EMR classes and
held that before the state cou ld use IQ tests, it would have to meet the following
standards:
1. Tests would have to yield the same pattern of scores when administered to
different groups of students.
2. Tests would have to yield approximately equal means for all subgroups
included in the standardization sample.
3. Tests would have to be correlated with relevant criterion measures, that is,
lQ scores of black children with classroom performance.
The implication in Riles that an unbiased test must yield the same pattern of
scores when administered to different groups of people is psychometrically unsound . It is generally , though not uniformly, conceded that tests are fair when
they predict with equal accuracy, not with equal results, for all groups. If that
position is correct, then the court's definition "eliminates a priori any possibility
of real group differences on various psychological traits [Schmidt & Hunter,
1974, p. I] . " The court rejected the possibility of genuine inferiority and socialclass differences . Though the court rested its decision on the finding that the tests
were culturally biased, it provided little hard data to support such a conclusion
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and was tentative in discussing it. In fac t, the court 's empirical support fo r its
conclusions consumed only I of 70 printed pages. Moreover, the court's determination that the tests contain questions biased against poor black children is not
uniformly accepted , and there are some data to suggest that whatever discrimi nation there is in tests, lower scores in blacks are not totall y the res ult of content
bi as.
By definition , achievement and intelligence tests will always fail to meet the
demand fo r assessment dev ices devoid of environmental influence. Given what
they purport to measure, they inev itably refl ect the social setting of the test taker:
" [All] behavior is ... affected by the cultural milieu in which the individual is
reared and since psychological tests are but samples of behavior, cultural influences will and should be refl ected in test performance . It is therefore futile to try
to dev ise a test that is free from cultural influences [Anastasi, 1976, p. 345]."
Efforts to produce culture-free tests or to reduce content bias have met with
little success. " Nonverbal or performance tests are now generally recognized as
fa lling short of the goal of freedom fro m cultural influences, and attempts to
develop culture fair verbal tests ... are recognized as failu res [Reschl y, 1979,
p. 23 1] ." More spec ificall y, Anastasi (1 976) states: "On the WISC , for instance, black childre n usuall y fi nd the Performance Tests as difficult or more
di fficult than the Verbal Tests; this pattern is also characteristic of children fro m
low soc ioeconomic levels [p o 348]. " Kirp (1 973) concludes: " [It] is sobering
but instructi ve to recognize that minority children do poorl y even on so-called
culture-free tests [p o 758 ]."
There has been relati vely little research on content bias itself, particularl y
with regard to individual intelligence tests. What has been found with regard to
standardized tests generally (Flaugher, 1978; Green, 1978), or individual intelligence tests specificall y (Reynolds, 1982; Reschly , 1980 ; Sandoval, 1979) , does
not support Judge Peckham ' s conclusions. For example , contrary to popular
thought , such widely criticized questions on the WISC- R comprehension subtest
as, " What is the thing to do if a boy (girl) much smaller than yourself starts a
fight with you?" (a question that even Judge Grady in PASE fo und biased) may
actually be easier fo r black children than they are for white (Reschly, 1979).
Eliminating 13 items perceived to be biased fro m a widely used 82-item elementary reading test " did not improve the perfo rmance of schools with high-minority populations relative to their performance on the original ' biased vers ion '
[Flaugher, 1978, p. 675]." Deleting what appear to be idiosyncratic items fro m
group ability tests res ults only in " making the tests considerably more difficult
for everyone, since many of the items [exhibiting] the widest discrepancy between groups [are] moderate to low in overall diffic ulty [Flaugher , 1978 , p.
675]" (but see Oakland & Matuszek, 1977) . Most pertinentl y, Sandoval ( 1979)
fo und no ev idence of items bias on the WISC-R : "The notion that there may be a
number of items with radically differe nt di fficulties for children fro m diffe rent
ethnic groups has not been supported [p o 925 ]. " Moreover, the interjudge agree-
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ment concerning cultural bias on the WISC-R appears very low (see Reschly
citing Sandoval, 1980).
Although Judge Peckham can be faulted for his analysis of cultural discrimination in intelligence tests and for implying that the issue is more settled than it
is, any criticism of his analysis does not imply that his concl usion is incorrect or
that there is support for such alternative hypotheses as genetics- rejected by all
parties in Riles and PASE--Dr socioeconomic explanations. In any event, the
court in Riles was correct in criticizing test publishers for not adequately standardizing . and validating their instruments on discrete minority populations . The
court could only rest its holding on the data presented to it by the parties. The
state's defense was made difficult by the lack of relevant studies on differential
validity, the absence of systematic research concerning content bias, and California's concession that cultural differences affected IQ scores .
If Judge Peckham's analysis of the issue of cultural bias was scanty and
fau lty , Judge Grady in PASE v. Hannon (1980) can best be described as naive.
At worst it was unintelligent, and completely devoid of empirical content. Distrustful of the expert testimony in the case, he felt it imperative to exami ne the
tests themselves so he could judge whether the claim of cultural bias cou ld be
sustained. Thus, in a startling and extraordinary manner , he proceeded to cite
each question on the Wechsler and Binet scales in an attempt to determine which,
in his estimation, were culturally biased. The result of this analysis was the
judgment that only eight items on the WISC/WISC-R and one item on the
Stanford- Binet were suspect or actually biased . At bottom , what it represented
was a single person's subjective and personal judgment cloaked in the apparent
authority of judicial robes. If submitted as a study to one of psychology's more
respected refereed journals, rather than masquerading as a legal opinion , it would
have been summarily rejected as an experiment whose sample size and lack of
objectivity stamped it as unworthy of publication. The court's opinion in PASE
amply supports Reschly's (1980) conclusion that with regard to item bias on the
individually administered intelligence tests, "subjective judgments appear to be
unreliable and invalid in terms of empirical analysis . . . . The only data confirming test bias that exists now is judgmental and speculative [p o 127]."
What makes Judge Grady's opinion interesting, if not precedent setting, is the
fact the decision contains the questions and correct answers to every item on the
WISC, the WISC-R, and the Stanford- Binet. McClelland ( 1973) suggested
several years ago that tests should be given away. Whether inadvertent ly or
purposely, Judge Grady has done just that. Those who wish to destroy the
usefulness of these tests need only inform parents and anti test advocates of the
existence of the decision and its citation to the proper volume in the series of
legal reports that publishes verbatim all federal district court opinions . Although
Judge Grady eventually upheld the tests as valid, his decision , to a far greater
extent than Judge Peckham's decision in Riles, may have the effect of invalidating the tests as they are presently used. The Psychological Corporation, publisher
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of the Wechsler Scales (and the System of Multi-Pluralistic Assessment
[SOMPA] that uses these scales), tried unsuccessfully to convince Judge Grady
to seal that part of his decision containing the questions and answers to the scales
so that their content would not be published and thus made public. It has since
issued a statement attempting to protect its copyright in the tests and threatens
legal action if it is not protected: "The Psychological Corporation considers
unauthorized reproduction of its copyrighted material fro m any source, including
a court' s opinion , to be an invasion of its rights, including its copyright , and the
right to maintain the necessary security of its tests [Udell , 1980] ." As of this
writing , there has not been specific legal action against those who have informed
general audiences of its existence . But one potential outcome of the decision is
that the security of these tests may have, indeed , been seriously compromised , if
not destroyed.

Employment. The situation with regard to employment testing does not
evoke any greater confidence. There are sharp differences among the federal
courts, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and psychometric
experts as to the proper conceptualization of test validation within the industrial
setting . Novick (1 98 1) has perceptively summari zed the struggle:
Individual federal agencies have res ponsibilities and goals de legated by the exec utive and legislative branches of government , monitored by the judicial branch , and
ultimately spec ified by the incumbent age ncy man agement. Although these agenc ies share concern for benefit s to soc iety as a whole, they tend to foc us attenti on on
their own particul ar mandates, and for thi s reason they often view testing and other
issues quite differently . In fac t, it is not unco mmon for government agencies to be
on opposite sides in litigation involving tests, for employers to receive conflictin g
directives from different government agenc ies, and fo r e mp loyees to find th at the ir
tes t scores are considered in light of widel y varying objectives by employe rs and
government agency represe ntati ves [p. 1035].

The Supreme Court has been particularly unhelpful in sorting out this confusion . For example , in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1 971) a unanimous court
stated that the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing were "entitled to great
deference" (p . 434). Four years later, Chief Justice Burger, who had written the
dec ision in Griggs now complained in a minority opinion in Albermarle Paper
Co . v. Moody (1 975) about the Court' s "slavish adherence" (p . 452) to those
same G uidelines. Perhaps in a more important example, one I described at some
length in a recent American Psychologist article (Bersoff, 1981) , the Court has
badl y muddled the whole issue of test validation. In Washington v. Davis (1976)
in support of its opinion that validation could be accomplished in "anyone of
several ways," the Court cited the then extant version of the Standards fo r
Educational and Psychological Tests (APA, AERA, NCME, 1974) to the effect
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that there were " three basic methods of validation: 'empirical' or 'criterion '
validity . . . 'construct validity ' ... and ' content' validity [Washington v.
Davis, 1976 , p . 247 , fn . 13] ."
Many indu strial and academic psychologists (Guion , 1980; Messick, 1980 ;
Tenopyr, 1977) contend that insofar as the courts have interpreted the test standards and the EEOC Guidelines (superseded now by the Uni form Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, see EEOC et aI. , 1978) and its implementing
" Question and Answers" (EEOC et aI. , 1979) to mean that content , criterion,
and construct validity are distinct fo rms of validation , those interpretations are
oversimplified , if not erroneous . The Uniform Guidelines , according to thi s
view , inappropriately treat three aspects of validity as "something of a holy
trinity representing three different roads to psychometric salvation [Guion , 1980 ,
p. 386]" rather than viewing them as subsets within the uni fyi ng and common
framework of construct validity. Most judicial opinions, with one or two conspicuous exceptions (see Guardians Association of New York City v. Civil Service Commission, 1980) , concerned with the controversy over content versus
criterion versus construct validity in employment tests also view the th ree as
separable entities rather than on a continum and fail to cite or even recognize the
work of psychologists who have urged a more sophisticated approach to validation analys is. It has been suggested that the term construct-ref erenced validity
(Mess ick, 1975) would more prec isely encompass almost all di screte and speciali zed validation terms, integrating content relevance and content coverage as
well as predictive and diagnostic utility. "The bridge or unifying theme that
permits this integration is the meaningfulness of interpretability of the test
scores, which is the goal of the construct validation process [Messick, 1980 , p.
101 5]. "
In 1982, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the EEOC G uidelines and its implementing Questions and Answers in Teal v. Connecticut ( 1982)
but carefully avoided the issue. In that case, the plaintiffs are fou r bl ack provisional state employees who , when they sought to attain permanent status in their
jobs as Welfare Eligibility Supervisors, were obliged to participate in a selection
process requiring a passing score on a written tes ~. Those who passed the test
became part of an eligibility pool fro m which the state would select successful
applicants. The final determinations were made on the basis of a number of
nontest criteri a (e.g., past work , recommendation) .
All the plaintiffs failed to achieve the cutoff score of 65 on the test which
would have made them eligible fo r further consideration. As a whole, the pass ing
rate for blacks was 68% of that of whites. The unsuccessful plaintiffs then
instituted a suit cl aiming that the state's use of the test violated Title VII .
However, a month prior to tri al, the state made its final selection , the result of
which was that 23% of the eligible blacks and 13.5% of the eligible whites were
promoted to supervisor. The actual promotion rate of blacks, therefore, was
169.5% of the actual promotion rate of whites . Thu s, whereas the end result of
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the state's selection process (the so-called " bottom line" ) was nondiscriminatory to blacks as a class, the threshold testing component did not meet the Uniform
Guidelines "four-fifths" rule, which provides that a "selection rate for any race,
sex, or ethnic group which is less than [80%] of the rate for the group with the
highest rate will generally be regarded ... as evidence of adverse impact [29
C.F.R. §1607.4(c)]."
The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, hoiding that they
failed to prove a prima facie case of di sparate impact. It asserted that although
the ratio of the black passing rate to the white passing rate was 68%, the ratio of
the black appointment rate to the white appointment rate was almost 170%.
Thus, under the bottom-line approach found in the EEOC Guidelines, the plaintiffs ' Title VII claim has to fail.
The plaintiffs appealed. The COUl1 of Appeals reversed the lower court ,
holding that "where a plaintiff establishes that a component of a selection
process produced disparate results and constituted a pass- fail barrier beyond
which the complaining candidates were not permitted to proceed, a prima facie
case of disparate impact is established , not withstanding that the entire selection
procedure did not yield disparate results [Teal v. Connecticut, 1981, p. 135]. "
In concluding that the district court was wrong in ruling res ults of the written
examination alone were insufficient to support a prima facie case of disparate
impact, it distinguished an earlier decision by the second circuit court. In Kirkland
v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services (1975), the Court of Appeals
held that proof concerning disparate impact of certain subtests within a larger
examination did not constitute an unlawful discriminatory impact. But, the second
circuit said in Kirkland, all applicants were subj ected to a complete selection
process that, when viewed as a whole, did not produce di sparate results. In Teal,
however, the pass-fail barrier denied employment opportunity to a di sproportionately large number of minorities and prevented them from proceeding to the next
step in the selection process. Thus, the court concluded, affirmative action
policies that may benefit minority groups as a class do not excuse employers'
discriminatory conduct affecting specific and readily identifiable individuals. It
held that "Title VII was designed to protect the rights of individuals" and that it
"matters very little to the victimized individuals that their group as a whole is well
represented in the group ofhirees [pp. 139- 140] ."
The trial court , finding no evidence of prima facie discrimination, never
reached the question of the test' s validity (i.e., its " job-relatedness"), even
though it had been fully tried before the court. However , in addition to reversing
the tri al court' s decision , the Court of Appeals remanded the case with in structions that the lower court evaluate the test itself in light of the EEOC Guidelines.
The state of Connecticut , in June of 198 1, asked the Supreme Court to review
the second circuit' s opinion, arguing that their decision was antagonistic to that
of other circuits who had adopted the bottom-line concept in Title VII cases . The
state also asserted that scrutiny of testing practices in those instances where
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hiring or promotion practices revealed no di sparate impact would redirect employers' concerns from " the overall hiring process to the testing process, and in
that sense [the federal courts would] be restructuring business practices ."
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case and in June 1982 it rendered its
opinion . The Court held , in a 5-4 decision, that " the ' bottom line' does not
preclude ... employees from establi shing a prima facie case [of employment
di scrimination] nor does it provide [an] employer with a defense to such a case
[Teal v. Connecticut, 1982, p. 2529]." The Court reminded employers that
Section 703(a)(2) spoke not in terms of jobs and promotions but of limitations
and classifications that would deprive individuals of employment opportunities .
Thus , " when an employer uses a non-job-related barrier to deny a minority or
woman applicant employment or promotion, and that barrier has a significant
adverse effect on minorities or women, then the applicant has been deprived of
an employment opportunity ' because of . .. race, color, religion , sex, or national origin ' [p o 253 2]. " Therefore, T itle VII protects individuals, not groups
prohibiting victims of a facially discriminatory policy to be told that they have
not been wronged simply because other persons of their race or sex were hired:
"Every individual employee is protected against both discriminatory treatment
and against practices that are fair in for m, but discriminatory in operation .. . "
[po 2535 ] [emphasis added] ."
As a res ult , the Court refu sed to permit employers to claim as a defense in
disparate impact cases that di scriminatory , non-job-related tests that serve as a
pass- fail barrier to employment opportunities are permiss ible becau se the tests
did not actuall y deprive di sproportionate numbers of bl acks of promotions. " it is
clear ," the Court asserted , " that Congress never intended to give an employer
license to discriminate again st some employees on the bi as of race or sex merely
because he favorably treats other members of the employees' groups [p . 2535]. "
The di ssenters, led by Justice Powell , speaking for the Chief Justice and
Justices Rehnqui st and O ' Connor , agreed that the aim of Title VIi was to protect
individuals, not groups. But , they interpreted disparate impact claims to require
proof of di scrimination to groups. The di ssenting opinion argued that prior cases
had made it clear that di scriminatory impact cl aims cannot be based on how an
individual is treated because those cl aims are necessarily based on whether the
group fares less well than other groups under a policy, practice , or test. The
di ssent warned that the majority 's holding could " force employers either to
elimin ate tests or rely on expensive, job-related , testing procedures, the validity
of which mayor may not be sustained if challenged. For state and local governmental employers with limited fund s, the practical effect of today 's decision may
well be the adoption of simple quota hiring [p o 2540] ." Moreover, it cautioned ,
substanti all y fewer minority candidates ultimately could be hired simpl y by
employers integrating consideration of test results into one overall hiring decision because, by so doing, " they will be free to select only the number of
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minority candidates proportional to their representation in the workforce [po 2540
n.8] . "
All these decisions reveal that the issue of test bias is complex and controversial and that opinions concerning its existence are contradictory. Several models
of test bias, particularly with regard to its effect on prediction and selection, have
been offered (Jensen, 1980; Peterson & Novick, 1976) , none of which seem to
have gained favor over others. As Ysseldyke (1978) recently commented:
Several investigators have reviewed the models of test fairness and have concluded
that there is little agreement among the several models. It is readily apparent that
major measurement experts have been essentially unable to agree on a definition of
a fair test, let alone identify a test that is fair for members of different groups. T here
is little agreement on the concept of nondiscriminatory assessment [p o 150].

Definitions of test bias may not only be "widely disparate," stemm ing "from
entirely different universes of discourse [Schmidt & Hunter, 1974, p. I]" but
ethical positions regarding test bias may be "irreconcilable [Hunter & Schmidt,
1976 , p. 1069] . " Finally, and perhaps more importantly , reliance on psychometric models for test bias without consideration of the social and ethical consequences of test use ignores the concerns of significant segments of society .
Although the American Psychological Association Ad Hoc Comm ittee Report on
the Educational Uses of Tests with Disadvantaged Students (Cleary et aI. , 1975)
defended the technical adequacy of tests for prediction and selection, it failed to
consider what minority groups charge was the egregious misuse of tests having a
negative impact on the lives of minorities (Bernal, 1975; Jackson, 1975) . As
Reschly (1979) points out: " to defend tests on the basis of evidence of common
regression systems or to attempt to separate the issues of technical adeq uacy from
the social consequences is insufficient [po 235]." In that light, recent attempts to
examine the ethical, legal, and socia l implications of various models of test bias
are valuable additions to the literature (Cole, 1981 ; Hunter & Schmidt, 1976;
Messick , 1980; Novick & Ellis, 1977; Reynolds, 1982) . In essence, even the
selection of a model to measure and ameliorate test bias is ultimately a value
judgment (Kap lan, 1982).

PSYCHOLOGISTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
My complaints about the Supreme Court should not deflect responsibility from
psychologists. I think it may be legitimate to place at least part of the fau lt for the
current and continuing confusion concern ing tests on psychologists themselves.
One of the more intriguing aspects of Judge Grady's decision in PASE v. Hannon
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(1980) was his almost utter rejection of the testimony of expert psychologists
who testified either for the black children challenging the IQ tests or for the
school system seeking to defend them . In a quote that I think deserves some
thought he said:
None of the witnesses in this case has so impressed me with his or her credibility or
expertise that I would feel secure in basing a decision simply on his or her opinion.
In some instances, I am satisfied that the opinions expressed are more the result of
doctrinaire commitment to a preconceived idea than they are the result of scientific
inquiry . I need something more than the conc lusions of witnesses in order to arrive
at my own concl usion [p. 836).
Several years ago Cronbach (1975) warned psychologists involved in testing
issues not to be advocates. But , far too often they have testified/or one side or
the other. Although psychologists perform a valuable service when they testify as
expert witnesses , they should be aware that their data , interpretations , and opinions will be tested in the crucible of courtroom cross-examination whose very
purpose is to destroy credibility and evoke evidence of bias on the part of the
expert. Whereas the distillation of that process may yield testimony of great
consequence and weight to the court, it can be highly anxiety provoking for the
psychologist who acts as an injudicious advocate pleading for a position rather
than as a cautious, neutral scientist presenting data in an even-handed manner.
Recently, concerned psychologists have indicated the many ways social scientists can influence public policy effectively (Bersoff, 1983; DeLeon, 0 ' Keefe,
Vandenbos , & Kraut, 1982; Horowitz & Katz, 1975; Loftus & Monahan , 1980;
Saks, 1978) . Within the bounds of scientific and professional ethics, that is an
important, if not crucial, role. But, if psychologists are to be respected by the
courts and treated as more than mere numerologists attempting to convince the
judiciary of doctrinaire positions, they must offer more situation-specific, ecologically valid, objective data that serve science, not a particular adversary. In
that way , perhaps , courts may finally arrive at not only judically sound but
psychometrically justified decisions that will withstand both appellate and scientific scrutiny.
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Testing and the Oscar Buros
Lament: From Knowledge to
Implementation to Use

James V. Mitchell , Jr., Director
Buros Institute of Mental Measurements

The field of measurement can be conceptualized as having three different but
intenelated aspects. First of all, it is a science or a body of knowledge concerned
with the development of theory and methodology and with the identification and
confirmation of generalizations governing intenelationships among variables appropriate to its content. Measurement theory and its application to measurement
problems are important contributors here. Second, it is an applied science or
technology concerned with the development of products that represent a useful
application of such a science or body of knowledge . For the field of measurement, test development and validation are important exemplars. Third, it is a
body of information concerned with why, when, and how these products are
used, and the results of such use, in the practical measurement setting for which
they were typically intended. This sequence of intenelated aspects of measurement, from knowledge to implementation to use, is the conceptual foundation for
much of what follows.
Within such a context as that just described, the Buros Institute of Mental
Measurements has always played a unique role. The science of measurement or
measurement theory has not been one of the Institute's chief concerns, although
the Institute is often an indirect beneficiary of such contributions. However, the
Institute has had major involvement with the evaluation of test products, the
products of an applied science, and with the education of test users in the more
effective selection and use of those products . Because of the nature of this
involvement, the Institute has had a perspective on the three separate aspects of
the field of measurement that is not typical of those representing only the singular
aspects of the continuum. It is this unique perspective of the Institute that will
serve as the distinguishing feature of the discussion to follow.
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The purpose of this discussion is to evaluate critically the contributions and
progress made in these separate, but interrelated, aspects of measurement:
knowledge, implementation, and use. The theme of this discussion is that the
greatest progress has been made in our knowledge, lesser progress in implementation, and the very least progress in selection and effective use. The implication
of the discussion is that there is a pressing need to redress the imbalance that has
developed.
MEASUREMENT THEORY AND KNOWLEDGE
No one can accuse the fie ld of measurement of being static. Ferment seems to be
the rule . With this ferment has come new theories and models, controversy that
sometimes yields as much light as heat, new understanding, and some fresh
perspectives. Although it typically seems that activity has been greater than
results, the results themselves show evidence of progress. Two of the more
recent rev iews of test theory (Subkoviak & Baker, 1978; Weiss & Davison,
1981) both devoted considerable attention to criterion-referenced testing, latenttrait theory, and issues of test bias. Another recent review devoted entirely to
latent-trait theories (Traub & Wolfe, 1981) described the promise of latent-trait
theories in their application to educational measurement but also issued a caveat
about work to date and needed precautions . The overall impression obtained
from these reviews is that criterion-referenced testing, latent-trait theory, and test
bias have received the attention deserved from an able group of professionals and
that some relevant problems have been addressed, development has occurred,
and progress has been and will continue to be made. A similar reassurance is felt
with the more central role accorded to construct validity evidence in all areas of
testing, the attention given to problems with minimum competency testing and
the setting of standards, and the development of adaptive testing in relation to its
needed theoretical underpinnings. The influence of cognitive psychology on
testing has also been beneficial and holds important promise for the future. All in
all, psychometric theory and knowledge seem to be active, developing, productive enterprises that will continue to furnish strong and supportive bases for the
technology of testing and the wise selection and effective use of tests. The
foundation is promising; whether its promise will be paralleled by equal promise
in the technology or applied science it supports, or in the intelligent utilization of
that technology by its consumers, is the critical question to which we now turn.
TEST TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION

In comparison with the relatively strong showing of psychometric theory and
knowledge, the application of that theory and knowledge to the development and
validation of commercially published tests has produced mixed results at best. In
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The Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbook (1972) and again in The Eighth
Mental Measurements Yearbook (1978) , Oscar Buros, after describing the
"crusading" or "missionary" objectives of the Yearbooks, compl ained that:
Our success in attai nin g the last five missionary objectives has been disappointingly
modest. Test publishers continue to market tests which do not begin to meet the
standards of the rank and file of MMY and journal reviewers . At least half of the
tests curre ntly on the market should never have been published [Buros, 1972, p.
XXVII; 1978, p. XXX I].

These are harsh words; yet as one who has followed Oscar Buros as Institute
director and editor of the Yearbooks, it is difficult to find fault with hi s statement
even now . The situation is a curious mixture of positives and negat ives. On the
one hand , there is little doubt that some of the major test publishers employ
extremely able measurement specialists who have had much impact, for example, on translating new developments like latent-trait theory into practice in the
construction of new tests. On the other hand , there is much of the cottage
industry ambience to the test publishing business , and there are many test publi shers who are simpl y test authors distributing their own tests or very small test
publishers with single or extremely limited test offerings or book or instructional
materials publishers who have acqu ired a few tests and publish them in a manner
almost incidenta l to their major interest and thrust. Of the 496 test publishers that
are listed in Tests in Print II (Buros, 1974) , it is startling to discover that over
one- half, or 58 % , have on ly a sing le test listed; 75% have three or fewer tests
listed; and 85% have five or fewer tests listed. The 58 % who have but one test
listed acco unt for only 11 % of the tests published. T he 85% who have one to five
tests listed account for onl y 16% of the tests published. Although Buros may
have missed tests published by some companies, the Buros reputation for accuracy cannot be denied , and the overall impression is do ubtlessly correct. On
the other end of the continuum , where the large test companies predominate, a
mere 1.4% of the publishers are responsible for publishing 26% of the tests!
Teachers of measurement look ing for strikingly skewed distributions need look
no further. With a publishing field as skewed and fragmented as this, there is
little wonder that Oscar Buros often despaired abo ut the likelihood of improved
quality control.

Quality Issues in Test Publishing
Limitations of size and resources are quite likely to influence quality control
despite the efforts of a small test entrepreneur to meet or exceed minimal standards and produce a professional product. One president of a small operation
lamented that:
We are a very small cooperative venture with quite limited resources. For this
reason we have as yet not been ab le to move to a professional finish on the
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_ _ _ _ _ _ , and
manuals. However, in
spite of typos and home-grown typing each of the rough drafts gives ample information to permit an assessment of the instruments. They have continued to prove
themselves in actual use. For this reason I am forwarding additional copies of the
forms and manuals (rough or otherwise). None of the manuals are "finished." We
will revise them as information and funds permit.
This is an instance where the spirit is willing but the funds are weak. There are
other instances where the markedly skewed distribution of sizes and resources of
test publishers reported earlier seem to be accompanied by a parallel marked
skewness in the demonstration of psychometric savvy. The president of one test
publishing company, after expressing considerable resistance to our request for
complimentary test materials for review, stated that the company:
was highly critical about present methods used for determining the reliability and
validity of a psychometric tool. For example, often the concept of concurrent
validity is used to determine if a particular test is a valuable tool. Actually what this
means is that one or the other tool is unnecessary because they are virtually
measuring the same thing. If the correlation is not significant, we know that we are
measuring some aspect of behavior not currently being tapped. Buros, however,
chose to use this lack of correlation as a reason to reject or criticize a test.
Aside from the fact that Buros let the reviews and reviewers speak for themselves, the statement contains much that would cause concern if not apoplexy
among contemporary measurement specialists . Another company divides its tests
into those that have validity evidence and those that do not. One wonders what
kind of reassurance this provides to its clients!

Some Evidence on Test Quality
If we move from the level of specific examples to the more generic, It IS
regrettably true that there are still a surprising number of tests that are published
without reliability evidence, validity evidence, or norms. When this occurs, it
has been and will continue to be the practice of the Buros Institute to point out
this critical lack in the descriptive entry accompanying the reviews in the Mental
Measurements Yearbook. A small descriptive study was recently conducted by
Institute personnel to determine how often these critical data were lacking . The
results are not encouraging . They showed that 22% of the tests listed in The
Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook (1978) were without any reliability data
whatever; 8 Y2% had no validity data whatever; 7% had neither reliability nor
validity data; and an additional I % had neither reliability nor validity data for
certain parts, levels, or editions. Another 5% had no reliability data for certain
scores, and 9% had no reliability data for certain grades, subtests, or forms. All
together, some 41 % of the tests listed in The Eighth M ental Measurements
Yearbook were lacking reliability and/or validity data in some important respect.
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Tests in the areas of reading, vocations, and 'speech and hearing were the worst
offenders .
The data for norms were somewhat better but still not encourag ing. Of the
tests li sted in The Eighth Mental M easurement Yea rbook, II % had no norms
whatever. Another 3% had no norms for certain scores, and 8% had norms onl y
for certain subtests, form s, or parts of the standardi zation population . One percent had no description of the normative population , and for 4 percent the norms
consisted only of means and standard deviations. All to ld , some 28% o f the tests
listed in The Eighth Mental M easurements Yearbook were inadequately normed
in some important respect.
It should not be concluded that the 4 1% of tests lacking in validity and / or
reliability data or the 28% lacking in normative data were the result of very
rigorous criteria applied by the Buros Institute . As a matter of fact , any kind of
correlation coeffi cient would usuall y serve to remove the acc using statement for
either reliability or validity, and the situation for normative data was equally
charitable. T he standards for declaring such inadequac ies in the descriptive entries were minimal at best , and still many of the tests li sted in the 8th MMY made
an unhappy showing. If 41 % o f the tests listed in the 8th MMY were lac king in
validity and/or reliability data and 28% were lac king in normati ve data, was
Oscar Buros far wrong in asserting that at least half of the tests currently on the
market should never have been published ?

Some Affirmations
To consider the implementation of test theory and knowledge in actual test
products is a frustrating exercise in the reconciliation of opposites . On the one
hand , one observes the amazing rapidity with which a complex deve lopment like
latent-trait theory has been seized by the test constructor and incorporated into
instruments like the British Ability Scales; on the other hand , one observes 41 %
of the tests in the 8th MMY lac king in the simplest kinds of reliability and validity
data. Test manuals seem to be improving and more technical manuals are being
offered , many of them well conceived and executed; yet there are still commercially published tests that have no manual, an inadequate manual, or in structions
fo r admini stration masquerading as a manual. American Psychologist (Gl aser &
Bond , 198 1) issued a special edition on testing that provides abundant evidence
of continuing progress and sophistication in the field of measure ment and its
application ; yet there are some reading and personality tests and diag nostic
inventories whose authors appear never to have seen the inside of an elementary
measurement text. Because of the makeup of the testing indu stry, such contradictions are likely to ex ist fo r the foreseeable future.
In the face of such contradictions one could argue a good case fo r ap pl ying
some minimum competency criteria to the testing industry itself! In any event , it
seems clear that the number of poor or marginal tests could be substantially
reduced if a cl imate of opi nio n could be created for both tes t developers and users
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that would ensure a severe fiscal disadvantage for the test author or publisher
who did not meet certain minimal criteria. Specific problem areas are summarized below .

1. Proliferation of Tests. There is a finite amount of money that will be
spent on tests, especially with current econom ic conditions and cunent attitudes
toward testing. Under these circumstances we must do whatever we can in the
future to ensure that it will be in the best interests of test authors and publishers,
reputationall y and fiscally, to publish far fewer tests but much better tests. Thi s
was the rallying cry of Oscar Buros for over 40 years, and the years have not
diminished its truth or urgency. The proliferation of tests continues unabated ,
however, and the best defense seems to be that of educating people to be more
discriminating test users. Obviously the Institute of Mental Measurements has a
critical role here and so do the teachers of measurement. But the amount of
money sti ll spent on poor and marginal tests, and the startling amounts of money
acquired from the sale of such tests , suggest that we are probably losing ground
rather than gai ning.
2. Missing Reliability Information. The fact that 22% of the tests in the 8th
MMY were without rel iabi lity data is alarming and absolutely without justification . We have to find better ways to prevent or discourage a test author or
publisher from publishing and accepting payment for an instrument that suffers
from such a basic deficiency. Consumer protection for a gullib le testing public is
far behind consumer protection in other areas.

3 . Inadequate Validity Evidence . It was reported earlier that some tests are
publi shed without any validity evidence. More often, however, validity ev idence
is insufficient and flimsy and offered more as a ritual than to make a firm case.
We have reached a point in measurement where many measurement specialists
feel that all or most validity evidence is properly subsumed under the concept of
construct validity. The determination of construct validity requires the marshalling of a comprehensive and integrated set of ev idence that is no less demanding
than the scientific method itself. We shou ld increasingly insist that test authors
and publishers meet these more comprehensive criteria of validity evidence.
There is a long way to go from flimsy , halfhearted evidence offered as ritual to
construct validity evidence meeting the basic tenets of construct definition and
validation in scientific method. This further requirement , however, cou ld be very
beneficial in encouraging improvement in the quality of commercially published
tests and further reducing the number of poor and marginal tests.
4. Publishers' Claims vis-a-vis Validity Evidence. Measurement professionals shou ld increasingly insist that test authors and publ ishers bring test validity and putative test benefits into a more reasonable relationship with one an-
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other. Often it seems that modest to weak validity evidence is offered but is
somehow shunted aside into insignificance by an attitude and aura that implies
far more benefits emanating from the test than is justified by the evidence. Many
examples could be offered, but a case in point is the Common Examinations of
the National Teacher Examinations (NTE). A review of seven studies relating the
Weighted Common Examination score with ratings given by principals and
superv isors during the first year of teaching revealed a median correlation of . II.
Although attenuation could be a factor here, particularly with respect to the
criterion, the ev idence is hardly encouraging. But the publisher can and does
maintain that the NTE is a measure of academ ic preparation only, and thus the
validity issue can be at least partially sidestepped. The public most likely assumes that effective teaching is a simple function of knowledge attained, cares
and understands little about the technical aspects of validity issues, and thus
uncritically accepts the NTE into its belief system as a guardian of teaching
standards. The practical resu lt is that 50% of U.S. teachers coll ege graduates
took the NTE in 1980-1981 and nine states now use the NTE as part of the
teacher certification process. An overstatement of test benefits, either explicit or
impli cit, in the face of weak evidence and a public inclination to believe, will not
serve us we ll at a time when test critics are mounting new and more knowledgeable attacks on the industry and the profession. The tendency to promote test
utility despite weak validity evidence is surely an obstacle to better understanding and another potential source of public backlash as well.

THE BOTTOM LINE: THE SELECTION AND EFFECTIVE
USE OF TESTS
If the app lication of test theory and knowledge to the development and va lidation
of commerc iall y published tests has produced some mixed results, the actual use
of tests in practical settings has departed even further from the ideal. In the
Introduction to The Eighth M ental Measurements Yearbook, Oscar Buros (1978)
defined five objectives of the Yearbook, in his own inimitable manner, as his
"crusading" objectives. The three crusading objectives that related to users of
tests were as follows:

I. To foster in test users a greater awareness of both the values and limitations involved in the use of standardized tests.
2. To suggest more discerning methods to test users of arriving at their own
appraisals of tests in light of their particular values and needs.
3. To make test users aware of the importance of being suspicious of all
tests--even those produced by well-known authors and publishers- which are
not accompanied by detailed data on their construction , validation, uses , and
limitations [p o XXXI].
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As reported earlier, Buros felt that his success in attaining all his crusad ing
objectives, including these three, was "disappointingly modest." It could be of
some use now to take each oj these objectives and see what they highlight with
respect to current standards an~ practices of test usage.
In relation to the first objective, what can be said about the level of awareness
of the rank-and-file test user about the values and limitations of current standardized tests? Buros felt that we have gone through too many periods of " unwarranted optimism" about standardized tests (Buros, 1978 , p. 1973) . Although
some segments of the public may have unwarranted optimism and a lack of
appreciation about the limitations of standardized tests, there is some recent
evidence that this is not true of teachers and administrators in the public schools.
In a study reported by Salmon-Cox (1981), it was found that teachers, when
questioned about how they assessed the progress of their students, most frequently mentioned "observation" as their principal tool. Test scores served a
merely confirmatory role to observation; a child's classroom performance, as
observed, was given more credence than a test score. In another report in the
same series, Resnick (1981) summarized the Salmon-Cox results by suggesting
that: "Tests are, quite simply , a natural feature of the U.S. educational env ironment; it appears that teachers and administrators have adjusted to their presence,
neither desiring much benefit from them nor suffering much distress as a result of
them [po 624]."
This certainly seems to suggest rather strongly that teachers are not overly
impressed with standardized tests or ignorant of their limitations. They may even
be hard pressed to appreciate their values . Unwarranted optimism about tests
surely exists, but it is not likely to be found in the rank and file of teachers who
must administer the tests and interpret the scores.
In relation to the second Buros objective, what can we say about the methods
test users employ in their appraisals of tests? It is difficult to find helpful or
trustworthy data on this question , but it seems safe to say that there has been little
improvement in the sophistication of methods used to select tests. Perhaps there
is a more general understanding of how achievement test objectives and content
should match curriculum objectives and content, and perhaps some large school
districts with testing offices use the more "discerning methods" referred to by
Buros. But despite all the efforts of teachers of measurement and the Buros
Institute, test appraisal and selection in the field has still far to go before it
becomes the cautious, systematic, methodologically sound process that measurement specialists want it to be .
In relation to the third Buros objective, concerned with the "suspicious"
attitudes test users should have in the absence of data on test construction,
validation, uses, and limitations, the best available evidence seems to indicate
that many test users may not be interested enough to be suspicious. Th is conclusion, obviously, is quite congruent with the Resnick (1981) quotation reported
earlier. If they are interested enough to exercise some careful judgment or show
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some suspicion , that judgment or suspicion seems quickl y allayed by the cosmetic assurance of face validity evidence that seems compelling to many who have
the strong will to believe in the absence of substantive evidence. "If it looks
good, use it ," is not a consciously palatable slogan to most people, but it must be
an unconscious determinant for many people in the selection of tests or we
wouldn ' t observe so many poor tests being purchased . At the Buros Institute we
are continually amazed at how much money a poor test can make. For example,
we received word some months ago that one such test , with little to commend it ,
was responsible for sales amounting to 5 million dollars in 2 years.
Perhaps part of the problem here is that the criteria fo r determining whether a
test is useful or not are all bound up with that esoteric body of thought called
psychometric theory, which is available and valued by the specialist but seems
downright forbidding and scary for those uninitiated or of uncertain understanding . If a person looks for a new car , the criteria for what constitutes a good car
are reasonably within reach and understandable. For tests those criteria are
enmeshed in a scientism that for some people might as we ll be mysticism , with a
jargon that seems sufficiently repelling to some to justify ignoring it. Is it any
wonder , then , that it is the face validity features of a test that can so often
commend the test 's use to a potential purchaser and just as often mislead that
purchaser after use to believe that the test did in fact yield the results desired?

Perceptions of the Genera l Public about Tests
It is probab ly in that vast body called the general public where the threat of
misunderstanding about tests is greatest and where a little suspic ion, or at least a
questioning attitude, might be a good thing. Resnick (1 98 1) reports on a 1979
Gall up Poll that indicated that 8 1% of those poll ed thought that standardized tests
were "useful " or "somewhat useful ," with onl y 17% thinking they were " not
too useful. " Yet it is thi s same general public that is likely to be least in formed
and most confused about testing. Such confusion , lack of information , or evident
misinformation has become a critical factor with such issues as bias in testing,
minimum competency testing, and evaluation of the public schools . A vague
conviction that something is useful combined with a lac k of specific understanding about its most appropri ate uses and interpretations and no conception of its
limitations is a rec ipe fo r social di saster . Testing in the public domain has
become such a social disaster. One feels it keenl y when called uROn , as I have
been , to partic ipate in briefin gs to the publi c about the proper uses and the
limitations of tests and testing . One feels it keenly again when two federal district
judges in Californi a and Illinoi s reac h di ametricall y different judgments about
whether standardized intelligence tests discriminate against black children, with
little evidence that either one of them had an adequate understanding, or cared to
obtain such an understanding, of the psychometric issues involved (Larry P . v.
Riles, 1979; PASE v. Hannon, 1980).
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It is clear that the opportunity for the general public to raise its level of
understanding about testing is even more limited than it is for public school
personnel or people in business and industry. As professional people with both a
moral as well as professional responsibility for our field, I do not believe we can
ignore the public's need for greater understanding of testing without even graver
social consequences in the future . If continuing education and lifelong learning
are to be as important as some higher education specialists think, I suggest that
we do our part to ensure that increased understanding about tests and testing is
promoted as a critical component of such lifelong learning. How that is to be
done is an issue that deserves the very careful consideration of every person in
measurement.

Vocational Tests for Business and Industry
An area of special concern about test usage is the area of vocational tests for
business and industry . Recently the Buros Institute conducted a study on who
purchased the Mental Measurement Yearbooks, and we were surprised to find
that the group that purchased the most yearbooks was not education but business
and industry , which accounted for almost half of the yearbooks sold. We are
gratefu l for that , because it has often appeared to us that it is tests for business
and industry, among all others, that are most likely to be promoted with very
strong promises in the face of little or no evidence that the tests can deliver on
those promises. Such ambit ious and poorly substantiated claims sorely need the
antidote that critical reviews from the Yearbooks can provide. Many tests in
business , particularly those in the management area, involve elaborate conceptual schemes, sometimes assoc iated with training programs, that are magnificent
in their aspirations and complex ity and attractiveness to would-be true believers.
Such conceptual schemes would constitute ideal settings for obtaining construct
validity evidence, but you can bet your entrepreneuri al dollar that there is little
effort to do that in the great majority of cases . It would likely prove too embarrassing. What happens instead is that these tests for business and industry are
among the most serious offenders when it comes to the simplest kinds of validity
evidence, let alone construct validity evidence, and we have found that 57% of
the "Vocations" tests listed in The Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook were
lacking reliability and/or validity data in some way that was important for test
use.
Test use in business and industry, of course, is com ing under the increasingly
heavy fire directed toward tests in general. As a result of this double vulnerability
stemming from inadequate psychometric evidence and potential criticism or even
litigation , some test publishers show resistance to providing the Buros Institute
with the complimentary copies of tests needed for review purposes. Fortunately,
they remain a distinct minority. One test publisher, for example, was reluctant to
provide complimentary copies of his tests for fear that the reviews of these tests
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"might be used as 'authoritative' evidence in a discrimination su it. " He then
went on to say that:
No test's technical report is so comprehensive or so perfect that it cannot be
adversely criticized.
It seems to me that we have an obli gati on to our test users to avo id providing
plaintiffs with ready-made attack weapons which appear to have the prestige of the
Buros Institute behind them.

What interesting questions this raises, especially in relation to the concerns
with "obligation" raised in this letter. In a recent article on professional standards in testing Novick (1981) pointed out that "There are generally three
participants in the ability testing process: the institution , or test user, which
requires the test for some decision-making purpose; the test producer, which
develops, markets, and/or adm inisters and scores the test; and the test taker, who
takes the test by choice, direction, or necessity [p o 1035]. " Any reasonable set of
professional standards would have to take into cons iderati on issues of ob ligation
to all three of these parties, but particul arly to the test taker, who is sti ll the least
powerful of the three. The Buros Institute has an ob ligat ion to be fa ir to all three
parties involved while providing consumer protection to the test user and the test
taker. Although no test is so perfect that it cannot be criticized, it is on ly the
nonexistence or glari ng inadequacy of reliability or validity data that can furni sh
the ready-made attack weapons referred to in this letter, and under such circumstances it is the test producer, not the Buros Institute, that has fashioned the
weapons and handed them over to the attacker. The best defense for the test user
is to select tests that are well-constructed and validated and that can stand the
light of day and not to rely on test companies that have an understandab le but
misplaced motivation to protect the user from test inadequacies that would be
avoided altogether by not using the test.

Test Advertising
A very great influence on test selection and usage is test advert ising, and it is test
advet1ising that constitutes one of the greatest current concerns of the Buros
Institute. It was reported earli er that Oscar Buros was concerned abo ut "unwarranted optimism" about tests; it is in test advertis ing that "unwarranted optimism " reaches its peak. Good and poor tests alike are subj ected to advertis ing
claims that cannot be substantiated. The influence of such advertising is considerable, and the situation now is no different than it was in 1968 when Oscar
Buros, in a presentation to the Assoc iation for Measurement and Evaluation in
Guidance, reported the fo llow ing:
At present, no matter ho w poor a test may be , if it is ni cely packaged and if it
promises to do all sorts of th ings which no test ca n do , the test will find many
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gullibl e buyers. When we initiated criti cal test reviewing in The 1938 Yearbook, we
had no idea how difficult it would be to discourage the use of poorly constru cted
tests of unknown valid ity. Even the better informed test users who fin all y become
convi nced th at a widely used test had no validi ty after all are likely to rush to use a
new instrument which promises far more than any good test can possibly deliver [p.
94].

The appeals to gullible buyers still ring loud and clear. A diagnostic-prescriptive reading program is described as "so effective a system that it 's
been known to actually improve reading level by one year in only 11 to 12 one
hour lessons!" A personality inventory is described as " the quintessential assessment tool for the 80s and beyond- the wave of the future among diagnostic
instruments. " The same kind of extravagant advertising mania also affects scoring and interpretive services. A reviewer of several of the scoring and interpretive services for the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory expressed his
strong concern about the advertising for these serv ices in the following excerpted
comments from The Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook (Adair , 1978):
In reviewing the severa l scoring services fo r thi s yearbook , the writer was impressed with a curi ous dichotomy that appears to ex ist between the profess ional
psychologist who is obliged to uphold the ethics of the profession and the entrepreneuri al psychologist who is obliged to make a profit in order to maintain a
position in the market. ... The dil emm a of whether to uphold professional ethi cs
or to make a profit is seen most vividly in the promotional literature of the several
services . . .. The literat ure of promoti on takes on a Madison Avenue-like qu ality
where caveats are included in the fine print [p o 940].

Examples could be multiplied endless ly. The sins of advertising claims are so
numerous that the Institute may well consider sending out test advertising to be
reviewed criticall y right along with the tests themselves. The issue of extravagant
and unfounded test advertising cl aims mu st receive much greater attention in the
next revision of the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests. In the
face of such claims the major agents for consumer education and protection are
the Standards, Buros Institute publications, and a few beleaguered measurement
teachers. In terms of current standards of test selection and use and the continued
gullibility of the test-buying public in relation to extravagant test advertising
claims , even the best efforts of all of these are apparently not enough to change
the situ ation as much as it desperately needs to be changed .

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Thi s chapter has been quite different from the others with which it appears
because of its concern with the interrelation ships and current status and development of the enti re measurement continuum as it encompasses knowledge, implementation, and use . The latter two elements are the hi storic concerns of the
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Buros Institute. The conclusion that seems apparent from the evidence discussed
is that the theory and knowledge base of meas urement is strong and evolving, the
implementation of that knowledge base in developed products has brought tremendous variety and very mixed results, but that the selection , use, and interpretation of tests has been fraught with major difficulties and some unfortunate
social consequences. It is my strong conviction that although professionals in
measurement are usually most identified with the first or possibly second element
of this measurement continuum, they have a strong professional obligation to be
alert to and to join with others to take action against the continuing serious
offenses and mistakes that take pl ace through ignorance at the level of test usage.
Professional support for the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests,
especially as those Standards relate to test use, is one example of responsible
professional concern and action in this area. But in view of the extent of the
abuses and the strength of the need, it is not enough. The Buros Institute and the
Standards cannot do it alone.

A Ca ll to Action
What, then, can be done to stimulate substantial improvement in the selection,
use, and interpretation of tests (and perhaps, as a conseq uence, make it unprofitab le to publish poor tests) ? I submit that it will requ ire nothing less than an
organized campaign, launched and sponsored by NCME or the same consortium
that produced the Standards, that would increase substantially the public understanding about testing concepts; the values and limitations of tests ; and the
se lection , use, and interpretation of tests. Perhaps some funds could be obtained,
most likely from private philanthropies in this day and age, that could help
support such a campaign. Of what would such a campaign consist? The fol lowing are ill us trative:
J. Convention Programing. In our professional conven tions (NCME ,
AERA, APA, etc.) there should be more discussion of what practical steps could
be taken to improve the selection, use, and interpretation of tests. Symposia
could be organized on the topic. Although the 1980 NCME meeting featured
some usefu l examples of thi s kind of programing (Beck & Stetz , 1980; Crocker,
1980; Yeh & Herman , 1980), generally there is far too little of this done at the
present time. Practitioners often feel isolated at profess ional conventions. What a
fine opportunity this might provide for greater dialogue among the theory and
knowledge oriented and the practitioners. Benefits could be twofold: the development of ideas for improved test usage and the increased recognition by partic ipants of their responsibility for what happens in testing at the grass-roots level.

2. Education of the Public. There is much talk these days about how the
U.S. population is changing, how people are developing new careers and interests, and how there is more need than ever before for the implementation of a
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philosophy of " life long learning. " Continuing education has become an important topic and need. Why shouldn't increased understanding of measurement
concepts, tests , and testing be considered an important component of continuing
education or a lifelong learning program--or indeed- for citi zenship education
itself? As a part of such continuing education the following kinds of projects
might be implemented :
a. Public television could sponsor a series of TV programs on measurement
concepts and contemporary testing practices . To stimulate interest some dispassionate discussion of contemporary testing iss ues and controversies could be
intermixed with the foundational learning of concepts. The success of the program, "Who's Keeping Score?", which included parts of NlE's Minimum
Competency Clarification Hearing, suggests that much more cou ld be done with
the media to promote greater understanding of testing in the general public.
Further prospects should be actively explored .
b. Many continuing education programs offer "minicourses," typically with
continuing educat ion cred it, that are designed to accomplish short-term objectives focused on the development of basic understandings, ski ll s, or interests.
Why shou ldn 't measurement people develop and offer such short courses not
only to principals and teachers but also to the general public? When a local or
national testing controversy develops, why shouldn't minicourses be developed
to help the public better understand the real issues involved and the knowledge
bases for intelligent decision making?
c. Perhaps the Buros Institute should develop a short pamphlet describing
useful procedures and criteria for selecting a test and using and interpreting it
properly. Such a pamphlet could be sold to the public at minimal cost and could
also be included in the introduction to The Mental Measurements Yearbook. This
mi ght also be a useful project for NCME. A pamphlet of this kind would have to
be much shorter and more readable than the Standards for Educational and
Psychological Testing, which is tedious and forbidding reading at best.
d. As suggested earli er, it may well be appropriate for the Buros Institute to
send out advertising as well as the test itself for review. Some bad press in
response to extravagant claims might at least temper those claims and motivate
those involved toward more recognition of their responsibility for their advertising as well as for their product. "Truth-in-packaging" is a desperate need in
testing .
e . More ways shou ld be found to reward and reinforce those test authors and
publishers whose products represent hi gh standards of construction and validation. The professional organizations provide this kind of recognition for researchers; why shouldn ' t test authors and publishers receive a parallel form of
professional recognition? The development of a good test is a very difficult and
painstaking process , and its achievement should be professionally acknow ledged. The Buros Institute would like to participate in a program with such an
emphasis on the positive. Perhaps our reviewers could nominate tests that they
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judged to be exceptional exemplars of test construction and validation , and
members of our National Advisory Committee could select one or two tests from
each area deserving of special commendation, Or perhaps the profess ional organizations would wish to provide such recognition , There are possible pitfall s in
such an undertaking, of course, but a few minor risks may have to be accepted in
order to accomplish what is considered just and motivating for test authors and
publishers and beneficial for the field and for test users .
f. There are strong professionals in the test publishing organizations, and
they are doubtlessly professionally and personally interested in being part of an
organization that subscribes to the highest standards of test authorship and publication. Individuals who join professional associations are often subject to a
collective code of ethics promulgated by the association. Perhaps an association
like NCME should have institutional as well as individual memberships, and
both individuals and organizations should be subject to such a code of ethics.
PaIt of that code could cover professional responsibilities relevant to test development , validation , and advertising. A test publishing company that joined the
professional association would have to make a written and signed comm itment to
the code of ethics and could indicate in its advertising that it had done so . But if
any members of the professional association, or a duly constituted professional
ethics committee, uncovered evidence of code violation by a test publishing
organization, constitutionally defined steps could be taken to conduct a hearing
in accordance with rules of evidence and ultimately, if necessary, to take action
ranging from mild reprimand to ouster from the professional association. This
too is a rather radical suggestion, but the epidemiology of the disease seems to
require radical cures.
Scientists of any kind, whether they be natural , physical , or social scientists ,
are increasingly being called upon to recognize the moral and ethical implications of their work. Yet there is a tendency for many professionals in measurement to focus on the theoretical and knowledge bases of their field and to lose
sight of what is going on at the levels of implementation and use. It is our
business at the Buros Institute to be aware- and sometimes painfully aware--Df
what is going on at these levels . We recommend that other measurement professionals and social sc ientists direct more attention to such grassroots issues,
encourage their wider discussion , and join with the Buros Institute of Mental
Measurements in seeking more effective solutions to these problems than we
have ever had in the past. The social utility and reputation of a professional field
may hang in the balance.
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INFLUENCES ON APTITUDE
AND ACHIEVEMENT TEST
DEVELOPMENT AND USAGE

Aptitude and Ach ievement
Tests: The Curious Case of the
I ndestructi ble Strawperson 1

Anne Anastasi
Fordham University

In a talk I gave at the 1979 ETS Invitational Conference, I remarked that, if I
were suddenly endowed with the appropriate occult powers, I shou ld choose to
eliminate certain words from the psychometric vocabulary . Among them were
the words aptitude and achievement (Anastasi, 1980). These terms have led to
nearly as much confusion, misinterpretation , and misuse of tests as has the more
notorious term intelligence . Having been asked once more to discuss the same
general topic in 1982, it occurred to me that I might consider why the myths that
surround these terms are so persistent-and persistent they certainly are .
Let us examine specifica lly the traditional distinction between aptitude and
ach ievement tests. Aptitudes are typically defined more precisely than intelligence, to des ignate more narrowly limited cognitive domains . Nevertheless ,
like intelligence, they have traditionally been contrasted with achievement in
testing terminology. Thi s contrast dates from the early days of testing, when it
was widely assumed that achievement tests measured the effects of learning,
whereas intelligence and aptitude tests measured so-called innate capacity, or
potentiality , independently of learning . This approach to testing in turn reflected
a simplistic conception of the operation of heredity and environment that prevailed in the j 920s and 1930s. The relevant historical background has been
thoroughly exam ined in a recent book by a science hi storian, Hami lton Cravens,

I Paper presented in In vited Sympos ia: State of the Art Series- Ach ievement Testing, at the
meeting of the American Psyc holog ica l Assoc iati on, Washington, D.C. , August 1982.
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which covers the heredity- environment controversy among American sc ienti sts
between the two World Wars (Cravens , 1978; see also Anastas i, 1979).

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
Common misconceptions about the relation between aptitude and achievement
tests are highlighted by an index introduced in the 1920s and variously named an
achievement quotient or an accomplishment quotient. Both terms having the
same initials, this index soon came to be known as the AQ . Its origin is generally
attributed to Raymond Franzen (1920 , 1922). The AQ could be found by dividing the individual 's educational quotient (EQ) by hi s or her intell igence quotient
(lQ). The EQ was the ratio of educational age (EA) to chro nological age (CA) .
The AQ could also be computed more di rectly by dividing educational age by
mental age . The educational age was found by referring the score on an achievement battery to the age norms for that battery . Still another procedure was to use
age norms for tests in particular academic subj ects, li ke reading or arithmetic , to
find " subject ages" fo r the individual, and then to average these subj ect ages to
obtai n the educational age .
Earl y textbooks on testing regul arl y included a discussion of the AQ as a
means of evaluating a student 's educational performance in relation to that student' s intellectual potenti al- a means of comparing achievement with capacity
to learn (Freeman, 1926, 1939; Garrett & Schneck, 1933; Greene , 194 1; Lincoln
& Workman, 1935; Mursell , 1947). It is interesting to trace the statements about
the AQ in texts appearing from the 1920s to the I 940s and early 1950s. Even the
earliest di scussions called attention to the technical and stati stical weaknesses of
the AQ as a ratio . The major criticisms fe ll into two categories: The first category
was simil ar to the now famili ar criticisms of the traditional ratio IQ; the second
was similar to the equall y fa mili ar criticism of grade norms--educational age
norms were certainl y no better th an educational grade norms.
These and other technical criticisms, however, were usually mentioned as
limitations, which might be avoided under proper conditions or which should be
kept in mind in interpreting results. By the I 940s and earl y 1950s, the criticisms
had become more vigorous. The reader was now told that the AQ as a technique.
"cannot be recommended " (Mursell , 1947 , p. 373), that it has " nearl y gone out
of use " (Greene, 1941 , p . 25 1) , " is in growing disrepute" (Cronbach, 1949 , p.
282), and " is now practically extinct" (Anastasi, 1954 , p. 463).
Psychological criticisms of the use of AQs , as contrasted to statistical critic isms, are fo und in some textbooks from the outset. Frank N. Freeman ' s 1926
book , Mental Tests, a widely used tex t of the period , referred to two unwarranted
ass umptions: first, that intelligence tests provide a measure of innate capacity
independent of training; second , that all educational achievement depends on the
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same unitary intellectual capacity (Freeman, 1926, pp. 287- 288). These concerns were expressed more mildly and less clearly in other early books . Nevertheless , the same authors who critic ized the AQ on either statistical or psychological grounds accepted and even recommended a more general, qualitative,
informal procedure for using intelligence test scores in interpreting measures of
educational achievement. By midcentury, the AQ itself had in fact disappeared,
at least from the major textbooks- but its ghost lingered on.
Closely linked to the AQ is the concept of underachievement and overachievement, which was first introduced in attempts to interpret deviant AQs. If
chi ldren were performing up to capacity , it was expected that their AQs would be
close to 100. Those with AQs under 100 were designated underachievers; those
with AQs above 100 were the overachievers. Several writers did express some
discomfort with the finding of overachievement as thus measured , because it
implied that' certain persons were performing above their capacity, which seemed
a logical impossibility (e.g., Lincoln & Workman, 1935). Nevertheless , they
tried to defend the AQ by attributing values over 100 largely to unreliab ility of
both inte lligence tests and educational tests and to inaccuracy of educational age
norms . They also suggested that unusually strong interest and motivation might
account for a few remaining AQs above 100.
Actually, the question of underachievement and overachievement can be
more properly formulated as overprediction and underprediction from the first to
the second test (Thorndike , 1963). Such intraindividual differences from one test
to another simply reflect the well-known fact that no two tests are perfectly
corre lated. Of course , this statement is also true of other performance indicators,
such as course grades. Among the reasons for the prediction errors in individual
cases are not only the unreliability of the measuring instruments but also differences in content coverage, the varied effects of attitudinal and motivational
factors on the two measures, and the impact of such intervening experiences as
remedial instruction.
It should be noted that underprediction or overprediction will occur regardless
of the type of test used. It occurs not on ly when an intelligence test is used to
predict subsequent achievement test performance but also if an achievement test
is used to predict subsequent intelligence test performance. Furthermore , the
same prediction errors are likely to occur in either direction , whether we estimate
scores on the later test from scores on the earlier test, or vice versa. From a
practical standpoint, the admin istration of alternate forms or different levels of an
achievement test before and after a course of instruction permits a more accurate
analysis of individual accomplishment than does the use of two different tests.
To take an extreme example , if achievement in reading comprehension is predicted from a nonverbal intelligence test that is heavily loaded with spatial
aptitude , the children with higher spatial than verbal aptitude will look like
underachievers, whereas those with higher verbal than spatial aptitude will look
like overachievers.
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DEBUNKING VENTUR ES
Psychology has come a long way since World War 1. And some psychometricians have made repeated efforts to exorcise the AQ ghost. That intelligence and
aptitude tests are not fundamentally different from achievement tests was illustrated as early as 1927 by Truman L. Kelley . In this connection, Kelley coined
the express ion "jangle fallacy" to designate the opposite of the " jingle fa ll acy"
whereby things called by the same name are assumed to be the same . Kelley
(1927, p. 64) defined the jangle fallacy as " the use of two separate words or
expressions covering in fact the same basic situation , but sounding different , as
though they were in truth different." Through an analysis of correlational data,
Kelley demonstrated that widely used intelligence tests and achievement batteries overlapped by about 90% (Kelley , 1927, pp . 193-209).
Since that time, other investigators have again reported extensive overlap
between these two types of tests (e.g., Coleman & Cureton, 1954; Cronbach,
1970 , pp . 284-285). In fact , in some instances, the correlation between intelligence tests and achievement batteries is about as high as the reliability coefficients of each. Over the intervening decades, there have been repeated attempts
to dispel the myths and clarify the relation between aptitude and achievement
tests. Relevant discussions can be found in the successive editions of widely used
textbooks (e.g., Anastasi, 1982; Cronbach , 1970; Thorndike & Hagen, 1977).
They can likew ise be found in the published reports of conferences devoted
wholly or largely to this topic (e .g., DuBois, 1969; D. R. Green, 1974;
Schrader, 1980).
In major addresses and papers by psychologists, the terms aptitude and
achievement have been used time and again with precision and with sens itivity to
their possible misapprehensions. For example, in his presidential address to the
APA Division of Evaluation and Measurement, Bert Green observed that " tests
of general verbal and numerical skills are usually called aptitude tests , which is
unfortunate since the term aptitude seems to suggest an inborn, unchangeable
trait. Actually the tests assess developed abi lities-sk ills acquired through years
of training and practice with verbal and numerical material [B . F. Green, 1978,
p. 669]." Further on, he referred to "the long-range achievement tests we call
'aptitude tests' [p . 669]. "
It is also enlightening to read what the College Board writes about its Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and its series of achievement tests. In various current
publications regularly distributed to students, counselors, and other persons concerned with these tests , the College Board consistently describes the SAT as a
measure of developed verbal and mathematical reasoning abilities that are related
to successful performance in college (e.g., College Entrance Examination
Board, 1981a, 198 1e). In a fuller statement, the Board (I981d) adds that the
SAT "is not a test of some inborn and unchanging capacity. Scores on the SAT
are subject to improvement as educational experience, both in and out of school ,
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causes these verbal and mathematical abi lities to develop ." In the same sources,
the achievement tests are described as measuring the student's " knowledge and
abi lity to apply that knowledge in specific subj ect areas." The distinction that
emerges is primarily one of breadth versus specificity of test content and of
antecedent learning experience.
Following the same trend, Snow (1980) described the SAT as "a test of
extended or generalized achievement designed to be indicative of aptitude for
college work, that is, for work requiring broader, deeper, higher, and more
elaborate organizations and reorganizations of scholastic learning than that represented directly in prior public schooling, or in conventional school achievement
tests [pp. 43 - 44]." At the 1981 ETS Invitational Conference , Christopher
Jencks presented a paper in which he discussed the SAT and argued quite
convincingly that what the SAT measures is not fundamentally different from
what the College Board's achievement tests measure. For many in the audience,
these arguments came as no surprise . Jencks went on to suggest, however, that
because of widespread misconceptions about the mean ing of "aptitude," college-bound high school students do not study the subject matter taught in their
high school courses as thorough ly and as earnestly as they otherw ise might
(Jencks & Crouse, 1982).
Even more recently, the GRE Board has taken decisive action to help dispel
the false aptitude-achievement distinctions. In a recent GRE Board Newsletter
(1982), it was announced that "effective with October 1982 administrations of
the Graduate Record Examinations, the Aptitude Test will become the General
Test and the Advanced Tests will be called Subject Tests. The GRE Board
approved the name changes to avoid any potential misunderstanding abo ut the
purpose of the tests [p o 3]." Viewing the question from a broader perspective,
the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Ability Testing, in its recently
issued formal report, clearly asserts that both aptitude and ach ievement tests
measure developed abi lities, and both serve as indicators of the abi lity to learn
(Wigdor & Garner, 1982, pp. 27, 163).
And so it goes on and on. Sti ll the popular misconceptions persist. These
viable misconceptions are especially ev ident in some of the current popular
attacks on testing, particularly on tests such as the SAT and other measures of
academ ic aptitudes. The criticisms follow a monotonously uniform pattern. First
comes the false attribution . For example, aptitude tests are supposed to assess
innate potential. Second comes disproof, which should be quite easy for such an
outrageously irrational and naive statement. Third comes the conclus ion : Tests
are wrong, bad , and should be abandoned .
This brings me to my subtitle, "The Curious Case of the Indestructible
Strawperson ." First, the critics set up what in folk lang uage is known as a
strawman; but in deference to editorial policies to avoid sexist language, I have
renamed it a strawperson . After the many decades of persistent efforts by psychometricians to dispel these misconceptions, anyone who accepts them as the
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major premi se is certainl y building a strawperson. Once the straw person is up , it
is easily demoli shed , and the demolition carries the tests along with the straw .
But the question still remains: Why do the mi sconceptions survive in the first
pl ace? Who keeps them alive?-certainly not the psychometricians and test
constructors.
Actuall y, the misconceptions survive among the general public and among
those test users who are not knowledgeable about either testing or psychology. I
would not be so bold as to claim that I have the answer to the indestructibility of
my straw person . But I suggest that one explanation may be found in the desire
for magic- the desire for easy answers, quick solutions, and shortcuts . It is the
des ire to which charlatans have catered across the centuries and which accounts
for the popu larity of astrology, phrenology, palmi stry , and all the other fancifu l
shortcuts for understanding ourselves and our associates. It is these pseudosc iences that the first appl ied psychologists had to compete with. Now that
psychology has expanded into the public arena, it is the psychologists themselves
who are expected to produce the magic. And, of course, they will be damned if
they do and damned if they don ' t.

THE CONTINUUM OF DEVELOPED ABILITIES
So much for mi sconceptions. What do we ac tually know about the relation
between aptitude and achievement tests? We may begin by recalling that any
psycholog ical test is essenti ally an objective and standardized measure of a
sample of behavior. With regard to cognitive behavior , test scores tell us what
the individual is able to do at the time. They do not tell us why individuals
perform as they do . To answer that question , we need to know something about
each person's experienti al background. Both aptitude and ac hievement tests can
be best characterized as tests of developed ability. I first heard thi s term used in
the 1950s by Henry Dyer, 2 in a Co llege Board committee meeting . It was
probably an idea ahead of its time and did not then have wide impact. It seems
we are no w beg inning to catch up with it. The term developed abilities is
appearing with increas ing frequency in publi cations on testing. It will be recalled , too, that the College Board now regu larly uses this term to describe the
SAT.

21 am d ifferentiating here betwee n the concept of deve loped abilities and an experimental battery ,
the Tests of Deve loped Ab ilities , produced by ETS for the College Board in the late 1950s (A nastas i,
196 1, pp . 442- 443 ; Dyer , 1954; Dye r & Coffm an, 1957). Those tests were eventu all y abandoned
because they proved no more predicti ve of co ll ege success than a combin ation of the SAT and
ex isting ach ievement tests in spec ifi c fie lds, while bei ng more costl y to prepare, adm ini ster, and
score and less flexible in their use.
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What of the differences between instruments traditionally designated aptitude
tests and those designated achievement tests? First , tests of deve loped abilities do
not fall into sharply differentiated categories but rather along a continuum . Both
aptitude and achievement tests vary widely among themselves; and those near the
center of the continuum overl ap to such a degree as to be nearly indi stinguishable. Nevertheless, if we arrange the instruments that have traditionall y been
called aptitude tests and achievement tests in this continuum and strip them of
unwarranted ass umptions about their nature, we can di scern some meaningful
and useful differences. A number of such differences have been identified with
considerable clarity by several psychometricians , including Lee Cronbach (1970,
pp . 28 1- 285), Robert Ebe l (1974 , p . 316), and Lloyd Humphreys ( 1974, p.
263), among others. Each formul ated the distinction somewhat differently and
focused on different aspects of the comparison; but their approaches to the
question have much in common. I should like to sum up the di stinction between
instruments at opposite ends of the continuum under two headings: one perta ins
to antecedent experience, the other to the use of test scores. From the standpoint
of any particular test, we might say that one di stinction concern s its past and the
other its future .

Antecedent Experience
The tests traditionally designated aptitude tests, at one end of the continuum ,
differ from those des ignated achievement tests, at the other end , in the degree of
precision with which relevant antecedent experience is defined. This does not
necessarily mean generality or specificity of test content , nor does it imply
breadth of transfer effect or of applicability of the instrument. Intelligence tests
and educational achievement batteries can be equally broad in content coverage
and in the situ ational scope of their predictive validity . A spatial aptitude test and
an achievement test in typewriting can be equally specific and limited in content
coverage and in applicability . What I am referring to instead is essentiall y the
experiential pool upon which the test constructor draws in formulating test items.
This experienti al pool is defined with considerable clarity and precision in constructing, let us say, an achievement test in so lid geometry, or medieval hi story,
or motor vehicle operation. At the other extreme is a test like the Stanford- Binet,
in which the definition specifies little beyond growi ng up in America in the
twentieth century. Broadly oriented educational achievement batteries, which
endeavor to di ssoc iate themselves from spec ific course content , add littl e to thi s
definition . Their domain of antecedent experience could be defined as growing
up and going to school in America in the twentieth century.
I am reminded in this connection of the difference between a learning curve
and a growth curve plotted with test scores. The growth curve is a learning curve
covering a longer period of time and obtained in the absence of precise knowl-
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edge about the independent variables that bring about the observed behavioral
changes .
To sum up the first difference, tests of developed ability differ in the degree
of prec ision versus vagueness with which tbe relevant domain of antecedent
experience is defined.

Use of Test Scores
The second difference concerns the way in which test scores are utilized. It is
generall y recognized that traditional ac hievement tests are designed and used
primarily to assess current status, whereas traditional aptitUde tests are des igned
and used to predict future performance followin g a specified learning experience .
Typical tests of current status , at one end of this continuum , can be illustrated by
a licensing examination (as in obtaining a driver's license) , a typing test (as in
hiring a secretary) , a French test (as in selecting an interpreter) , a test to assess
the effects of self-study or life experiences (as in credit by examination) , and a
competency test in so-called basic skill s (presumably chosen because they are
prerequi site to a wide variety of roles in our contemporary culture) .
At the other end o f the continuum , we find typical " intelli gence" and "apti tude" tests des igned parti cul arl y fo r predictive purposes. What can the individual learn- how much and how fas t can he or she learn- when put through a
particular course of study , educational program , indu strial apprenticeship , or
other systematic learning experience? I'm sure that at this point many o f you are
thinking that traditional ac hievement tests can often serve as effective predictors
of future learning . T hat is certainly true . An ac hievement test in arithmetic is a
good predictor of students' subsequent performance in an algebra class.
We must remember that all tests actually asses s current status, whether their
purpose is terminal assess ment or prediction . Hence it is not surpri sing that some
aptitude tests look very much like ac hievement tests and vice versa. In fact , some
writers (Carroll , 1974; Snow , 1980) have argued for aptitude as a concept or
construct , defined as all the characteri stics of an individu al that predispose him
or her to success or failure in new learning or in the performance of some future
activity . An aptitude test, according to this view , is only one indicant of aptitude;
other indicants would include achievement tests, data on prior performance, and
information regarding re levant personality and physical characteristics. T hi s definition o f aptitude obviously focuses on the predicti ve use o f information about
the individual , includin g current test scores of all sorts.

MORE ABOUT APTITUD ES
Let us take a closer look at the concept of aptitude itself. T his, after all , is where
myths and excess meanings have acc umulated. In di scuss ions of aptitUde and
achievement tests, it is generally the mi sconceptions about aptitude that have led
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to false distinctions and to misuse of scores. Aptitude, as we have seen, has been
identified with the predictive use of tests. Prediction , in turn , has traditionally
been linked with the process of selection : Some students are admitted (to college,
medical school, or whatever) and others are not; some job applicants are hired
and others are not. As a result of several emerging societal changes, selection is
beginning to give way to classification. Tests are being used increas ingly for
such purposes as assisting individuals to choose among courses of study , careers,
or other alternative action plans; placing applicants in different jobs for maximal
utilization of their individual qualifications; and assessing the prerequisite skills
and knowledge of individu al students in order to fit instructional programs to
specific needs.
In all these contexts, the concept of diagnostic testing is coming to replace
that of testing for prediction. But the role of tests in diagnosis and prediction is
not fundamentally different. In all these situations, appropriate tests should be
chosen or constructed in the light of a task analysis of the desired behavior
domain- whether identified through an academic curriculum, a career, a particular job , or whatever. To be effective, a predictive or diagnostic test should assess
the development of those prerequisite ski ll s and knowledge that the individual
needs before taking the next step. Although test content may be drawn from a
common pool of experiences shared by the examinee population , the selection of
relevant items from that pool should be oriented toward the requirements of the
subsequent performance pool. Every test has both this backward and forward
reference . The forward reference, however, is especially relevant for tests used
to assess one's readiness to advance from where one is to where one wants to
go--for instance, into a particular job or educational program.
The concept of aptitude as prerequisite skill s and knowledge is exemplified in
what Ben Bloom (1976, 1980) calls cognitive entry behaviors and affective entry
characteristics. The cognitive entry behaviors include such general skills as
reading comprehension , basic quantitative skills, writing competence, logical
reason ing processes, and possibly still broader skills such as attention skills and
study skills. These are the ski ll s tapped in most scholastic aptitude and academic
intelligence tests. Bloom maintains, however, that the more specific cognitive
entry behaviors identified as prerequisites for a particular set of learning tasks
provide more accurate assessment and are more readily alterable by appropriate
instruction. Affective entry characteristics also influence the individual's subsequent learning performance. They include relevant emotional, motivational, and
self-concept variables. To some extent, they too can be altered by subsequent
instruction adapted to individual needs. Effective instruction requires full information regarding the individual 's status upon entry into the instructional program
(initial aptitude), as well as clear specification of what is to be learned (achievement goals).
School readiness is another condition assoc iated with the concept of aptitude.
It refers essentially to the attainment of prerequisite skills, knowledge, attitudes,
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motivations, and other behavioral traits that enable the learner to profit maximally from school instruction . These prerequisites are what Hunt and Kirk
(1974) have called the "entry skills" that the child needs to cope with the
teaching-learning situation encountered in the first grade. At one time, such
readiness was conceived largely in terms of maturation. To be sure, the development of certain minimum physical qualifications facilitates some kinds of learning. Unless chi ldren can make the necessary auditory discriminations, they cannot learn to speak by the usual procedures; without the ability for fine motor
coordination, they are unable to manipulate a pencil in writing. Most school
learning , however, is not so closely linked to sensorimotor development. In the
mastery of educational tasks, the importance of prior learning is being increasingly recognized. More and more emphasis is now placed on the hierarchical development of know ledges and skills, whereby the acquisition of simple
concepts equips the chi ld for the learning of more complex concepts at any age .
Still another way to conceptualize aptitude and achievement in an educational
context is presented by Robert Ebel (1969, 1974). In an incisive analysis of the
goals of education, Ebel (1969) concl uded that the essence of educational
achievement is "command of useful verbal knowledge [po 66]" and that this
objective should be reflected in the construction of educational tests. In order to
be meaningful to the individual learner and retrievable when relevant, each new
acquisition must be integrated into a coherent structure of knowledge. According
to this view, "aptitude for learning consists mainly and essentiall y of relevant
knowledge .. .. What the student has achieved in learning becomes, if it is
relevant, his aptitude for further learning" (Ebel, 1974, p . 3 16) . This process
cannot occur independently of the subject matter to which it is applied. We do
not think content-free thoughts nor develop content-free abilities . The avai labi lity of a large, well-organized, and eas ily retrievable content store is also emerging
as a major difference between the performance of expert and novice in such
activities as playing chess and solving difficult problems in physics (Glaser ,
1981).
The increasing .recognition of the importance of the knowledge context of
developed abilities is reflected in a recent statement prepared under College
Board auspices. The statement concerns the basic academic competencies that
college-bound high school students should develop (College Entrance Examination Board, 1981 b, 1981c). Following an initial year of intensive discussions by
representative groups of educators, a plan was formulated covering both broad
developed abilities (called academic competencies) and recommended curricular
fields . The list of academic competencies, although defined at a higher academic
level, sounds very much like the cognitive entry behaviors described by Bloom.
They include developed abilities in reading, writing , listening and speaking ,
mathematics, reasoning, and studying . A major conclusion was "that acquis ition
of the competencies and achievement in the curriculum are interdependent- that
is, subject matter cannot be mastered without the necessary competencies, and
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the competencies cannot be developed in a vacuum without reference to subjectmatter content [College Entrance Examination Board , 1981 c , p. 10]. "
Despite the indestructible strawperson , we have indeed been making steady
progress in expanding, clarifying, and refining our understanding of what aptitude and achievement tests measure . Our main problem is still how to communicate this growth in understanding to test users , test takers, and the general public .
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Achievement Test Items:
Cu rrent issues

Robert L. Ebel

Michigan State University

The writer of achievement test items is confronted with two major problems, as
Lindquist pointed out nearly half a century ago (Lindquist , 1936, p. 17) . The
first of these is the problem of what to measure. The second is how to measure it.
The solution proposed for the first problem is to focus primarily on testing for
know ledge and only secondarily on testing for abi lities. Cognitive abilities, it is
reasonable to believe, depend entirely on know ledge. Although the term knowledge, as common ly used , includes both information and understanding, the most
useful kind of knowledge , the kind that will occupy our attention almost exclusively , is that which involves understanding. Understood knowledge is a
structure of relations among concepts. To understand is to be aware of relationships. Each of these relationships can be expressed in words as a proposition.
The solution proposed for the second problem is to present the examinee with
a series of incomplete propositions , accompanied by two or more alternative
completions, only one of which makes the proposition true. Many of the current
issues in the writing of achievement test items are related to these two proposed
so luti ons.

A CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge originates in information that can be received directly from observations or indirectly from reports of observations. These observations may be
external (objects or events) or internal (thoughts and feelings) (Scheffler , 1965,
p. 137). Information feeds the mind and , like food for the body, it must be
digested and assimilated. Think ing is the process by which these things can be
accomplished (Newman , 1852, p. 134). Information that is simply stored in
memory remains only information , the lowest , least useful form of knowledge .
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But if the information becomes the subject of reflective thought , if those who
received it ask themselves , "What does it mean?" "How do we know? " "Why
is it so?" , the information may come to be understood. It may be integrated into
a system of relations among concepts and ideas that constitutes a structure of
knowledge. This has been referred to as "semantic encoding" (Anderson , 1972 ,
p. 146) . Information that is understood , that is incorporated into a structure of
knowledge , tends to be more powerful, more useful, and more satisfying. It is
likely to be a more permanent possession than information that is simply remembered (Boulding, 1967 , pp. 7- 8).
The basis for verbal knowledge exists in the mind in a form that Polanyi
(1958) has called "tacit knowledge." In that form , it is a purely private possession. But if concepts can be abstracted from these images and expressed in
words, and if the relations among the concepts can be expressed in sentences,
then tacit knowledge is converted into verbal knowledge. This can be communicated and thus made public. It can also be recorded and stored for future reference. It can be manipulated in the processes of reflective thinking. It is thus a
very powerful form of knowledge. The peculiar excellence of human beings
among all other creatures on earth is their ability to produce and to use verbal
knowledge. Thinkers produce it. Teachers and students, planners , and managers
use it. Classrooms and libraries and study rooms are full of it. So are conference
rooms , memoranda , and reports . It would be difficult to overstate the importance
of structures of verbal knowledge in human affairs (Hayakawa , 194 1, pp. 15-25;
Langer, 1957, pp . 200- 204).
If a structure of verbal knowledge consists entirely of a system of articul ated
relations among concepts and ideas , can it be described completely by li sting the
elements (propositions) that compose it? Might not a complex structure involve
relations or dimensions that are not expressed by the constituent elements of the
structure? Indeed it is possible that a listing of the elements of a structure might
omit some that have not been perceived or expressed in words . But it is unreasonable to believe that there might be important elements of the structure that
could not be perceived and expressed; to cite an example of such an unperce ived
and unexpressed element, one would have to perceive and express it. Once it had
been expressed, it could be added to the list. The conclusion that a structure of
verbal knowledge can be described completely by listing the elements that compose it appears to be logically necessary . Where structures of knowledge are
concerned, the whole seems to be precisely equal to the sum of all the parts.

THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE TO ABILITY
The contribution of knowledge to effective human behavior is sometimes questioned. Know ledge alone is not enough, says the businessman. It does not
guarantee financial success . Know ledge alone is not enough, says the co llege
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president. It does not guarantee scholarly achievement. Knowledge alone is not
enough, says the religious leader. It does not guarantee virtue. Knowledge alone
is not enough, says the philosopher. It does not guarantee wisdom.
They are all right, of course. Knowledge alone is not enough . But in this
complex world of chance and change , no one thing nor any combination of
things ever will be enough to guarantee financial success or scholarly achievement or virtue or wisdom. Although this is true , few would deny that the
command of knowledge does contribute greatly to the attainment of these other,
more ultimate goals.
The term knowledge, as it is used in this chapter, means considerably more
than the same term means in the Bloom Taxonomy (Bloom, 1956, pp. 201297). There, knowing something means simply being able to recall it. Having
knowledge is nothing more than having information. Here, the term knowledge
refers not only to information but also and, far more importantly, to understanding , which requires a structure of relations among concepts. In addition, the
emphasis here is on useful knowledge. If knowledge is not available to be used,
it is not fully possessed. Thus the possession of knowledge, as the term is used
here , should enable a person to demonstrate all the other abilities and skills
identified in the other categories of Bloom's Taxonomy: comprehension, application, analysis , synthesis, and evaluation . If one knows how to do these
things, one ought to be able to do them .

THE MEASURABILITY OF HUMAN
CHARACTERISTICS

Any important human characteristic is necessarily measurable. To be important,
a personal characteristic must make an observable difference , that is, at some
time, under some circumstances, a person who has more of it must behave
differently from a person who has less of it. If different degrees or amounts of a
personal characteristic never make any observable difference , what evidence can
be found to show that it is, in fact, important?
But if such differences can be observed, then the characteristic is measurable,
for all measurement requires is verifiable observation of a more- less relationship. Can integrity be measured? It can if verifiable differences in integrity can
be observed among men . Can mother love be measured? If observers can agree
that a hen shows more mother love than a female trout or that Mrs. A . shows
more love for her children than Mrs. B , then mother love can be measured . The
gist of the argument is this. To be important, a personal characteristic must make
a difference. If it makes a difference, the basis for measurement exists.
In principle , then, any important human characteristic is measurable. In practice, however, many characteristics said to be important seem to be very difficult
to measure. Where can one find a reliable test of ability to see relations , to
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formulate hypotheses, to interpret data, to organize ideas, to draw concl usions,
to solve problems, or to think?
Perhaps the difficulty may lie in the characteristics themselves. Perhaps they
simply do not exist as separate, unified , measurable abilities. Perhaps what we
call abilities are simply categories of tasks that have some superficial characteristics in common but which cannot be dealt with effectively by the application of a
single general task-related ability. Perhaps what they may require mainly is
knowledge of the special context in which the tasks arise. Take problem solving
for example. The problems a physician must solve are likely to be quite different
from those a chess player or a football coach or a highway engineer or a theoretical physicist must solve. No test of general ability to solve problems is likely to
predict very accurately how successful a practitioner of each of these arts or
crafts is likely to be. Too little of what makes a physician successful in problem
solving is also likely to make the chess player, the coach, the engineer, or the
physicist successful.
Many of the alleged abilities that are said to be important human characteristics have never been defined operationally, which must be the first step in
developing valid measures of them. If an operational definition of one of these
very general abilities could be developed , it might lead to a test composed of
such a heterogeneity of tasks, with very low intertask correlations, that the test
scores would be very low in reliability. When this is the case, differences among
individuals in the amount of this general ability are likely to be difficult to
discern. It will probably be equally difficult to show that such differences matter
very much. If they make little difference on a test designed to measure them,
they are unlikely to make much difference in other contexts . If this is the case,
they cannot be of great importance .
It may be a waste of time and energy to try to measure " hard to measure "
human characteristics . Their measurability is directly related to their importance.
For the same reason it may be a waste of time and energy to try to develop these
"hard to measure" characteristics through instruction. A teacher who claims to
be doing so without being able to produce ev idence of success in doing it
(because , you see, they are " hard to measure") may be simply throwing dust in
our eyes . Those who argue that "what can be easily assessed should not dictate
what is taught" are mistaken. If it cannot be easi ly assessed it cannot be surely
taught. It is not likely to be worth trying to teach.
An instructor who wishes to develop in pupils some important characteristic
must first devise a method for measuring reliably how much of that characteristic
each pupil has acquired. Then the instructor must devise a method for developing
that characteristic . Finally the instructor ought to measure the effectiveness of his
efforts. Most teachers can find a sufficient challenge to their abilities and commitments in teaching things that are not' 'hard to measure ." They should not add
unnecessarily to the difficulties and frustrations of their work by undertaking to
teach and to test "hard to measure" achievements. Teachers would teach more
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effectively and talk more sensibly if they would ban references to " hard to
measure " qualities from their discourses .

THE RELATIVE MERITS OF ESSAY AND OBJECTIVE
TESTS
Specialists in testing tend to recommend the use d objective tests in general and
multiple-choice items in particular. They claim not only that objective tests are
more objective and convenient but that they provide more extensive samples of
the ability to be tested and yield scores of higher reliability. Critics of multiplechoice tests claim that essay tests, despite their limitat ions and the difficulties of
using them , provide more valid measures of ability and encourage more wholesome educational practices.
In considering the relative merits of essay and objective tests, it is important
to make this point at the outset. If the purpose of the test is , as it is usually, to
determine how much useful knowledge a person has on some subj ect, then that
purpose can be achieved by using either an essay or an objective test. The point is
important because some believe that essay tests call for a different, and higher,
level of mental ab ility than is req ui red by an objective test. The fact, however, is
otherwise. There is no empirical evidence to support belief in such a difference
and no rational basis for expecting it.
It is reasonable to believe that any cogn iti ve ability consists entirely of knowledge of how to do something . That knowledge is made up of a structure of
elements of knowledge, a structure of relations between concepts and ideas. By
testing exam inees for possession of a sample of those e lements, one can determine the extent and strength of their structures of knowledge relevant to the
ability and, thus, the degree to which they possess the abi lity.
If person A knows more about a subject than person B, then A is likely to
write a better answer than B to an essay question on the subject. A is also likely
to give more correct answers than B to an objective test on the subject. The
correctness of the answers either person gives to either type of test question
depends largely on the extent and firmness of that person's structure of
knowledge.
It is true that essay tests present tasks to the examinees that are distinctly
different from the tasks presented in objective tests. T he difference , however, is
more one of form than of substance. In both cases the information used in giving
the answer comes from the examinee's structure of knowledge. In both cases an
examinee must choose information relevant to the question being asked. Then ,
with an essay test answer, the exam inee must choose how to express in words the
relevant items of information and the conclusions to which they lead. With an
objective test , the exam inee must choose how to relate the relevant items of
information to the questions posed by the item and then choose which of the
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answer options is best supported by the relevant information. In both cases the
foundation for an answer is the examinee ' s structure of knowledge. In both cases
the process of arriving at an answer involves making repeated choices. In both
cases the examinee must apply the knowledge possessed , must relate and infer as
well as remember.
The advantage that essay tests have in not suggesting the correct answer to a
question, or providing clues to it, is more apparent than real. Those who are most
successful in selecting correct answers to a multiple-choice question tend to be
also more successful in producing good answers to essay test questions (Cook,
1955) . The cues to the correct answer that multiple-choice items provide seldom
give away the correct answer to one who lacks knowledge of it or ability to infer
it. Multiple-choice items often prove to be too difficult to discriminate well
despite the cues they may provide . If the multiple-choice items are well written,
cues to the correct answer will be offset to some degree by other cues that suggest
incorrect answers to poorly informed examinees. The items in which cues are
likely to be most helpful are the less desirable kinds in which a previously
learned answer simply must be recognized. If the item requires application of
what has been learned to answer a question or solve a problem that has never
been encountered before, cues will be less helpful. Presenting a good test question in multiple-choice form seldom if ever makes the question too easy to do its
job well. Seldom if ever does presentation of correct answers keep objective tests
from clearly distinguishing those who know more from those who know less
about a subject.
Whatever theoretical advantages there might be to having the exam inee produce an answer are likely to be offset by the tedious, subjective process of
evaluating the answer and the unreli able scores that often result. Errors in scoring
objective tests are quite rare and usually very smal l. Differences of opinion in
judging the quality of essay test answers are often substantial. This is not to say
that there are no occasions on which an essay test should be used in preference to
an objective test. It is to say that a general preference for essay tests is unwarranted . The abi lity tested by an item is determined mainly by the content of the
question , not by the form of the response.

THE MERITS OF ITEMS BASED ON REALISTIC
PROBLEM SITUATIONS
For over 40 years some test spec ialists have recommended the use of test items
based on verbal descriptions of realistic problem situations . Items of this kind are
suitable for inclusion in paper and pencil tests. They are more realistic than items
that test directly for possession of knowledge or for understanding of principles
and procedures . They are less realistic than performance tests presented in simu-
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lations of "real-life" situations. A discussion of the possibilities and problems of
applied performance testing can be found in Fitzpatrick and Morrison (1971).
T he inclusion in paper and pencil tests of items that present verbal descriptions of realistic problem situations has several attractions to test constructors. It
demonstrates that objective tests are not limited to testing for recall of isolated ,
trivial factual detail s. Situation-based items cannot be answered correctly by
simple recognition of the right answer. They force the examinee to think. They
obviously require the application of knowledge to real-life prob lems. Realism in
the test encourages faith in the validity of the test scores. These are valuable
assets. But situation-based items also have disadvantages. They tend to be complex and wordy. Complexi ty may obscure the crucial element in the situation ,
complicate the task of the examinee, and thus lower the discriminating power of
the items. It is true that the real problems we face in living are complex.
Unfortunately, complex, real problems seldom have si ngle demonstrably correct
right answers. Giving a person a complex problem to solve may not be the best
way to estimate that person's capability of solving such problems.
Ordinari ly a complex test question contributes only a single unit to the total
test score. It is answered correctly (l) or incorrectly (0) . But to arrive at the final
answer to a complex question , the onl y answer that counts, the exam inee must
provide himself with a multitude of intermediate or contributory answers that do
not count. To reach a correct answer, each of a number of contributory steps
must be taken correctly . A single error in anyone of them may lead to a final
answer that is wrong. The value of nine correct decisions can be offset by the
penalty for one that is incorrect. Shou ld not right and wrong decisions carry more
nearly equal weight in judging an exam inee's capabilities? Would it not be more
reasonable , would it not be more informative, would it not lead to more acc urate
measurement of the mental ability being tested to assess the correctness of each
step independently?
Some would say not , arguing that the whole is more th an and more significant
than the sum of its component parts; that ability to avoid even a single error
during a complex process is the essence of competence. T he arg ument is not
without merit. Surely it is true that in the ord inary affairs of living , single errors
can be very costly . One thing done wrong can cancel the rewards for doing many
things right. But is our purpose in measuring mental abi lities to imitate life? Or is
it mainly to assess a person's cognitive resources, that is, the person's knowledge
and mental abi lities? For that purpose it may be appropriate and advantageous to
take each decision into acco unt and to assess them independently. It may be
inappropriate and disadvantageous to consider only a single outcome from a
seq uence or cluster of related , contributory decisions.
Wordiness should make the items more time-consuming so that fewer could
be included in a test of g iven duration. Obviously a test composed of simple
items wi ll yield more independent scorable responses per hour of testing time and
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hence will tend to yield more reliable scores than a test composed of complex
items. Simple test items should also be easier to comprehend and present fewer
ambiguities or occasions for misinterpretation by the examinees. Because of
these differences one would expect scores of higher reliability from simple than
from complex items in tests of similar duration. Experimental studies by Howard
(1943) and by Ebel (1953) have confirmed these expectations. It seems difficult
to obtain scores of reasonable reliability in tests of reasonable duration if the test
items are situation based. This has been true of patient- management problems in
medicine (Skakun, 1979), of air crew problems derived from critical incidents in
military aviation, and of simulations in legal education (Alderman, Evans, &
Wi lder, 1981). There seems to be an inverse relation between the realism of the
problem situations in the test and the reliability of the scores yielded by the test.
Recognizing these disadvantages, the test constructor may sti ll favor the use
of situation-based items. For they do test examinee understanding , abi lities to
app ly knowledge, and abi lity to think. Is there any better alternative? There may
be . Whereas items involving complex , realistic problem situations are often
inefficient, ambiguous, and indeterminate, items testing elements of knowledge
tend to be efficient and can be less ambiguous and more determinate. There are
reasons for believing that most cognitive abilities that can be measured by situation-based test items can also be measured, perhaps with greater efficiency and
re li ability , by proposition-based items. In many situations , tests composed of
simple items may provide more efficient and accurate measures of mental abilities than can be provided by complex test items. In item writing as in many other
arts, simplicity can be a virtue.

THE MERITS OF ALTERNATE-CHOICE ITEMS
A simple approach to assessing knowledge is available to those who can accept
the idea that knowledge is a structure of relations among concepts. Each of the
relations that makes up the structure can be expressed as a proposition. A proposition is simply a sentence that can be said to be true or false (Cohen & Nagle,
1934, pp. 27 - 30). Propositions simi lar in appearance to those that are part of the
structure but expressing relations that are not part of the structure can also be
written. The person whose knowledge is being assessed is asked to distinguish
between the correct and the incorrect propositions.
Th is sounds suspiciously like a true- fa lse test, as indeed it is. True- false
tests, however, have been condemned by many specialists in testing , often with
cons iderab le vehemence (Adkins, 1947, p. 41; Travers, 1950, p. 42). Other
authorities have suggested a different view, which I share. The fau lts found in
true- false items are not inherent in the form but sometimes result from careless
or incompetent use of it (Bergmann, 1981, p. 92; Popham , 1981 , p. 243).
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Both the amount of guess ing pupil s do in taking true- false tests (Ebel, 1968)
and the amount of error that the guessing contributes to their scores (Hill s &
Gladney, 1968) tend to be exaggerated . Classroom true- false tests of approximately 100 items have yie lded coeffi cients of reliability in the .80s and .90s.
These results wo uld be most unlikely if the scores were di storted seriou sly by
guess ing .
Each true- fal se item tests only one element in a structure of knowledge, but
there can be many such items in a test. No single essential element in an
important structure can be regarded as trivial. If the item is seriously ambiguous,
or if it encourages rote learning, much of the fa ult must be wi th the one who
wrote it. Elements in a structure of knowledge can be expressed clearl y. They do
not need to reward rote learning by being expressed in the exact words or
sentences of the textbook or lecturer. The fear that incorrect pro positions in a
true- false test will lead to wrong learning has proved to be unjustified (Ross,
1947 , p. 349; Ruch, 1929, p . 368).
Despite their intrinsic relevance to the assessment of achievement in learning,
true- false test items can be ambiguous. They call for absolute judgments of truth
or falsity . They do not offe r different answers among which the examinee can
choose. Because few statements are complete and accurate enough to be perfectl y true, the examinee must dec ide how far the statement can dev iate from
perfect truth and still be call ed true. This is one source of ambiguity . Another is
lack of clarity in the focus of the item . T he e lement in the statement that is cruci al
to its truth or falsity is not identified clearl y to the examinee .
An alternative to the true- fa lse item , designed to remove some of the ambiguity , is the alternate-choice item . It consists of an incomplete statement of a
proposition along with two or more alternative completions, only one of which
makes the statement true . For example :
An eclipse of the sun can onl y occur when the moon is:
(I) full (2) new.
Items of this kind do not call for absolute judgments of truth or fa lsity. The
critical element in the statement they make should be quite cl ear. Their indices of
di scriminati on should be higher on the average than the indices of comparable
true- fa lse items given to the same exam inees. The test scores therefore should be
more reliable . A recent stud y has verified this expectation . Students (N = 28)
enrolled in a cl ass in educational measurement took parallel 25-item true- false
and alternate-choice tests on each of eight units of instruction in the course. The
Kuder- Richardson 20 reliability coefficients for the true- false tests ranged from
. 13 to .7 1, with a mean of .47 . Those fo r the alternate-choice tests ranged
fro m .56 to .76, with a mean of .66 (Ebel , 1982).
Alternate-choice items are di stinctively di fferent from the fa mil iar fo ur-alternati ve multi ple-choice items in ways other than the num ber of response opti ons
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offered . Because they tend to be simpler and use fewer words, they take less time
per item (Ebel, 195 3). This could lead to higher reliability for tests of a given
duration. The response options tend to be shorter, often one or two words, which
foc uses the attention of the examinee more clearly on the element of knowledge
being tested.
One objection likely to be raised to the use of the alternate-choice items is that
they deal with isolated factual detail s. Their brevity and specificity may be taken
as indications of triviality (Highet, 1950, p. 120). But if the conception of
knowledge presented in this chapter is correct, if verbal knowledge can be
expressed completely as a structure of relations, if each of these relations (the
elements of the structure) can be expressed as a proposition , and if each proposition is used as the basis for an alternate-choice item, then one can assess the
extent and firmness of the whole structure by examining the parts that compose it
(Thorndike, 1935; Wood & Beers, 1936, p. 162). The choice of a response to an
alternate-choice item is simple to indicate, but the process of making it rationally
may be quite complex. If a problem like the following has not been encountered
before, it is likely to test understanding and application as well as recall.
The buoyant force on a ping-pong ball immersed in water is:
(I) greater than (2) the same as (3) less than that
on an iron ball of the same size. (Answer 2)
Even if the problem has been encountered before, it is reasonable to suppose that
the person who understands the bas is for the answer is more likely than the one
who does not to give the correct answer.
When using the alternate-choice item form, the item writer is free to pose
questions that admit only two good alternative responses. Here are some
examples:
I. The density of ice is (I) greater (2) less than that of water.
2. A point on the surface of the Earth moves toward the (I) east (2) west as
the Earth turns.
3. The average size of farms in the United States has (I) increased (2)
decreased during this century.

Often, as in these examples, there is only one plausible alternative to the key
word or phrase in the proposition.
When item writers are obli ged to produce four-alternative multiple-choice
items, they sometimes do so by combining several alternate-choice items. They
may present fo ur propositions and ask which one is true or not true. They may
ask if a statement is true or false, and why. The responses might be: (I) true,
because A; (2) true , because B; (3) false, because C; (4) fa lse, because D. They
may ask if something is true of both X and Y. The responses might be: ( I) yes,
both ; (2) no , only X; (3) no, only Y; (4) no, neither. They may ask the speed and
direction of a change, so that the responses might be: ( I) rapid increase; (2) slow
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increase; (3) slow decrease; (4) rapid decrease. Presented separately the two or
more alternate-choice items would yield two or more independent indications of
achievement. Combined, they yield only one. The result is likely to be a loss of
reliability (Ebel, 1978) .
Three other characteristics of alternate-choice items give them some advantage over conventional multiple-choice items . When the response options are
brief, as they usually are, they can be included as parts of a continuous sentence
and need not be listed below an item stem. This makes the typing simpler and the
resulting pages more compact. When it is awkward to arrange the wording of the
sentence so that the response options come at the end, they can be put in the
middle or at the beginning. This sometimes simplifies the wording of the item.
Finally, because alternate-response items are simple in structure, they are easier
to write. There are fewer opportunities for errors in item writing that might spoi l
the effectiveness of the item.
One other point ought to be mentioned before concluding this case for alternate-choice items . There are items like the following in which more than two
good response options are readi ly availab le. For example:
1. The gas given off in photosynthesis is (I) carbon dioxide (2) hydrogen (3) oxygen (4) nitrogen. (Answer 3)
2. Most of the territorial possessions of the United States were gained as a
result of the (1) War of 1812 (2) Civil War (3) Spanish-American War (4)
World War I. (Answer 3)
When more than two good response options are available, the item writer should
probably offer more than two .

PROSPECTS FOR A TECHNOLOGY OF ITEM WRITING
Cronbach (1970) expressed the opinion that "The design and construction of
achievement test items has been given almost no scholarly attention. The leading
works of the generation-even the Lindquist Educational Measurement and the
Bloom Taxonomy- are distillations of experience more than scholarly analysis
[p o 509]." The contrast implied here between "distillation of experience" and
"scholarly analysis" is interesting. Did not Lindquist and Bloom rely on scholars to aid in the distillations? Did not these scholars analyze the experiences of
which they were aware? Is it obvious that a theory of item writing has much to
add to the "distillation of experience" in the development of a technology of
item writing?
Roid and Haladyna (1980) have reviewed recent research on item writing,
with special attention to the more or less mechanistic or semiautomatic methods
of item generation. Their article contains descriptions and discussions of six
classes of methods for producing test items:
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1. Those in which the item writer is guided by statements of the objectives of
instruction.
2. T hose whose items must meet specifications of the domain of content to be
covered and the forms of items to be used.
3. Those in which items are produced by linguistic transformations of segments of prose instruction.
4. T hose in which mapping sentences derived from facet theory are used to
define a content domain.
5. Those whose items are designed to test understandings of concepts.
6. Those in which items are stored in or actually produced by computers.
The limitations of these methods is acknowledged clearly in the review. Each
method appears to have a particular application. They cannot be app lied to any
content level and at any cogn itive level. They require ingenuity and the exercise
of judgment. At present they are in the infancy of their development. Cronbach
believes that they will mature into useful tools for the test constructor. Others,
including this writer, are more skept ical. Roid and Haladyna endorsed Berk's
(1978) observation that the rigor and precision of item-writing spec ifications are
inversely related to their practicability .
In a sense, the item development procedures outlined in earl ier sections of this
chapter constitute a technology for item writing . The form and derivation of the
items is spec ified quite precisely. The content of the items depends on the item
writers' knowledge and ski ll s. Propositions that are important and defensible
must be selected. They must be expressed clearly, accurately, and concisely.
Incorrect answer options that have commonsense plausibility must be provided.
The judgment involved in these choices is crucial, and no algorithm or computer
program is likely to provide it.

CONCLUDING STATEMENT
This chapter has attempted to make 15 points.
I. Information is the source but not the substance of knowledge .
2. Useful knowledge is a structure of relations among concepts and
principles .
3. The peculiar excellence of human beings is their abi lity to produce and to
use verbal knowledge.
4. Cognitive abilities are entirely dependent on the possession of relevant
knowledge.
5. The assumption that each kind of cognitive task requires a separate special cognitive abi lity is unnecessary and probably unwarranted.
6. Special tasks are more likely to require special knowledge than special
abi lities.
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7 . Any important human characteristic is necessarily measurable.
8. Human characteristics that are hard to measure are likely to be of limited
importance.
9. Either an essay test or an objective test can be used to measure any
important cognitive achievement.
10. Multiple-choice items that present correct answers among the response
options can indicate quite accurately an examinee's ability to produce
correct answers.
11. Items based on realistic problem situations tend to yield unreliable test
scores.
12. Items that consist of incomplete propositions each of which is accompanied by one correct and one or more incorrect completions can yield
valid measures of achievement.
13 . Items that provide only two response options can measure achievement
satisfactori ly .
14. Technologies for the mechanical or semiautomatic generation of test
items are likely to be of limited value.
15. Simplicity in the conception of what to test and in the means used to test
it is commendable.
Paraphrasing Plato's assessment of the ideas he attempted to illustrate in the
Allegory of the Cave, "Heaven knows if these things are true , but this, at any
rate, is how they appear to me ."
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Abilities and Knowledge in
Education al Achievement
Testing: The Assessment of
Dynamic Cognitive
Structu res 1

Samue l Messick
Educational Testing Service

T his chapter confronts the question of what role cogniti ve abilities play or ought
to play in educational achievement testing, which raises the prior question of
what educational achievement tests are or ought to be . I begin by considering the
nature of educational achievement as a construct in an attempt to circumscribe
what achievement tests ought to be rather than by examining extant achi evement
tests that may be variously o ff target. S imilar consideration is accorded cognitive
ability as a construct. This distinction between constructs and the imperfect,
variously contaminated tests that are purported to measure them is a critical
recurrent theme in these de liberations . Other questions to be briefl y addressed
concern the role of cogniti ve abilities in the processes of schoo l learning and the
role of schooling in the development of cognitive abilities.

STRUCTUR ES OF KNOWLEDGE AND ABILI TY
Educational ac hievement refers to what an indi vidual kn ows and can do in a
spec ified subject area . At issue is not mere ly the amount of knowledge acc umulated but its organizatio n or structure as a functional system for productive

IT hi s chapter was presented as part of a Divisio n 15 (Educati onal Psychology) invited symposiu m on Achievement Testing at the annual meeting of the America n Psychologica l Assoc iation,
Washingto n , D.C. , August 1982 .
T his chapter is dedicated to the memory of Robert L. Ebe l. Hi s endu ring commitment to the
improvement of educational measurement as a means of improv ing education is a worthy legacy fo r
the fie ld.
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thinking , problem so lving , and creative invention in the subject area as well as
fo r further learning. T he individual 's structure of knowledge is a critical aspect
of educational achievement because it facilit ates or hinders what he or she can do
in the subject area . What a person can do in an area includes a variety of areaspecific skills, such as extracting a square root or parsing a sentence or balancing
a chemical eq uation , but also broader cognitive abilities that cut across subject
areas, such as comprehension , memory retention and retrieval, reasoning, analysis and restructuring, evaluation or judgment , and flu ency.
T hese broader cognitive ab ilities contribute to the assembly and structuring of
knowledge , to the continual reassembly and restructuring of cumulating knowl edge, to the accessing and retrieval of know ledge, and to its use in problem
representation and solution . "Thus achievement," in Snow's (1980a) words,
" is as much an organization function as it is an acquisition function. And new
achievement depends as much on transfer of such organization as it does on
transfer of specific prior facts and skill s [p o 43 ]. " Because cognitive abilities
pl aya central role in both the acqui sition and organi zation functions of educational achievement, their influence can hardly be suppressed or ignored in educational achievement testing that assesses knowledge structures. However , their
role may be reduced in low-level achievement testing that stresses amount of
in fo rmation alone. Let us next consider the nature of developed knowledge
structures in more detail and then the nature of deve loped abilities , before attempting to relate thi s formu lation to other conceptions of educational
achievement.

Knowledge Structure as Relational Understanding
A person's structure of knowl edge in a subject area includes not only declarative
knowledge about substance (or information about what) but also procedural
knowledge about methods (or information about how) and strategic knowledge
about alternatives for goal setting and planning (or information about which,
when , and possibly why). Although the acquisition of declarative and procedural
knowledge is an explic it goal of typical instruction in most subject areas, strategic knowledge is rarely so and must often be acquired by induction , if at all
(Greeno, 1980). Despite enormou s variability in the effort , the principles and
generali zations and first-order relations among concepts that provide coherent
though rudimentary structure to newly acquired knowledge are also often taught
explicitly . Possible exceptions are likely to occur at the beginning or elementary
levels of learn ing in a field , where emph asis may be placed on the accumulation
of a critica l mass of information prior to organi zing it. But the more idiosy ncratic
structures that relate newly acquired knowledge to ex istent knowledge structures
(which sometimes entail s qualitative reorgani zations) and the more complex
structures that evolve as experti se develops (which frequently entail s qualitative
reorganizations) are rare ly under instructional control.
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Knowledge structure basically refers to the structure of re lationships among
concepts. But as knowledge develops, these structures quickly go beyond classifications of concepts as well as first-order relations among concepts and classes
to include organized systems of relationships , or schemas. As organizations of
present knowledge, these schemas provide a context for the comprehension and
interpretation of objects and events; hence, they profoundly influence the acquisition of new knowledge. Schemas guide the storage and retrieval of knowledge, the generalization and interpretation of ideas, and the initiation and regulation of action (Anderson, Spiro, & Montague, 1977) . Thus, educational
achievement is not just data driven by the bottom- up processing of incom ing
information but also conceptually driven by top- down assimilation to mental
schemas or relational structures. Furthermore, as expertise develops , these schemas or relational systems themselves become organized in complex patterns ,
hierarchies, and dynamic networks. These networks are called dynam ic because
the knowledge structures of experts permit and even facilitate flexibl e reorganizations for the application of multiple perspectives to problem representation
and solution . I have more to discuss later about the implicatio ns for educational
achievement testing of the differences between novices and experts and between
beginning learners and experienced learners in a field .
In the context of school learning, the development of students' knowledge
structures may be viewed as an explicit educational objective in its own right. In
this connection, Scriven (1974) points out that knowledge structures comprise
"organized relational knowledge," which is what we ordinarily mean by understanding, and that implicit in the use of this latter term are a number of affective
educational goals bearing on the development of attitudes, values , sensitivity,
and appreciation. As Scriven (1 974) put it , "there are deep reasons from cogni tive psychology why understanding almost has to have an affective component,
reasons which emerge in the verstehen theory of the philosophy of history, in the
notion of empathy, and in concepts of modelling and role playing [p o 334]."
Furthermore, affect and personality are intrinsically implicated in knowledge
structure as a conseq uence of the individual's psychology of knowledge
(Tomkins, 1965); that is, what people know and are interested in knowing is a
function of the kinds of persons they are and especially of their ideologies .
Moreover, the degree of differentiation and hierarchic integration of the knowledge structure, the permeability of its boundaries, and the flexibility or rigidity of
its dimensions or compartments are reflective of the individual's personality and
cognitive style (Messick, 1976, in press).
This view of educational achievement stresses the assessment of developed
knowledge structure because it is both a product of earlier learning and at the
same time is instrumental to, or a vehicle for , subseq uent learning. Thus, know ledge structure is central whether the aim of achievement testing is the certification of past accomplishment, the diagnosis of present functioning, or the forecasting of future attainment. By emphas izing the role of knowledge structure as
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the representation each learner constructs of a subject area to comprehend tasks
and events, make sense of new experiences, and plan appropriate actions, this
view is inherently constructivist in character. It is consistent with a variety of
constructivi st psychologies but does not derive from anyone of them . For example , this view of learn ing and achievement is closely allied to what Bruner has
called " instrumental conceptualism" (Bruner, Olver, & Greenfield, 1966). It is
also quite congenial with Piaget's overall stance on developmental process without comm itting to his position on developmental stages; that is, learn ing and the
development of cognitive structure are seen as the active assimilation of experience to conceptual schemas , in balance with the restructuring of schemas in
accommodation to reality-based or theoretically-correct structures.

Cognitive Abilities as Process Structures
T urning now to cognitive ability as a construct, let me stress at the outset that I
am speaking of multiple abilities and not a unitary force or power , about developed abilities and not fixed abi lities or capacities (Humphreys , 1962). Indeed,
these abi lities are clearly sti ll developing well into ad ulthood (Cattell , 1971).
They may develop more slowly later in learning than earlier and more rapidly for
some individuals than others . Some may decline with advancing age, sometimes
being compensated for by increasing facility in the utilization of other abilities.
But, in general , cognitive abilities appear to respond over the long term to
education and experience throughout the school years and beyond-even such
broad intellective abilities as verbal comprehension and quantitative reasoning
that are relatively well crystall ized by adolescence (Cattell, 1971 ; Messick ,
1980, 1982b).
Nor is there any implication of innateness of these cognitive ab ilities inherent
either in the way they are measured or in the way they are theoretically conceptualized. At the level of measurement, the drawing of inferences about innate
abi lity from an individual's test performance has long been discredited. Such
in ferences drawn by early intelligence testers were based on two unsupportable
assumptions abo ut equality of motivation to learn and equality of opportunity to
learn. These early testers reasoned that by selecting skills that all individuals are
expected to develop as a matter of course in their cu lture, gross differences in
motivation to learn were avoided ; selecting ski ll s that can be mastered on the
basi s of universally available experiences within the culture avoided gross differences in opportunity to learn. Hence, performance differences on tests of
those skills, they would have it , reflect individual differences in innate ability to
learn.
The crucial flaw in this reasoning lies in the premises- ski lls that all examinees have equal motivation and opportunity to acqui re probably do not exist
(Schwarz , 1971). Efforts to satisfy these ass umptions continue, however, in the
gui se of so-called "culture-free" or "culture-fair" tests . Here, the usual ap-
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proach is to select novel tasks where the opportunity (or rather, the lack of
opportunity) for mastering them is more nearly equivalent in different cultural
settings. This may better satisfy the opportunity assumption but at the expense of
the motivation assumption, because tasks that are not emphasized in a culture
depend for their salience or stimulus value on their intrinsic interest and the
presumed importance of the testing to each examinee.
In contrast, the concept of developed abilities stresses the individual's current
level of consistent proficiency however derived. Individual differences in developed abilities frankly reflect all sources of ability differences, including individual differences in prior motivation and opportunity to learn. Nonetheless,
direct measures of the student's current functioning level, whatever its multiple
determinants, are important in their own right for a variety of educational purposes. In much instructional planning, for example, it is critical to know what the
student can do now. Some instructional strategies may differ, to be sure, depending on whether current ability levels are thought to reflect deficiencies or difficulties deriving from problems of motivation or of opportunity. In these instances,
and perhaps as a general rule, measures of developed abilities should be interpreted in the context of independent information about motivation and opportunity, the latter being conceived broadly enough to include the quality of prior
and current instruction (Heller, Holtzman, & Messick, 1982; Messick, 1983).
At the level of theory, most modern conceptions of ability development are
basically interactionist in character; that is, they accord a causal role to interaction with the environment and hence are counter to earlier traditions of fixed
intelligence and of genetically predetermined development (Hunt, 1961; Messick, 1972). Although many theorists hold that the primitive or rudimentary
processes that initially interact with the environment are innate, these processes
are not the abilities that develop out of the interaction. Even in those instances
where a basic innate ability is postulated to start the interactive process , such as
Catte ll 's (197 1) fluid intelligence, this ability itself develops as a conseq uence of
environmental interaction while it simultaneously facilitates the formation and
development of specific abilities in response to differentiated environmental
structure.
Many of these theories also stress a centra l role for positive transfer in learning and development. In the theory of ability development elaborated by Ferguson (1954, 1956), for example, abilities are viewed as learned proficiencies that
attain relative stability through overlearning. They develop through repeated
performance across similar tasks and gradually attain relative stability through
exercise, challenge, and practice. Note that the reference is to relative stability ,
not fixity- that is, proficiency has developed to that part of the learning curve
where additional effort yields small though nonzero increments. Learning that
leads to the development of a particular ability, however, is influenced by prior
learnings and previously established abilities through mechanisms of transfer.
Indeed, one should expect that the most critical variables exerting transfer effects
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on subsequent learning would be abilities- that is, those earlier acquisitions that
have attained stability in performance.
The operative transfer function in this regard relates performance on a particular task, or set of simi lar tasks, both to training on those tasks and to proficiency
levels on relevant abilities. If the learning period is sufficiently prolonged that
significant changes in the abilities accumu late as a function of training and
experience, those changes would also be taken into account. Ferguson (1954)
maintains that "as the learning of a particular task continues, the abi lity to
perform it becomes gradually differentiated from, although not necessarily independent of, other abilities which facilitate its differentiation [po 110]." Because
existing abi lities, once developed, thus serve to facilitate the differentiation of
other specific abi lities, the operation of positive transfer produces positive correlations not only among tasks but among abilities . Thus, positive transfer furnishes a simple rationale for the emergence of broader and broader higher-order
abilities organizing the primary abilities. This suggests that individuals not only
develop multiple abilities but organized ability structures as well. It also suggests
that major gains in intellectual power may not come so much from the further
honing of already well-developed specific abilities as from their organization into
more general and widely applicable assemblies of integrated ability complexes.
Furthermore, an important implication of Ferguson's (1954, 1956) line of
argument is that consistent differential exposure to various task domains leads to
differential learning and hence to the emergence of different ability patterns in
different learn ing env ironments or different cultures (Irvine, 1969; Lesser, Fifer,
& C lark, 1965; Stodolsky & Lesser, 1967). One might expect, however, that
higher-order abi lities , if they indeed reflect general transfer components underlying the mutual facilitation of several primary abiliti es, would tend to apply across
a variety of task requirements. Hence, higher-order abilities should appear more
similar from one cultural group to another than do the more specialized primary
abilities (MacArthur, 1968; Vernon, 1969).
Given different learning histories and different learning sty les, it seems likely
that- although the same basic ability processes may be involved in many different tasks- they may be strategically used more or less frequently in different
tasks by different persons. Ability processes may also be organized and deployed
in different ways for performing the same task, with attendant variation in
effectiveness. This has led some investigators , such as Simon (1976) and Snow
(l980b) , to emphasize the assembly and control funct ions of abilities and abi lity
structures.
For Gui lford as for Ferguson, transfer also plays a critical role in abi lity
development. Guilford (1967) claims that' 'the brain is apparently predesigned
to perform in five major ways [po 417]" corresponding to the five informationprocessing operations of cognition or comprehension, memory, convergent production, divergent production, and evaluation that comprise the heart of his
factorial model of the structure of intellect. Specific intellectual abilities develop
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through the repeated use of these five operations to process information in the
individual's environment, which Guilford's extensive empirical investigations
suggest is so structured as to contain 24 types of information generated by the
cross-classification of four types of content (figural, symbolic, semantic, behavioral) and six types of form or product (units , classes , relations , systems, transformations, implications).
In Gui lford 's (1967) view , these specific abilities are generali zed ski lls or
habits that develop through transfer effects occurring by virtue of similarities in
the task-to-task activities of a particular operation-content- product type. How
well any specific ability develops depends on how much and how effectively the
individual exercises the requisite operation in relation to the particular content- product combination. This in turn depends on the opportunities the person's
environment offers to operate on such combinations and the individual's needs to
cope with those offerings . Because tasks within the same operation- contentproduct category are more simi lar in shared activities than those in different
categories, a specific ability should eventually develop via transfer for every cell
of the operation by content by product cross-classification . This would yield the
120 abilities in Guilford's structure of intellect. Moreover, because simi larities in
shared activities may cut across content- product differences for a given operation such as memory or across operation- product differences for a given content
such as figura l, higher-order abilities such as general memory facility or general
figural facility may also emerge (Guilford, 1981 ; Messick , 1973).
Cattell 's ( 1971) theory of ability development is especiall y pertinent to issues
of educational achievement because he explicitly stresses not only the role of
transfer processes in development but the transfer power of developed abi lities in
task performance. Originating in the investment of innate fluid intelligence in the
learning of particular tasks or task domains, specific task ski ll s become integrated into primary abi lities that cut across simi lar or related tasks. That is ,
because of an inherent simi larity in the required activities in a particular domain ,
a unity of functioning develops--or in Cattell's (1971) words , "a coherent set of
habit ski lls, know ledge, conceptual developments, and tactical and strategic
' know how ' [p o 319]," These primary abi lities, which Cattell calls "agencies,"
become organized through the ir mutually facilitative transfer effects and shared
investments of fluid intelligence into higher-order abilities.
Catte ll (197 1) gives major emphas is to those primary ab ilities derived from
the learning of judgmental sk ill s associated with the more abstract parts of school
curricula and nonschool experiences, such as verbal ability and numerical abi lity.
In the course of education and ex perience , these judgmental skill s become organized into a broad higher-order abi lity complex, which Cattell call s crysta lli zed
inte lligence . Other higher-order abi lities include general memory , general visualization, and general retrieva l or fluency. In underscoring the increasing transfer
power of primary abilities and hi gher-order abilities, Cattell (1971) likens a
specific transferable sk ill to a " tool ," by which he means "some insightful
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device in thinking and acting which , once picked up, enables the user to handle a
whole group of further performances [p o 316]." He conceives of an agency or
primary ability as a "whole tool box of cognitively consistent habits [p o 321],"
which would make crystallized intelligence a veritable workshop of transferable
structures of ability processes. For Cattell, crystallized intelligence comprises
highly general abstractions that possess wider transfer effects than those of any of
the agencies and hence displays a broad generality of useful application.
From Cattell's (1971) description of abilities as organized complexes of transferable concepts and skills and from Guilford's (1967) formulation of abilities in
terms of information-processing operations, it seems clear that abilities in this
factor-analytic tradition may be conceptualized as process structures, to use
Carroll's (1974) term, or as stable constellations of psychological processes.
This usage is consistent with information-processing formulations in cognitive
psychology, as exemplified by Snow's (I 980b ) conception of abilities as structures of assembly and control processes as well as performance processes and by
Sternberg'S (1977) treatment of intellective abilities in terms of both structure
and process. On the one hand , Sternberg characterizes abilities as task proficiencies- specifically, as particular constellations of information-processing components that satisfy the requirements of a given task or type of task. On the other
hand, he also views abilities as dimensions of individual differences- spec ificalIy, as generalized constellations of information-processing components that form
stable patterns of individual differences across multiple tasks or types of tasks .
The critical concept bridging these two notions is that abilities are stable
consistencies within individuals (across variations in setting, time, and task) that
reliably differentiate among individuals (Messick , 1982a). The intraindividual
pattern of abilities for a particular student is the ability structure of concern in
educational achievement. This mayor may not include all the ability dimensions,
or interrelate them in the same way, as in interindividual structures of betweenperson differences. Nevertheless, research on the structure of individual differences does provide many of the dimensions and associated ability measures
for characterizing and assessing individual structures (Burt, 1949; Cattell, 1971;
Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976, 1979; Guilford , 1967; Hakstian & Cattell ,
1974) .
Moreover, because abilities in this view are constellations of informationprocessing components operative either in a particular task or stably across
multiple tasks , they in turn may serve as components or organizers of still more
complex or temporally extended sequential processes, such as problem solving
or creative production (Guilford, 1967; Messick , 1972, 1973) . Thus, functioning
much like subroutines or prior assemblies in computer terms , abilities not only
facilitate performance on specific tasks and enhance the learning of new tasks but
may also serve as operational modules in higher-order psychological processes.
Overall , then, a person's developed ability structure is conceptuali zed here as a
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multidimensional organization of stable assemblies of information-processing
components that are combined funct ionally in task performance, learning, problem solving, and creative production (Messick , 1972, 1973 , 1982a) .
In educational achievement, abilities and ability structure are engaged with
knowledge structure in the performance of subject-area tasks. Abilities and
knowledge combine in ways guided by and consistent with knowledge structure
to form patterned complexes that may differ by subject area, so that problem
solving in physics, for example, appears different from problem solving in
biology or in political sc ience. Furthermore, as expertise develops these ability- knowledge complexes may become markedly , even qualitatively, different
by area. Thus, abilities are not revealed directly in educational achievtlrnent
testing but rather are entai led in ability- knowledge combinations. Yet they do
operate in achievement conjointly with knowledge, and hence ability tests and
achievement tests will overlap considerably and correlate substantially---except
possibly, as indicated earlier, in low-level achievement testing that primarily
stresses information retrieval and first-order relations. Moreover, because the
engagement of abilities is extensive and complex in high-level achievement, it
would not be surprising to find quite high correlations at advanced achievement
levels. For example, in a Graduate Record Examinations rescaling study, when
19 advanced subject-matter tests were correlated with a combination of verbal
and quantitative abilities, six coefficients were between .71 and .81, whereas
nine were between .60 and .70 (Wallmark , 1969).
Still, cognitive ab ilities are not the same as subject-matter achievement, even
those representing generalized school-related learnings such as crystal lized intel ligence. Indeed, for many educational purposes it is important to assess them
separately . That is, a person may fail in subject-area task performance because of
inadequate knowledge (especially strategic knowledge), dysfunctional knowl edge structure , ineffective mobilization or organization of a complex of relevant
abilities, or deficiencies in anyone of these abilities. Achievement tests tap all of
these in concert and although they may often effectively separate knowledge
retrieval from knowledge use, they do not provide independent assessments of
cognitive abilities . Thus, the coordinate measurement of cognitive abilities as
well as subject-matter achievement may contribute to the comprehensive diagnosis of academic difficulties.
Cognitive abilities are independent of subject matter but they are by no means
content-free; rather, they cut across content areas. In some instances , they may
be specialized by type of content such as verbal , numerical, or figura l, but at
higher orders they represent more general functions such as memory or fluency .
The route taken to arrive at this point may have appeared to be circuitous, but it
was a deliberate attempt to forge an explicit link between concern over the role of
cognitive abilities in achievement testing and 50 years of factor-ana lytic work on
the delineation and measurement of abilities.
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Contrasting Views of Knowledge Versus Ability in
Achievement Testing
This view of educational achievement as a compound of developed ability and
knowledge structures shares some important features with other conceptions of
achievement but also entails some critical differences in substance and emphasis.
As an instance, Ebel (1969, this volume) maintains that' 'the essence of achievement is command of useful verbal knowledge [1969, p . 66]." Ebel (1974, 1982)
makes it clear that he is speaking not merely about amount of knowledge or
information but about knowledge structure-that is, abo ut the "structure of
relationships among concepts, a structure built out of information by processes of
thought [1974 , p. 3171." But he limits this structure specifically to verbal knowledge, whereas the present formulation admits any form of knowledge, whether
verbal or visuospatial or whatever. Ebel (1969, 1982) also stresses the usefulness
of the knowledge, with the implication that useful knowledge is what gets built
into the knowledge structure whereas useless knowledge is soon forgotten. In
contrast, the present formulation stresses the usefulness of the knowledge structure as a functional system in thinking. However, the critical difference between
Ebel's view and the present one is his exp licit exclusion of general cognitive
abi lities except for knowledge-dependent, area-specific ski lls such as addi ng
fractions or formulating sentences (Ebel, 1969, 1974). This is puzzling in light of
Ebel's insistence that achievement is the command of knowledge because, as
Snow (l980a) has underscored, "'command' implies organization, generalization, faci le adaptation and application of knowledge in new contexts; that is
what, I contend, general mental abilities are! [po 43]."
In contrast to Ebel' s exclusion of developed cognitive abi lities from achievement, Anastasi (1976, 1980, this volume) subsumes achievement under the
rubric of developed abilities. She refers to a continuum of tests of developed
abilities that vary in their degree of experiential spec ificity . Included along with
"culture-fair" tests, tests of verbal and nonverbal intelligence, and tests of
differentiated cognitive abilities are course-oriented achievement tests of technical skills and factual knowledge as well as broadly oriented achievement tests of
major long-term educational goals such as the interpretation of literature or the
understanding and application of scientific principles (Anastasi, 1976).
The differentiation among educational and psychological tests in terms of
experiential specificity is a helpful one, and the implication that these tests" fuse
imperceptibly" with one another is an important caveat against misuse. For
example, some tests designed to assess subject-matter achievement so stress the
application of learned skills to the solution of new problems in the area that they
appear to measure general reasoning and other cognitive ab ilities fairly independent of factual content; whereas some other tests designed to assess general
scholastic abi lity draw free ly on varieties of specific word knowledge and arithmetic principles learned in school. However, the subtle implication that because
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ex isting tests overlap markedly or are misa ligned with the ir constructs, there fore
the construct distinctions are unimportant- that " the terms intelligence, aptitudes. abilities. and achievements are indeed different words for essentially the
same human characteristics lEbel, 1980, p. II) "-{!oes not fo llow at all and is
insidious in its impact on new measurement efforts. What is needed is not a
downplaying and blurring of the construct distinctions but , rather, attempts to
illuminate these distinctions in refined measures of knowledge structures, of
cognitive abilities as process structures, and of ability- knowledge complexes in
problem representation and solution .

EXPERTISE AND APTITUDE
It should be noted that the present conception of educational achi evement is not
tied to program or course obj ectives. Educational achievment in thi s view re fers
to what a person knows and can do in a subject area, not just the degree to which
the person knows and can do what was taught. Such a narro wing of purview can
of course be imposed and for some uses of achievement tests, such as the
certification of curriculum mastery or the evaluation of program or course effectiveness, probably shou ld be imposed . Even here, however, one should not
automatically preclude the assess ment of generalization and transfer in the former instance or of potential side effects in the latter. The po int is that for other
uses of achievement tests-s uch as the diagnosis of academic strengths and
weaknesses as a basis for remediation or for adaptive instruction and the prediction of future attainment as a basi s for selection , placement , or assignment to
alternative treatments- the broader view may offer added value. Some examples
of thi s added value come from a consideration of the differences between beginning and experienced learners in a fi eld and between novices and experts.

Assessing What Is Learned, Not On ly What Is Taught
As we have seen , when students learn something spec ific, they usually also learn
something general; that is , they tend to educe general attributes from spec ific
instances and evolve general structures for representing and understanding new
spec ifics. For beginning students in a fie ld , these rudimentary knowledge structures tend to be idiosyncratic , because new information is assimi lated to the
student 's intuitions about the subj ect derived from everyday experiences . These
structures or informal theories are also frequently fragmented or overextended or
misaligned with reality . In some instances, these informal theories are simply
vague and poorly articu lated vers ions of acceptable structures, requiring the
progressive differentiation and reintegration of already ex isting ideas with new
know ledge (A usubel, 1968). In other instances, however, the student' s informal
notions may be seriously at variance with form al theories or accepted structures,
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in which case they constitute what Driver has called "alternative frameworks "
(Driver, 1981 , 1982; Driver & Easley, 1978). These alternative frameworks,
being based on student's intuitions , tend to be quite persistently embraced and
are frequently resistant to change through instruction .
A number of common alternative frameworks have been uncovered in science
education in particular. For example, some beginning biology students evince a
persistent tendency to think in Lamarckian terms (Deadman & Kelly , 1978) and
some believe, despite instruction on photosynthesis to the contrary, that plant
"food" comes exclusively from the ground (Driver, 1982). Some beginning
physics students have been found adhering to non-Newtonian ideas about motion
and to notions of impetus reminiscent of pre-Galilean dynamics (Viennot, 1979) .
It appears that intuitions are not readily abandoned and, in particular, that scientific principles that are counter-intuitive are not easily assimilated. If conceptual
learning entai ls such radical restructurings of ideas , it is not enough to assess for
diagnostic purposes whether or not the student knows what was taught--one
must also assess what else the student "knows" or believes about the subject.
A simi lar point holds for the assessment of expert- level achievement but for a
different reason : namely , much of what is learned in the development of expertise, we do not know how to teach . However, from a convergence of recent
studies we have begun to characterize, albeit tentatively , some of the complexities of developed knowledge and ability structures that constitute the power of
expertise (Chi, Feltovitch , & Glaser, 1981; Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979;
Glaser, 1981; Hunter, 1982; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980a,
1980b; Rigney, 1980; Simon, 1976). Hence , we may be able to approach the
assessment of expertise in terms of these outcomes of learning and development,
which are beginning to become clear, rather than in terms of the objectives of
teaching, which in the case of expert ise continue to be vague and ill-defined.
It appears from this recent work that not only do experts know more than
novices or have a vastly richer store of relevant knowledge in long-term memory,
they also structure and continually restructure knowledge in more complex ways.
In particular, experts construct comp lex schemas that comb ine some of the
dimensions and simpler schemas used by novices into integrated funct ional patterns, while at the same time discarding as redundant or irrelevant some other
dimensions that novices attend to. Experts also develop new patterns of perceiving, thinking, and acting or what Ian Hunter (\ 982) calls "adroitly usable patterned complexes." These complex abilities to perceive and apply both patterned
relational schemas and the attendant action sequences strongly influence the
nature of problem representations, the avoidance of irrelevancies, and the organization of performance and solution processes . Experts also develop greater speed
and fluency of performance, implying in addition to the restructuring already
mentioned a continual tuning of processes, the automatization of routines and
control processes, and the shedding of redundant processes (Rumelhart & Norman, 1976) . Furthermore, in contrast to novices , experts appear more capable of
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flexible restructuring for the application of multiple perspectives to problem
representation and solution as well as for the adjustment or replacement of
dysfunctional initial schemas as hypotheses change.
In addition to providing possible guidelines for the assessment of expertise,
these findings suggest that not only do abilities facilitate the development of
more complex abilities but so do rich and extensive knowledge structures. Thus,
developed abilities influence the structuring and restructuring of knowledge
whereas developed knowledge structures influence the organization and application of abilities, leading to increasingly more complex structures of each. Although the "adroitly usable patterned complexes" of ability developed by experts are inherently knowledge-dependent, some of their structural and
functional aspects may be generalizable to the learning of other fields. For
example, when an expert in one field attempts to learn a different subject matter,
he or she may be more able than the ordinary novice to discern the deep structure
of the new field, to ignore irrelevancies, and to perceive the patterned relationships entailed in constructing complex schemas, even though a massive store of
knowledge in the fi eld has not yet been acquired. If this is possible, then what we
should mean by a generalist is not a jack-of-all trades and a master of none , but a
jack-of-all-trades and a master of one or, preferably, two. Thus, expertise in one
field may be aptitude for the functional mastery of another.

Aptitudes as Facilitators and Forecasters of
Performance
This brings us to the construct of aptitude which , according to Snow (I 980a) ,
refers to " psychological characteristics that predispose and thus predict differences in later learning under specified instructional conditions [p o 4 1] ."
Again , at the outset I want to make clear that there is no necessary implication of
innateness in this use of the term. This conception comprises two distinct but
closely related notions of aptitude- namely , aptitude as a forecaster of learning
or performance and aptitude as a facilitator of learning or performance (Cronbach
& Snow, 1977) . Although the applied emphasis may be on predictiveness per se,
the scientific emphas is-in such psychoeducational research as the study of
aptitude-treatment interactions-is mainly on illuminating the facilitating processes that underlie the prediction (Snow, 1980a). This may lead not only to
better prediction but to better and more responsible use of the predictive findings .
A compatible conception of aptitude as learning rate is also current (Carroll,
1963; Green, 1974), but again the primary concern is with the process structures
that underlie differences in rate (Carroll, 1974) .
Considerable confusion arises when aptitUde tests as predictors are contrasted
with achievement tests as measures. because achievement in a subject-matter
area happens frequently to be quite predictive of subsequent performance in the
same field. Subject-matter achievement is also often predictive of performance in
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related fi elds, although somewh at less so , whereas measures of general ability
complexes such as tests of schol astic ability or of crystalli zed intelligence tend to
be more widely predictive ac ross disparate fi elds. Furthermore, the distinction
between developed abilities and developed knowledge structures cuts across this
aptitude-achievement contras t, as does Anastasi's (1 976) continuum of experienti al specificity and Snow 's (l 980a) pyramid of referent generality . The latter,
consistent with the present formul ation , illustrates why ability and achi evement
constructs are more readily di stingui shable both conceptu ally and empirically at
more spec ific than more general levels.
Aptitudes may be spec ific or general and so may achievements, developed
abilities, or knowledge structures. Developed abilities and knowledge structures,
being evo lved through education and experience, are both achievements, to be
sure . Yet they are also predictive of subsequent learning and performance, more
broadly in the case of abilities and in more focused fashion in the case of
knowledge structures, thereby qualifying as aptitudes as well. But the predictive
developed ability is not the same as the subsequent performance, nor is it a
measure of that performance . Similarly , current achievement that predicts future
achievement is not a measure o f that later achievement.
T his confusion between prediction and measurement has led some investigators to argue that aptitudes, abilities, and achievements are " essentially the same
human characteri stics [Ebel, 1980 , p. II) " and that aptitude, ability , and
achievement tests are " fundamentall y simil ar" in what they measure (Anastas i,
1980) . The point may be we ll taken in regard to many existing tests. But as
Carroll (1 974) has pointed out , " with a definition of aptitude that identifies it
with the present state of the individual as symptomatic of future performance, it
is difficult to see why there should be any great difficulty in distinguishing
between aptitude and achievement as concepts [p o 287) ." Similarly , in spite of
high corre lations between tests of education al achievement and tests of developed cognitive abilities but in li ght of their differenti al responsiveness to direct
in struction , their differential involvement in aptitude-treatment interactions, their
different courses of development , and differences in their process and content
components, it is difficult to see why there should be any great problem in
di stingui shing between educational achievement and cognitive abilities as
constructs.

TH E FAILINGS OF FALLACIE S
We have been alerted to the jingle fallacy , whereby tests purported to measure
the same construct are naively taken to measure the same thing, and , to the
jangle fall acy , whereby tests purported to measure diffe rent constructs are naive ly taken to meas ure different things (Kelley , 1927) . We now find that if tests
purported to measure different constructs correlate highly with each other, the
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constructs are taken to be the same thing . This might be called the jingle- jangle
fallacy , because convergent correlational evidence , which would support jingles ,
is taken as tantamount to the absence of discriminant experimental evidence,
which would support jangles . However, I prefer to call it the jungle fallacy
because , by failing to maintain the distinction between constructs and their
indicants or measures, we are in danger of reverting to the jungle of operation ism
whereby test meaning resides in each investigator's measurement operations
rather than in validated relational or nomological networks.
What is needed now is what has always been needed- namely , not just the
empirical buttressing of constructs inferred from existing measures but the development and validation of measures attuned to constructs, especially as constructs
evolve or change with conceptualizations of new evidence. In educational theory
and practice today, we must recogn ize, to use Glaser's (1980) words , that "the
study of learning appears to be taking on the characteristics of a developmental
psychology of performance changes- the study of changes that occur as different
knowledge structures and complex cognitive strategies are acquired, and the
study of conditions that affect these transitions in competence [po 322]." Accordingly , in educational measurement today, we must recognize, to use Snow's
(l980a) words, that " achievement constructs refer to complex dynamic cognitive structures [p o 44] ." Hence, to better serve both theory and practice, new
approaches to achievement measurement shou ld be more complex, dynamic , and
cognitive .
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